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SUMMARY 
 
I explore the sensuous, kinaesthetic experience and analysis of screen dance and the 
interconnectivity between our bodies, film, and heightened embodied sensibility. This 
physicality creates a dialogue between the rich diversity of screen dance genres under 
consideration, thereby avoiding hierarchical classifications. It also focuses attention on 
more abstract cinematic qualities, investigating how cinematic technique (as well as 
thematic content) generates emotional impact; allowing for the enjoyment of film as a 
material and sensual medium. 
However, since our senses have been trained according to the regulatory controls within 
our socio-historical/cultural contexts, equal attention is given to the ideology of 
representation, and to the links between embodiment, identities, meanings, and broader 
relations of inequality. I am particularly interested in how dance and film can function 
politically, both expressing and disrupting norms and ideologies. But I am also 
interested in how the presence of dance (and/or choreographed movement) can enhance 
a film’s agency and its ability to cross time and space, “touching” the viewer and 
thereby working to transform historical objectification into embodied interaction. 
 
I combine a phenomenological lived-body experience of viewing with the 
epistemological functions that characterise it, using my own somatically felt body as a 
methodological starting point and a creative practice, and theoretical text-based and 
socio-historical contextual analyses. This balance between lived-experience and critical 
discussion is used to explore chapters on the deconstruction of national, cultural, and 
gendered identity through Flamenco dance and film; dance and physical disability; and 
avant-garde feminist screendance. A final chapter brings these key themes together by 
investigating how (psychiatric) disability, feminism, and national identity are treated in 
a contemporary Hollywood dance film. 
 
Whilst embodied perception is never “innocent” and always shaped, I show how the 
movement of affect and emotion between the film and viewer’s body can constitute an 
ethical experience, encouraging progressive and self-reflexive political and ideological 
engagement.  
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Introduction 
Affective experiences: emotional and physical encounters with film and television 
I have numerous and vivid childhood memories of my mum’s perplexed expression and 
anxious assertion that “it is only a film Frances”, after witnessing my complete and utter 
emotional absorption in my favourite film of the moment, often wholeheartedly sobbing 
and/or deeply affected in some way and for quite some time after the viewing event. 
Whilst many different genres could (and still can) elicit this type of response in me, it is 
the magical combination of dance on screen that has quite literally been able to move 
me in more ways than one. Indeed, I can still remember the heightened level of 
excitement my sister and I would feel as the theme tune to the American TV spin-off, 
Fame (1982-87) would begin, religiously dressed for the occasion each week in our red 
and gold glittery Fame jumpers, matching ra ra skirts and stripy leg warmers, we would 
be perched on the arm of the sofa ready to leap off into the air with arms and legs spread 
wide open in a star shape as we and Erica Gimpel (who played Coco Hernandez) belted 
out the lyric…”Fame, I’m gonna live forever” for the first time in the chorus. The 
numerous dance scenes that would follow in any given episode never failed to get us up 
on the (living room) floor, as we imagined we were two of the kids from Fame, 
emotionally invested in the characters and their narrative development, as well as being 
literally moved by the sight of them dancing and singing. And for the duration of the 
programme (or film), I felt a powerful sense of freedom through my dancing body as I 
was in command of time and space, transported “out” of the confines of my family 
home and into my own creative world of expansive imagination. 
 
This film and television-produced emotion felt (and continues to feel) real as opposed to 
“as if real”, engaged as I am in a kind of physical, emotional, and deeply loyal 
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relationship with these much loved “texts.” So despite a dominant critical opinion that 
this popular narrative dance genre is of “low” cultural worth, my enduring emotional 
attachment is grounded in my direct bodily experience, as thought, for me, 
(momentarily) surrenders its centrality in relation to the affective dimension of 
screendance.1 It is, then, the physicality of this genre, combined with my own love of 
dance that induces this visceral response, and at thirty-eight years old, I am not ashamed 
to admit that I still feel the same bodily sense of joy and elation every time I hear the 
first bars of the theme tune to Fame, or watch my favourite character, Leroy (Gene 
Anthony Ray) dance.  
 
This thesis is therefore driven by my interest in this kind of immediate and imaginative 
lived-body experience of film, since viewing is a creative process that can be as much a 
material as it is a psychical experience. For whilst screendance can be “read” like a text, 
it is, for me, first and foremost “felt” with my entire body involved, addressed, 
conceptualised and (re)formed in relation to what I am watching/feeling. Film induced 
emotions undoubtedly rely on cognitive evaluations, but their strength and meaning also 
rely on this kind of embodied participation and response, a crucial element of a film’s 
evaluation, interpretation, and expression of meaning. And so my aim is to explore the 
role of embodiment in meaning making through the sensuous, kinaesthetic experience 
and analysis of screendance and the interconnectivity between bodies, film, and 
heightened embodied sensibility. However, because we do not all participate bodily or 
are necessarily able or want to engage materially with other objects in the same way, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is not only popular Hollywood dance narratives that elicit this kind of experience and response in me, 
these are simply the films, along with the Golden era of Hollywood song and dance with the likes of Fred 
and Ginger, that first inspired my interest in the synthesis between dance and film. I will therefore engage 
with films from across the spectrum of this multi-faceted genre, including avant-garde screendance, 
choreography that has been created for the camera, and adaptations of existing dance performances for 
the screen. 
 
	   3	  
shall use my own somatically felt body as a methodological starting point and a creative 
practice. This will help avoid making totalising claims about what are subjective (albeit, 
always situated) experiences. Furthermore, this focus on physicality will create a 
dialogue between the rich diversity of screen dance genres under consideration, thereby 
avoiding hierarchical classifications between them. It also focuses attention on more 
abstract cinematic qualities, investigating how cinematic technique (as well as thematic 
content) generates emotional impact; allowing for the enjoyment of film as a material 
and sensual medium into which we can invest so much of ourselves. This will aid an 
understanding of how film works ontologically, and not merely as a form of 
representation and signification. And as this material connection between film and 
viewer collapses binary divisions between object and subject, mind and body, it can 
further account for the emotional significance and power of films, how they are able to 
touch and become so much a part of us, and how we can forget ourselves in the duration 
of the viewing experience even as we know that what we are watching is “only” a 
fiction. As Stanley Cavell so eloquently puts it:  
We involve movies in us. They become further fragments of what happens 
to me, further cards in the shuffle of my memory, with no telling what 
place in the future. Like childhood memories whose treasure no one else 
appreciates, whose content is nothing compared with their unspeakable 
importance for me.                                                                      (1979: 154)  
 
The social and political conditions of embodiment 
However, this kind of phenomenological experience of film cannot be taken for granted 
nor considered autonomous. Embodied perception is never “innocent” and always 
shaped, and precisely because our senses have been trained according to the regulatory 
controls within our socio-historical/cultural contexts, I shall be giving equal attention to 
the ideology of representation, and to the links between embodiment, identities, 
meanings, and broader relations of inequality. Even as I explore how the movement of 
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affect and emotion between the film and viewer’s body can constitute an ethical 
experience, encouraging progressive and self-reflexive political and ideological 
engagement, I am equally aware that this reflexivity is socially mediated and 
constituted. I am thus simultaneously both inside and outside of my embodied 
experience and so cannot, as Judith Butler writes, ‘be who I am without drawing upon 
the sociality of norms that precede and exceed me’ (2004: 32).  
 
I will therefore combine a phenomenological lived-body experience of viewing with the 
epistemological functions that characterise it, incorporating theoretical text-based and 
socio-political historical contextual analyses. This balance between lived-experience 
and critical distance/discussion not only reflects the sense of being both inside and 
outside of my body/experience, but it also demonstrates how textuality and 
embodiment, or semiotic and phenomenological categories of knowledge do not have to 
oppose each other. Instead, and as Thomas J Csordas suggests, I shall be using them as 
‘corresponding methodological fields’ and ‘dialectical partners’ (1994: 12). This 
balance between approaches also explains the movement throughout this thesis between 
third and first person writing perspectives. Since I am interested in a more holistic 
approach to film and to “knowing,” my use of the first person effectively renders my 
investment in these dance films more immediate and embodied. And this interest in the 
embodied self (that responds in different ways to the pleasures of the text), locates my 
work within a critical tradition of feminist/other scholarship that acknowledges the self. 
Examples include (but are not limited to) Audre Lorde, who, through writing about the 
ways in which her own lived experience of race, class, age and health (as well as 
gender) played a role in shaping her lived experience, challenged the essentialism in 
feminist political theory by showing how impossible it is to theorise about women’s 
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lives by considering only one part of their complex and multidimensional identity (i.e., 
gender). Although she does not recount her personal story in Unbearable Weight: 
Feminism, Western Culture and the Body, Susan Bordo acknowledges how this critique 
of the cultural production of eating disorders ‘is deeply informed by my experiences as 
a woman who has herself struggled with weight and body-image issues all her life’ 
(1993: 35). Moreover, whilst she interrogates the normalising cultural practices that 
produce anorexia and bulimia, she simultaneously resists the (disembodied) notion ‘that 
the body is a tabula rasa, awaiting inscription by culture. When bodies are made into 
mere products of social discourse, they remain bodies in name only’ (ibid, original 
emphasis). Thus I have been greatly aided by her form of embodied postmodernism, 
which incorporates cultural inscription, multiplicity, historical location, and a constant 
acknowledgement of the self. Richard Dyer’s work is also a continuous source of 
inspiration, since he often considers his own relationship to the topic at hand ‘in order to 
situate what follows in the particularity of the person who is writing it’ (Dyer 1997: 
xiv). 
 
These multiple devices and discourses will be used to explore how dance and film 
function politically, both expressing and disrupting norms and ideologies in chapters on 
the deconstruction of national, cultural, and gendered identity through Flamenco dance 
and film; dance and physical disability; and avant-garde feminist screendance. A final 
chapter will bring these key themes together by investigating how (psychiatric) 
disability, feminism, and national identity are treated in a contemporary popular 
Hollywood dance film. But first I will begin by contextualising how and why I turned 
towards a more sensuous approach to film, daring to use my own embodied lived 
experience as a tool to aid scholarly investigation. 
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Contextualisation: from textual dominance to feminist phenomenology  
Because of its politicised approach to questions of cinema and affect, feminist film 
theory (as well as queer theory) has been particularly influential upon my approach to 
film. Relating spectators’ deepest desires and pleasures to ideological concerns has 
aided and developed an understanding of, and political resistance to classical narrative 
cinema as a phallocentric, heteronormative, white dominated and racist structure. 
Psychoanalytic methodologies derived from Jacques Lacan and Sigmund Freud were 
first used in the 1970s/1980s to explain the gendered structures of the cinematic 
apparatus, and to affirm the power of the text. As Laura Mulvey establishes in her 
seminal essay Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, the pleasures of the voyeuristic-
scopophilic male gaze are made possible through the construction of the female 
spectator as ‘the male other, bound by a symbolic order in which man can live out his 
fantasies and obsessions through linguistic command by imposing them on the silent 
image of woman still tied to her place as bearer, not maker, of meaning’ (1975: 59).2 
Since these patriarchal underpinnings structure, and thereby exploit female spectators’ 
unconscious desires, dominant ideologies are reproduced and inscribed through textual 
representation and identification, leaving only two viewing positions available for her. 
Either she ‘temporarily accepts “masculinisation”’ (Mulvey 1981: 129), by identifying 
with (and perpetuating) the dominant visual and narrative economy of voyeurism and 
fetishism, or she narcissistically and masochistically over-identifies with the objectified 
female, an ‘illusion cut to the measure of [male] desire’ (op cit. 1975: 68).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
2 Ed Guerrero equates the cinematic gaze with white power, extending Mulvey’s work by revealing how 
‘dominant cinema constructs and positions the black image for “the look” of the norm, for the visual and 
narrative pleasure of the white spectator-consumer’ (1993: 125). 
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Therefore, actual ‘”women as women”’ (Gledhill 1984: 18) in film, as well as a female 
viewing subject, and particularly a lesbian/queer female viewing subject who might 
complicate the ‘rigid distinction between either desire or identification, so characteristic 
of psychoanalytic film theory’ (Stacey 1988: 129), are all absent. And considering that 
the woman-to-be-looked at in classical Hollywood cinema was always (and largely still 
is) white, then black women are doubly absent both from the screen and from 
spectatorial subjectivity. Indeed, in its failure to acknowledge that identification is not 
only masochistic for the black female spectator, but also a negation of her very 
existence, this early form of feminist film theory (developed predominantly by white 
feminists) did not adequately respond to, or even recognise the exigencies and 
specificities of black lives.3 It thereby ignored the potential for what bell hooks has 
termed, a resisting ‘oppositional gaze,’ by which ‘[b]lack female spectators, who 
refused to identify with white womanhood, who would not take on the phallocentric 
gaze of desire and possession, created a critical space where the binary opposition 
Mulvey posits of “woman as image, man as bearer of the look” was continually 
deconstructed’ (1992: 122-123). 
 
But despite the undeniably limited and exclusionary nature of this psychoanalytic 
framework for female spectatorship, Mulvey’s original yet problematic aim to ‘get us 
nearer to the roots of our oppression … [and] begin to make a break by examining 
patriarchy with the tools it provides’ (1975: 59), did help lay the foundations upon 
which an ever-reflexive feminist film theory, or perhaps more accurately, a reflexive 
feminist subject position, would develop, and a more inclusively fluid queer theory 
would be built. Mulvey’s answer at the time was to encourage our ‘passionate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Given the fact that black men as well as women have long been punished for looking, black feminist 
film criticism has been less concerned with gender due to this shared oppression under a ‘racial 
patriarchy’ (Gaines 2000: 720). 
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detachment’ (69) by radically destroying traditional film form in favour of an avant-
garde filmmaking practice. But this led to a debate amongst feminist film theorists, and 
instead of rejecting and destroying dominant modes of representation, many (including 
Mulvey: 1981) sought to acknowledge and respond to the limitations and dangers of 
this dichotomous and universalising textual determinism, in which white female 
subjectivity is only ever the negative to its gendered binary, and viewing pleasure is 
only equated with/reduced to ideological indoctrination.4 For example, Linda 
Williams’s more sociologically-inspired approach to female spectatorship and the 
maternal melodrama attempts to address this lack of complexity, by ‘identifying what 
pleasure there is for women spectators within the classical narrative cinema, … [and] 
developing new representational strategies that will more fully speak to women 
audiences’ (1985: 483).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Although Mulvey’s Afterthoughts on ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ responds to the 
‘persistent question “what about the women in the audience?”’ (1981: 122), it still works within 
psychoanalytic paradigms. So whilst she may reject passivity, the female spectator is ‘unable to achieve a 
stable sexual identity, torn between the deep blue sea of passive femininity and the devil of regressive 
masculinity’ (123). However, lesbian/queer identities do not necessarily fit within these rigid binaries of 
masculine/feminine, and a female spectator who might not be feminine, passive, nor regressive is not 
necessarily ‘restless in [her] transvestite clothes’ (129), but just androgynous, dykey, or butch and happy 
to be that way. Indeed, queer theory developed in order to appropriate subversive sex and gender 
performance as a challenge to these ontological categories, and female masculinity, whether in 
appearance or “behaviour”, does not necessarily signal a “regressive” fantasy of becoming a man. It is 
here that the use of psychoanalysis, oppressing and fixing certain identities within rigid binary positions 
that do not reflect any sense of fluidity, can appear outmoded. However, it is still a useful and important 
tool in aiding an interpretation of the text, and for understanding the power in the history and 
pathologising of LGBTQ representation. Furthermore, implementing and inverting what is in essence a 
troubling psychoanalytic perspective can help transform reactionary texts into progressive texts. Indeed, 
as Paul Burston and Colin Richardson argue, ‘Freudianism is open to a wide range of interpretations, not 
all of them inimical to lesbians and gay men and some positively brimming with potential’ (1995: 2). 
This is why both the theory and politics of the “past” should not be forgotten or negated, since 
epistemological movements and trends can (or should) peacefully co-exist and nourish each other, seeing 
as everything seems to be a reaction to what came before. Therefore, I am in complete agreement with 
Victoria Hesford when she writes that feminism will always be haunted by its past, ‘complicating any 
simplistic commitment to political “progress” or evolvement’ (2005: 232). This provides a convincing 
rationale for why I consider it important to include this theoretical contextualisation/development in my 
introduction, since this project is built upon all of this feminist and queer work that has come before and 
made it possible. 
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Inspired by Stuart Hall’s (1980) trail-blazing work on encoding/decoding, these 
developing representational and analytical strategies would therefore assert the agency 
of the female spectator.5 Accustomed as she is to more radical opposition as well as 
imaginative and dialectic cross-identifications due to her marginalised status, 
particularly (but not necessarily) if she is a person of colour or queer, whilst never 
losing sight of the dominant structures that construct and (attempt to) contain her. This 
kind of critical resistance involves locating moments of fissure, incoherence, and 
contradiction that enable a (patriarchal) text to be read as subversive, offering the space 
in which a plurality of feminist politics and female desire may be located. This is 
basically the same recuperative tool as queer’s theory’s method of reading against the 
grain, which, as Cherry Smyth acknowledges, ‘began as a wish for inclusion by 
marginalised, underrepresented people and ended up as a strategy essential for our 
survival’ (1995: 123). 
 
A burgeoning interest in the complexities of female, as well as other marginalised 
groups’ experiences with cinema and television, led to a body of politically motivated 
feminist and qualitative research into audiences. Ien Ang’s (1985) study of how a 
(Dutch) female audience experiences pleasure in the U.S soap opera, Dallas, is read 
against the potentially damaging ideological power of such a popular and dominant text. 
Similarly, Jacqueline Bobo’s (1988) reclamation and validation of the pleasures that the 
black female audience of her study found in the 1985 film, The Color Purple, offers an 
alternative to the overwhelmingly negative critical response to the film at the time of its 
release. Valerie Walkerdine’s (1986) analysis of a working class family’s viewing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Stuart Hall’s encoding and decoding model argues that meaning is not fixed in the text, but resides in 
the negotiation between the reader and the polysemic text, producing a range of dominant, negotiated, or 
oppositional readings. Whilst this does recognise the power of both institutions and texts, it has been 
criticised for not acknowledging that texts, as well as audiences, may themselves be complex and 
contradictory. 
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pleasure in the film Rocky II (1979), and Jackie Stacey’s (1994) study of female fans of 
Hollywood stars, both attempt to explore the links between psychoanalytic theory and 
empirical work on audiences, as well as being reflexive about the politics and ethics of 
their research. Inspired by this trajectory in feminist film theory and cultural studies, 
and having enjoyed writing many essays that read deliciously queer subtexts into films, 
I culminated my MA in Film Studies with a multi-disciplinary dissertation investigating 
the complexities of lesbian representation, desire, and identification within popular 
Hollywood cinema.  
 
Combining analyses of audience, text, and context, I scrutinised and challenged the 
dominance of theoretical text-based constructions and definitions of the lesbian 
spectator, but not to simply replace textual determinism with a celebration of 
autonomous audience activity, which would be equally monolithic, but to explore queer 
complexity and contradiction by opening out the study to these different approaches. So 
instead of stating my allegiance and loyalty to either feminist film theory and its typical 
reliance on psychoanalytic paradigms, queer theory, a cultural historical approach, or 
audience research, I explored the insights and possibilities that these critical approaches 
offer in their own right as well as in dialogue with each other, investigating points of 
ambiguity, intersection, and/or contradiction, whilst acknowledging that neither of them 
can ever offer any “truths” of a lesbian audience, or of meaning and interpretation, since 
a lesbian (or indeed, any) audience is not a homogeneous mass and meaning and 
identification will always be multiple and shifting. This integrative structure avoided 
privileging one discourse over another, or of conveniently fitting the audience study into 
a structure defined by textual readings, by creating a dynamic and dialectical 
relationship between the chosen texts, their contexts, and the viewers.  
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However, whilst the ethnographic aspect of this study helped to avoid the narrowness of 
theoretical abstraction, I became acutely aware of the methodological limitations of 
questionnaires, which have been both designed and interpreted. Indeed, although I don’t 
agree, critics might argue that audience research is nothing more than displaced textual 
analysis, in which words, rather than images, are interpreted and “fixed” by the 
researcher.6 More significantly, I found myself increasingly interested in the creativity 
and complexity of individual encounters with films, and how they are framed by more 
phenomenological questions. Even as I knew that my interest in (and the importance of) 
locating the material body in relation to its socio-political context, and addressing 
questions about sexual identity, gender, race and class etc., would continue to inform 
my research, I started to question whether the bodily and emotional aspects of viewing, 
so pertinent to me, were being permanently deferred and immobilised behind the 
imposition of discourse. Whilst a Foucauldian-inspired approach to the discursive body 
has undoubtedly aided a feminist deconstruction of sex and gender norms, revealing the 
power of ever-changing disciplinary systems to produce “normalised” embodiment 
from the outside, it does not consider how the body itself might react back and influence 
discourse. In this sense, the body is only ever epistemological and never a material, 
physical, and biological object that can itself be a focus of investigation and a location 
of experience and meaning. As such, Vivian Sobchack writes that ‘scholarly interest has 
been focused less on the capacity of films to physically arouse us to meaning than on 
what such sensory cinematic appeal reveals about the rise and fall of classical narrative, 
or the contemporary transmedia structure of the entertainment industry, or the desires of 
our culture for the distractions of immediate sensory immersion in an age of pervasive 
mediation’ (2004: 57). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 However, I believe that this can be challenged through careful reflexivity and, where possible, by 
privileging respondents’ words over the researcher’s interpretations. 
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So at the same time as fully understanding women’s troubled history with the body and 
reductionism, I do not think that writing about the immediacy of this lived body 
experience and interaction (which thereby reduces the distance between cinema, 
perception and the body) is either essentialist or biologically deterministic. Indeed, I am 
in complete agreement with Chris Shilling when he argues that we can ‘conceptualize 
the body as a simultaneously biological and social phenomenon that is both shaped by 
but irreducible to contemporary social relations and structures’ (2003: 182). What 
becomes clear, then, as I review the film theories that have influenced and informed my 
academic development so far, is that I have always been most intrigued by the 
relationship between film and its audience, and have moved progressively from exterior 
to interior relationships. If my MA dissertation was about deconstructing the “self” and 
then putting the fragments back together, aware that these fragments do not form a 
“whole” but are instead a fiction (a fiction we are, nonetheless, forced into believing 
and living in order to function and/or to be visible), then the sensuous turn towards my 
bodily experience is not about “transcending” or denying this fragmented nature of 
identity, but about exploring how it may be addressed and how it may respond 
holistically.  
 
A sensuous turn 
Momentarily moving away from the (secondary) concepts that are always constructed 
after a lived experience, what about the potential for colour, sound, rhythmic current, 
movement, texture, pace and the force of a film’s body in motion to affect embodiment, 
challenging and subverting the very social, cultural, and political discourses that attempt 
to shape and fix viewers into “ideal” form? And thus how film can offer pleasurable and 
desirous experiences and extensions that are both inside and outside frameworks of 
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image, narrative and representation. Yvonne Tasker makes reference to this in her 
investigation into the complexities and multiple pleasures of action cinema, another 
popular yet critically devalued genre:  
Whilst valuable work has been undertaken on, for example, cinema-going 
as a social practice, the cinema as a sensuous experience is too often 
neglected. Features such as the breathtaking nature of visual spectacle, or 
the feelings of exhilaration at the expansive landscapes in which the hero 
operates, are fundamental to action cinema.              (1993: 6, my emphasis) 
 
Furthermore, if I respect the kind of feminism that asks questions about the individual, 
and values the personal voice, then why had I internalised such a distrust of my own 
emotional involvement in and response to film/aesthetics? Of course, to continue on 
from Tasker’s words above, ‘[s]uch features are also, inevitably, rather difficult to 
render in academic prose’ (ibid), and so, as Gaylyn Studlar observes, ‘[f]eminists cannot 
help but be wary that such a leap might, in fact, be a hurling of self into a yawning 
theoretical abyss’ (1990: 77). Concerned, then, about seeing my mum’s anxiety 
reflected in the academic appraisal of my work, and of writing merely descriptive 
accounts of my embodied experiences with screendance, it wasn’t until I came across 
branches of film philosophy that I discovered, to borrow Andrew Dudley’s words, that I 
could ‘restrain the naïve romanticism and exuberance of phenomenological criticism 
while retaining its goal of going beyond the text by means of fructifying experience of 
the text’ (1985: 630). Therefore, in putting my “self” into this thesis, I am attempting to 
bring together two sides of my viewing experience, combining the pleasure that comes 
from identifying and interpreting signs with the immediacy of a sensory and then 
reflexive experience of and engagement with my chosen films. In so doing, I hope to do 
justice to the complexities of the viewing experience, avoid the dangers of interpreting 
other peoples’ words, and more significantly, engage in a feminist practice that focuses 
on the subjective lived experience of my own body. Since society perpetually objectifies 
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the female body, specifying what “normative” embodiment ought to be, this can be seen 
as an alternative and more affirmative account of female corporeality. I am thus in 
complete agreement with Studlar when she writes that a phenomenology of feminist 
film theory: 
may help reconceptualize women’s experience with film in such a way as 
to permit the unification of theory, social experience, and creative film 
practice. A descriptive method that illuminates both the structures of 
textual operation and the quality (dare we say, depth) of filmic experience 
can contribute to the formulation of alternative, non-sexist modes of 
expression and must do so if feminist film theory is to fulfil its promise as 
political praxis.                                                                 (Studlar 1990: 76) 
 
Critical summary: film as an embodied epistemology 
Important work that addresses the sensuality of the cinematic experience, and has thus 
informed this thesis, includes Richard Dyer’s article on ‘Entertainment and Utopia.’ 
This examines non-representational signs in the Musical, and how judgements based on 
‘taken-for-granted’ terms such as ‘escape’ and ‘wish-fulfilment,’ are generally made to 
either dismiss a genre or to resist studying it seriously (1985: 222). He argues that 
whilst the utopian qualities of this popular genre do not offer any practical or political 
solutions to the problems and realities of everyday life, it both responds to and mediates 
socially generated needs through ‘the feelings it embodies… [P]resent[ing], head-on as 
it were, what utopia would feel like rather than how it would be organised. It thus works 
at the level of sensibility’ (ibid, my emphasis). Yet in responding only to certain needs 
arising from specific societal inadequacies, it ultimately delegitimises others by 
ignoring them, and particularly ‘class, patriarchal and sexual struggles’ (228). As a 
consequence, and despite popular entertainment always being complex and 
contradictory, it largely operates in the service of the dominant socioeconomic order: 
consumer capitalism. Similarly, in her article on ‘Dance Narratives and Fantasies of 
Achievement,’ Angela McRobbie acknowledges how ‘[a]rt is always an emotional 
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space’ (1997: 227), and how visions of a dancing utopia specifically provide young girls 
and women with ‘symbolic escape route[s] from … more normative expectations’ 
(217). The generic importance of physical movement particular to dance narratives (and 
musicals), thereby allow women a certain degree of freedom. At the same time, 
however, romantic storylines and fetishistic camerawork act as strategies of 
containment, refusing simplistic readings of this popular and derided form as either 
subversive or disempowering. Interested in these patterns of marginalisation and 
assimilation, McRobbie explores how dance might be considered as ‘other’, non-white, 
working class etc., and so in need of domesticating and taming, but equally how it 
might be aligned with dominant identities. Both of these articles, then, address the ways 
in which kinaesthetic appeal is set against visual and narrative representational signs, 
but they ultimately give more focus to the underlying workings of ideology than to the 
meanings that come from a direct embodied experience of and response to cinema. In 
other words, whilst they question ocularcentric paradigms, the object of analysis is still 
restricted to the film/context itself and not to the entire process of representation, which 
would encompass the viewer and her/his process of embodied interpretation.  
 
Tom Gunning (1986, 1989) and Miriam Hansen (1993, 1999) have both stressed the 
sensual and immersive qualities of contemporary film by drawing upon Siegfried 
Kracauer and Walter Benjamin’s early work on cinema as a modernist medium.7 Instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Early film theorists, such as Sergei Eisenstein, Siegfried Kracauer, and Walter Benjamin, all addressed 
the sensuous qualities of cinema, and how it teaches us through the body. Eisenstein considered film to 
be a profoundly expressive medium that appeals as much to the senses as it does to the emotions and the 
intellect. Writing about the effects of montage, he refers to its ‘strength of physical palpability’ (1942: 
32), and Jane Gaines writes that in ‘Eisenstein’s theory of social change and cinema, the bodily senses 
lead the spectator, whose involvement is not strictly intellectual’ (1999: 88, original emphasis). Later, 
Kracauer contends that cinema ‘communicates less as a whole with consciousness than in a fragmentary 
manner with the corporeal material layers’ (Kracauer quoted in Hansen 1993: 462). And in Benjamin’s 
famous ‘The Work of Art In The Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, he talks about the ‘physical shock 
effect’ of film, ‘which is … primarily tactile, being based on changes of place and focus which 
periodically assail the spectator’ (1999: 748). This physical contact can ‘bring things “closer” spatially 
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of drawing the spectator in through narrative action or empathetic identification with 
characters, early cinema worked to “show” something to its audience, interacting with 
and eliciting powerful physical sensations in them. Similarly, contemporary cinema is 
concerned with these ‘aesthetics of attraction,’ since it is both a presentational as well as 
a representational medium and process (Gunning: 1989). Hansen therefore critiques 
psychoanalysis in her (1993) essay ‘Early Cinema, Late Cinema,’ for ignoring this 
materiality of affect and for focusing solely upon the text’s psychical and ultimately 
dualistic “meanings.” In both Gunning and Hansen’s view, the sensorium of kinetic 
thrills, shocks, and excitement presented by cinema, provides an overall experience that 
affects the body of the viewer as much as the mind. 
 
In his seminal book, The Philosophy of Horror, Noël Carroll addresses two fundamental 
(and paradoxical) questions concerning this genre: why are audiences’ disturbed by 
horror (when they know it is fictional), and why do they seek out filmic experiences that 
disturb them? Rejecting the psychoanalytic explanations of disavowal and 
identification, Carroll argues that the defining element of modern horror is the 
audiences’ emotional response to it, which he terms ‘art-horror’ as opposed to ‘natural 
[or “real” life, everyday] horror’ (1990: 8, 13, original emphasis).8 Through an 
interdisciplinary investigation that utilises analytic philosophy, cognitive psychology, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and humanly’ and thus, the reaction to filmic/mechanical reproduction is ‘characterized by the direct, 
intimate fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment … Such fusion is of great significance’ (735, 744-
745).  
 
 
8 Carroll addresses critiques waged at cognitive approaches to film by paying attention to the emotions. 
However, his attempt at constructing a cognitive model explaining the fascination of horror is also a 
counterargument against the dominant psychoanalytic and ideological models in film studies at the time. 
This book therefore continues his attack/analysis of these approaches from his previous work, Mystifying 
Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory (1988) and Philosophical Problems of 
Classical Film Theory (1988), despite the fact that both approaches are concerned with increasing the 
cultural value of horror. 
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and literary theory, he proposes a ‘thought theory’ that explores how horror is designed 
and constructed in order to elicit the appropriate emotional effects in the viewer. He 
thus suggests that simply imagining horror scenarios, without irrationally believing in 
them, is enough for the spectator to enter into an emotional state. However, this does 
not make these emotions any less genuine, because as he writes himself, ‘if it were a 
pretend emotion, one would think that it could be engaged at will. I could elect to 
remain unmoved … I could refuse to make believe I was horrified. But I don’t think that 
that was really an option for those, like myself, who were overwhelmingly struck by it 
… And, of course, another reason to think that we are genuinely art-horrified rather than 
pretending to be in such a state is that we don’t seem to be aware that we are playing a 
game of make-believe’ (74). So although focussing on a different genre, this study 
addresses (in part) one of the driving themes of my own research, in that it places 
importance on the (active) viewers’ experience of film and the genuine emotional 
response that this entails. This works to collapse many of the distinctions between 
filmic and textual discourse. However, Carroll prioritises objectivity, and in restricting 
his study to content analysis alone, can be critiqued for making generalisations that fail 
to consider actual audiences, or how the body might respond to and influence both the 
overall experience and meaning of film. Indeed, he argues that the viewer’s emotional 
state is essentially distinct from their physical response, and only considers the former 
in his model explaining the desire to consume ‘art-horror.’ Therefore, perhaps it is fair 
to say that in unearthing the features of the film that give rise to emotions, there is an 
element of explaining these emotions away in terms of a cognitive disembodiment.  
 
Linda Williams’s now canonical essay on “body genres” explores how horror, 
melodrama, and pornography are designed to have profound and gratuitous effects on 
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the body of the spectator, eliciting physical responses (terror, tears, and sexual arousal) 
by displaying mostly female bodies in the grip of uncontrollable emotions. It is this 
corporeal connection and mimicry between the body on screen and the body of the 
spectator that marks these genres as aesthetically disreputable, explaining their 
‘especially low cultural status’ (1991: 4). But then Williams problematizes this process 
of empathy and mimicry by considering gender-specific cultural attitudes embedded in 
these responses, arguing that identification is much more complicated than simplistic 
mimicry. This is because whilst the fantasy scenarios on offer may well appear to be 
mere ‘spectacles of feminine victimization’ (6), they actually provide oscillating 
categories of identification for the female as well as the male spectator, because ‘even in 
the most extreme displays of feminine masochistic suffering, there is always a 
component of either power or pleasure for the woman victim’ (8). Consequently, 
identification and subject positions ‘are not as gender-linked and as gender-fixed as has 
often been supposed’ (ibid). And since fantasy is not the opposite of reality, but what 
reality forecloses, these fantasy-genres tell us a great deal about the ever-changing 
differences between gendered identities that vary both over time and across cultures. 
Therefore, to ‘dismiss them as bad excess whether of explicit sex, violence, or emotion, 
or as bad perversions, whether of masochism or sadism, is not to address their function 
as cultural problem-solving’ (12). In seeking to understand the enduring appeal and 
success of these kinds of body genres, then, Williams explores the body’s response to a 
filmic experience as a valid part of analysis, refusing to simply objectify it or dismiss 
these genres as either gross or ideologically duplicitous, whilst simultaneously using a 
psychoanalytic approach to their fantasy structures in order to expose ideological 
investments. This intervention in film theory thus engages with the materiality of film, 
paving the way for more experimental approaches to the filmic experience/aesthetics 
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that recognise the body as a ‘sentient, sensual, and sensible ensemble of materialised 
capacities and agency’ (Sobchack 2004: 2).  
 
However, despite all of this scholarly interest in the bodily, emotional, and sensate 
aspects of cinema being important in its own right, none of it fully addresses the 
complexity of an embodied engagement with and response to film, or as Jane Gaines 
puts it, ‘a body-first way of knowing’ (1999: 94). Indeed, in a later article Linda 
Williams writes about the sense of embarrassment she finds in much of the feminist 
scholarship on melodrama, including her own earlier work that reveals an 
‘unwillingness to recognise the importance of melodramatic pathos – of being moved 
by a moving picture’ (1998: 47). And this ties in with Vivian Sobchack’s observation 
that, ‘most film theorists still seem either embarrassed or bemused by bodies that often 
act wantonly and crudely at the movies, involuntarily countering the fine-grained 
sensibilities, intellectual discriminations, and vocabulary of critical reflection’ (2004: 
56-57). Within the academy, we are rigorously trained to maintain a critical distance 
from our object of study, using theoretical constructs to carefully explain our 
experience, ‘or perhaps, more aptly, to explain it away’ (ibid: 52, my emphasis). So 
whilst it can be difficult to know how to write about a multisensory and sensuous 
experience of film (as acknowledged by Tasker and Studlar above), to do so works to 
respect the fact that intelligence(s) are diverse and interactive, that we think about the 
world in all the ways that we experience it, and that scholarship does not have to 
abstract the mind (so much) from the body.  
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The phenomenological paradigm 
Despite Dudley Andrew’s rallying suggestion, originally written in 1978, that 
‘phenomenology claims to be closer, not necessarily to truth, but to cinema and our 
experience of it,’ there was negligible interest in film phenomenology from the mid-
1970s until the 1990s (1985: 632).9 With increasing importance being placed on the 
relationship between moving image and spectator, and the need to address questions of 
agency, pleasure, and the body in relation to the gradual transformation of cinema into a 
complex and multifaceted form of experience, and a wide range of textual objects and 
mediums, the renewal of interest in phenomenology was spearheaded by Vivian 
Sobchack’s (1992) The Address of the Eye. Moving away from the kind of 
transcendental and idealist phenomenology previously rejected both from within and 
without film studies, Sobchack builds upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential 
phenomenology.10 And along with her later book, Carnal Thoughts (2004) develops a 
theory of film that is, in her own words, ‘a reflective method that is responsive to the 
viewing experience as it is variously lived, rather than only theorized’ (2009: 444). The 
meanings that come from this are thus ‘spatially and temporally embodied, lived, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This was largely due to reaction against the phenomenologically inflected work of people like 
Benjamin, Kracauer, and Andre Bazin, which, by the late 1960s, had led to the dominance within 
academic film studies of the semiotic, psychoanalytic, and ideological approaches of Christian Metz, 
Jacques Lacan, and Louis Althusser. Considered more “scientific,” rational, and politically important, it 
was in this context, as Vivian Sobchack writes, that ‘phenomenology came under critical attack on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Not only were its transcendental (and often theological) leanings deemed “idealist” 
and “metaphysical,” but also its foundational grounding in the description of “direct,” “immediate,” and 
“subjective” experience and its celebration of the cinema’s “revelatory” capacity seemed evidence of 
“naïve realism”’ (2009: 441). 
 
10 I am not grounded in philosophy and so am undoubtedly offering a simple explanation, but from my 
limited understanding, what separates Merleau-Ponty from the transcendental phenomenology established 
by Edmund Husserl, is the relation between experience and the body. For Husserl, consciousness and the 
transcendental ego are separate from reality and the world, and embodiment is constituted through 
thought, in that we identify our experience as inhabiting our body. Thus, agency and experience are 
disembodied because they are “thought first.” Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, moves away from this 
subject/object divide in order to stress the embodied nature of human consciousness. For him, the body 
itself is the subject of perception, and not the mind, soul, or transcendental ego. As Taylor Carmen writes, 
‘[e]mbodiment thus has a philosophical significance for Merleau-Ponty that it could not have for Husserl. 
Indeed, taking the problem of embodiment seriously, as Merleau-Ponty does, entails a radical 
reassessment of the very conceptual distinctions on which Husserl’s enterprise rests’ (1999: 206). 
 
	   21	  
valued by an objective subject’ and, as such, are ‘always already qualified by the 
mutable specificities and constraints of history and culture’ (2004: 2). It is this 
experiential methodology in context, that I am most indebted to and inspired by. 
Making Sobchack the key thinker of the (phenomenological) approaches in this thesis, 
along with Laura Marks (2000, 2002) and Jennifer Barker (2009), who similarly build 
upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology, to varying degrees. 
 
Merleau-Ponty 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty attempts to describe our lived 
experience of things, suggesting that is through the body that we perceive, relate to, and 
make sense of the world before we are able to consciously reflect upon it. Or in other 
words, our consciousness is materially embodied. Often, then, we may know/sense 
things on a feeling/material (rather than a thought) level, and it is only until we have had 
time to reflect upon it that we can then apply the theories and discourses that we use to 
explain what our bodies already knew.11  
In short, my body is not only an object among all other objects, 
a nexus of sensible qualities among others, but an object which 
is sensitive to all the rest, which reverberates to all sounds, 
vibrates to all colours, and provides words with their primordial 
significance through the way in which it receives them.                        
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 236, original emphasis)                                  
 
Therefore, the relationship between the self and the world/other objects is mimetic, and 
since ‘[t]he body is borne towards tactile experience by all its surfaces and all its organs 
simultaneously’ (ibid: 317), this sensuous proximity and material connection creates 
meaning, enabling the body to “become” what it sees. Or, ‘[i]n other words: to look at 
an object is to inhabit it, and from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 I have taken and adapted this term from Vivian Sobchack’s chapter, ‘What My Fingers Knew: The 
Cinesthetic Subject, or Vision in the Flesh’ (2004: 53-84). 
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aspect which they present to it…Thus every object is the mirror of all others’ (ibid: 68). 
This sense of closeness, of “becoming”, habitation, and mirroring, transforms the 
hierarchical relationship between subject and object so that subjects take on the 
(material) qualities of objects, and objects take on the qualities of the subject, namely 
their knowledge and perceptive qualities. 
 
The film’s body 
Sobchack extends this by stressing the intersubjective and dialectical nature of the filmic 
experience, in which both spectator, filmmaker, and film are all in communication, ‘all 
viewers viewing, engaged as participants in dynamically and directionally reversible acts 
that reflexively and reflectively constitute the perception of expression and the 
expression of perception’ (1992: 5, original emphasis). Just as viewers take in films 
through their bodies (and not just their eyes) before reflecting on and processing them, 
film is similarly embodied, with ‘an existential presence in its own right’ (ibid: 216). 
This is not merely metaphorical or a reference to a film’s mechanical body, because 
although the camera’s vision guides the viewer the film’s body is not reducible to 
camerawork, director’s vision, or editing etc. Granted these are all, in part, responsible 
for choices made and effects rendered, but a film is much more than the sum of these 
choices/vision. This is evident in the way that a film can have its own attitude towards 
its subject(s), and one that is not shared with it’s writer, director, camera-operator, 
viewer etc. And evidence of this can be found in the director’s regular checking of 
rushes, since filmed footage does not always correlate to the way in which it has been 
seen through the camera when shot. To quote Sobchack, ‘[t]he “film’s body” is not 
visible in the film except for its intentional agency and diacritical motion. It is not 
anthropomorphic, but it is also not reducible to the cinematic apparatus (in the same way 
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that we are not reducible to our material physiognomy); it is discovered and located only 
reflexively as a quasi-subjective and embodied “eye” that has a discrete – if ordinarily 
prepersonal and anonymous – existence’ (2004: 66, f48).  
 
Film cannot, therefore, be reduced merely to a visual, psychic, or ideological experience 
(although it is all of these), because it is a subject/object that ‘locates its own address, its 
own perceptual and expressive experiences of being and becoming’ (Sobchack 1994: 
41). And through our embodied ‘address of the eye,’ we, in turn, inhabit, mirror, and 
“become” in response to its expression, via a simultaneously haptic, tactile, and visual 
language. As such, the filmic experience is a pre-reflective interaction between the 
performing bodies of both film and viewer, and so what we come to “know” isn’t simply 
conceptual but about what ‘meaning, and value emerge carnally through our senses’ (op. 
cit. 2004: 8).  
 
The mimetic body and haptic visuality  
Also drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s (1962: 253-4) suggestion that our body is our 
anchor in the world, allowing us to move into situations and take them up rather than 
objectify and dominate, Laura U Marks explores mimetic ability and the materiality of 
haptic vision in both The Skin of the Film (2000), Touch (2002), and her later journal 
article, ‘Haptic Visuality: Touching with the Eye’ (2004). In these, she traces the ways 
in which ‘cinema can appeal to the senses that it cannot technically represent: the senses 
of touch, smell, and taste’ (2000: 129). As such, Marks suggests that seeing is located in 
the whole of the body; that ‘the eye [is] like an organ of touch;’ and that looking signals 
the desire for a form of reciprocal contact between the thing perceived and the perceiver 
(Marks 2004: 79). By then drawing upon our own ‘resources of memory and 
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imagination to complete’ the images we see/feel expressed on the surface skin of the 
film, we, the perceiver/‘experiencer’ can sensuously absorb, connect to, and mimic what 
we see rather than be drawn into the depths of narrative (op. cit. 2000: 163).12  
 
In this way, film can be experienced as a tactile medium and epistemology as well as a 
visual one, bridging the distance between subject and object, viewer and viewed that is 
so necessary for a voyeuristic gaze, and thereby realigning vision ‘with respect rather 
than mastery’ (160). This is particularly important when watching bodies that deviate 
from the hegemonic ideal, as I will argue in my chapter on dance and disability. 
However, this is not to negate the undeniable fact that we need and engage with both 
optical and haptic forms of vision for different and equally important reasons, and that 
there is never a clear-cut division between them. So instead of simple condemnation, 
Marks attempts ‘to open up visuality along the continua of the distant and the 
embodied, and the optical and the haptic’ (132, my emphasis). This provides an 
understanding of how haptic visuality, in Marks’s own words,  
is not about power but about yielding; or even that the object takes on 
more power than the subject. Haptic images push us out of cinema’s 
illusionary depth and invite our eyes to linger on the surface of the 
image. Rather than pull us into an idealized space, they help us feel the 
connectivity between ourselves, the image and its material support, and 
the world to which the image connects us.                                 (2004: 81)   
 
Since I agree with Marks’s assertion that ‘in order to have the kind of radical potential I 
saw in them, [haptic images and haptic visuality] need to be motivated by something 
radical’ (2004: 82, original emphasis), I would argue that it is the film’s intention to 
deconstruct exclusionary and binaristic mind-sets, that encourages a haptic yielding (to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Craig Sinclair ‘coined the term “experiencer,” an awkward yet suitable multisensory and yet sense-
neutral expression to describe someone who “partakes of film”. …[He] hope[s] by using this term to 
overcome the prevalent and persistent logic that has already hegemonically inscribed the idea that film 
experiencing is primarily a visual endeavour’ (2003: 17-18). 
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a transformative respect of difference). After all, haptic images are being used more and 
more in advertising, computer games, music TV, as well as in popular film, so what was 
once radically experimental has now been incorporated into and put to the service of 
dominant ideologies, namely capitalism. As such, it is of paramount importance that 
haptic visuality is balanced with critical distance so that we remain vigilant to what we 
are being “sold” through our bodies, and to what exactly we are yielding? Furthermore, 
this yielding is also dependent upon how we “meet” the film, and whether our viewing 
bodies share the same political, ethical, and moral investments, so that we are not 
‘other’ to what the film assumes. So whilst film can be a medium of ethical experience, 
as Jennifer Barker asserts, it is only ‘[w]hen viewers and films share certain attitudes, 
tasks, or situations, [that] they will move in similar ways’ (2009: 77).  
 
A critique of phenomenology 
This balance between the film object and what we bring to it as embodied viewers is 
important, because whilst an image can be haptic or optical, ‘haptic visuality is a term of 
reception [and so] [t]he viewer can choose, to some degree, whether to see optically or 
haptically’ (Marks 2004: 81). Indeed, a valid critique of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology is that he only ever refers to the body in the most general of terms, as 
the body rather than this body. Yet human beings inhabit or experience their physical 
bodies in vastly different ways, obviously dependent upon culture and identity 
formations such as gender, physical (dis)ability, race, class, and sexual orientation etc., 
their subjection to the vicissitudes of power and dominance, and upon childhood/life 
experience and history. In other words, not all of (felt bodily) experience is available to 
everybody, and haptic visuality can create a feeling of vulnerability since there is less 
control in an interaction than there is in distanced objectification. Not everybody, then, 
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will move with and be moved in the same way, and just as some may be ambivalent, 
others may actively resist the pull of the film. Therefore, as Marks so rightly advises: 
When we speak of embodied perception, we must include the embodied 
blocks to perception and to full participation in the world…Thus, if we 
consider that perception is subtractive, we can respect the fact that perception 
is not an infinite return to the buffet table of lived experiences but a walk 
through the minefield of embodied memory. Ultimately phenomenology can 
account for how the body encodes power relations somatically. It can 
acknowledge that embodiment is a matter of individual life-maps as well as 
cultural difference.                                            (2000: 152, original emphasis) 
 
Simone de Beauvoir 
Whilst Merleau-Ponty has been justly criticised for excluding the specificity of 
women’s corporeal experience, and for citing male subjectivity as a universal, Simone 
de Beauvoir’s groundbreaking form of political existential phenomenology cites 
patriarchy as one such block to women’s ‘full participation in the world’ (ibid), and 
thereby redresses this critique. In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir actively explores the 
complexity of sexual difference as materialised in her own experience and in the lived 
realities of women. Rejecting the idea that there any universal “truths” about women, 
she writes that women ‘have no past, no history, no religion of their own’ (1953: 19), 
because ‘the whole of feminine history has been man-made’ (ibid: 159). Through this 
alienation from our own embodied capacities, she draws parallels between women and 
other oppressed groups, writing that ‘[j]ust as in America there is no Negro problem, 
but rather a white problem; just as anti-Semitism is not a Jewish problem; it is our 
problem; so the woman problem has always been a man’s problem’ (ibid). Beauvoir 
therefore asserts that women experience their phenomenological bodies in ways that 
have already been written by the dominant group, which leads to her most famous 
statement, ‘One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman’ (295). In exploring and 
demystifying these myths of female difference, she thus leaves space to imagine what 
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women might become. So whilst her work continues to be contested, and fellow 
feminists have even accused her of being male-identified, de Beauvoir originated the 
vocabulary we needed for analysing social constructions of sex and gender, and for 
giving us an insight into the real effects that they have on our lived experience.13 It 
seems obvious, then, that her existential phenomenology will infuse this thesis even 
when not directly cited, and particularly in my chapter on avant-garde feminist 
screendance, inspiring me as I attempt to shake off the shackles of phallocentrism and 
confer meaning through my own embodied consciousness. 
 
The tactile eye 
Jennifer Barker’s more recent attempt at describing the tactile dimensions of cinema is 
an extension of Vivian Sobchack, Laura Marks, and Linda Williams’s work, since she 
argues that all genres are “body genres,” with viewers identifying and haptically 
interacting with the film’s body and not merely with the characters on screen. Through 
close, phenomenological, and what she refers to as ‘textural’ analyses of selected films 
from a variety of genres, national cinemas, and time periods, she illustrates the different 
forms of tactility (tactile, kinaesthetic, and proprioceptive) that are experienced and 
expressed within three different regions of the viewers’ and films’ bodies; the skin, 
musculature, and viscera. Describing exactly how the mind and body, vision and touch 
are thus married in the viewing experience, via a sensuous language that is itself tactile, 
she explores the ways in which ‘viewer and film are two differently constructed but 
equally muscular bodies, acting perhaps in tandem or perhaps at odds with each other, 
but always in relation to each other’ (2009: 72). Her imaginative and creative form of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ruth Evans writes that ‘Beauvoir’s body politics has had a bad feminist press. The Second Sex’s 
description of female sexuality as holes and slime have all been subject to worst case readings, 
confirming Beauvoir as a hopeless misogynist, mortgaged to what Atack describes as the Sartrean 
“hiérarchie ontologico-charnelle” [ontologico-corporeal hierarchy], where the negative metaphors of the 
in-itself align viscosity with femininity’ (1998: 15). 
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textural analysis works to challenge the critique that phenomenological approaches to 
film only provide theoretical underpinnings and generalisations about embodied 
cinematic experience, rather than specific and detailed analysis of particular films. It has 
therefore provided a more applicable analytical approach to film, outlining a conceptual 
and methodological framework for my own textural analysis, which thus helps to 
explain my sensuous immersion into film.  However, elements of the critique of 
phenomenology made above are also applicable to Barker, since despite providing an 
account of her own female embodied relationship to film, she is inattentive to other 
questions of (cultural, racial, sexual, physical etc.,) difference and the resulting 
structural issues of power relations. Barker only ever refers to viewers’ bodies in the 
most general terms, and I am more interested in accounting for the particular 
specificities of both the viewer and film’s embodiment, and the political ramifications 
and effects of this embodied interaction. 
 
Other scholars deserving of mention 
Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of this thesis, many more scholars have nourished 
my work than I have room here to review, but a couple are particularly important to 
mention. Elizabeth Grosz’s form of corporeal feminism tackles questions about how we 
occupy sex-differentiated bodies, which, along with de Beauvoir, has simultaneously 
helped me to build a stronger conception of the (female) embodied spectator whilst 
addressing the criticism of phenomenology that I have just made. In Volatile Bodies, 
she attempts to transcend dualistic thinking by arguing against the social 
constructionist’s ‘somatophobia.’ Using psychoanalysis, Deleuzian philosophy, and 
phenomenology to explore how bodies are ‘affected by other bodies’ (1994: 12), she 
develops a physical model that explores our felt, lived relations. As Grosz writes, 
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considering ‘the body as a discontinuous, non-totalisable series of processes, flows, 
energies, speeds and durations, may be of great value to feminisms attempt to re-
conceive bodies outside the binary oppositions imposed on the body’ (164). And 
although she does not specifically analyse film, the queer fluidity of this language 
works to kinaesthetically convey how bodies seep and merge with other, non-human 
(motion picture) bodies that move in a similar way. 
 
Like Laura Marks, Elena del Río writes about the tactile relationship between film and 
viewer, but in a more literal way. In her essay on ‘The Body as Foundation of the 
Screen,’ she explains how we are able to “touch” the film without literally touching it, 
writing that ‘[a]s the image becomes translated into a bodily response, body and image 
no longer function as discrete units, but as surfaces in contact’ (1996: 101). This is not 
to suggest that the body either “disappears” or is flat and superficial, but that in 
imaginatively and creatively engaging with film, it ‘is always outside its visible form, 
[and] that it constantly extends itself beyond its objective spatial and temporal 
boundaries’ (102). In this way, the body is forever in process and never “complete”, but 
is instead, as Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it 
is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my 
‘comprehension’’ (1962: 235). Del Río then goes on to use Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
flesh to describe this reciprocal and reversible relationship, ‘in which subject and object 
inhabit each other by participating in a common condition of embodied sense’ (op. cit. 
1996: 103). And thus, this concept of flesh disrupts the rigid binaries of subject/object 
relations, and externality and interiority. 
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Whilst this blurring of boundaries can elicit a curious and sensuous surrender to ‘a 
constant activity of reciprocal re-alignment and inflection’, it can also, as acknowledged 
above by Marks, be unsettling and potentially threatening, which is why haptic images 
are so often used in horror cinema (ibid). This also helps explain the often-polarised 
response to both sensuous filmmaking and analysis. Yet it is precisely this queer 
ambiguity of corporeal cinema, with its (deliciously dangerous) disregard for secure 
borders and “fixed” positions, that appeals to me most, since it allows for a more fluid 
conception of subjectivity. As such, I often use the concept of queerness as a synonym 
for a more generalised sense of liminality, particularly in chapter two, rather than 
engage with the theorisation of ‘queerness’ itself. 
 
The technology of film can extend the boundaries of what we are, becoming a part of 
our skin, our flesh. And it is precisely this merger and expansion that can endow “our” 
(filmic and human) bodies with an ethical experience, reducing the distance between our 
selves and ‘others.’ As Sobchack so elegantly puts it, this notion of flesh ‘expresses our 
desire to enfold other subjects and objects (and often the world itself), to know their 
materiality and objectivity intimately and, indeed, to embrace their alterity as our own’ 
(2004: 289, original emphasis). This highlights how in stressing the embodied nature 
and experience of film, we can simultaneously stress its importance as a political tool, as 
a way to look at, interact with, “touch” and be touched by what and whom we may not 
otherwise have the opportunity to know. And whilst acknowledging that tactility and 
mimesis can never replicate actual embodied experience, moving with ‘others’ can 
potentially offer a deeper and more embodied understanding of difference, helping to 
bridge these differences (even if only partially and momentarily) as well as compliment 
a hermeneutic approach to knowledge. 
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Why screendance and existing research in the field 
Since dance as an art form/practice and a textual and representational form has been 
historically devalued, largely due to its feminized association with bodily excess, it 
seems to me to be a perfect subject for a sensuous analysis, which has itself been 
criticised for its “excessively subjective touchy-feely” aesthetic, and for its descriptive 
bias. So whilst I agree with Angela McRobbie’s aforementioned claim that dance ‘is 
always an emotional space’ (1997: 227), I also acknowledge the inherent danger in this 
statement. This is because it can contribute to a binary formation in which the feminized 
masses’ appreciation of “low” culture is governed (and analysed) by the heart, as 
opposed to the “masculine” intellectuals who are governed by their heads and can be 
found watching and writing about experimental and avant-garde films with “proper” 
theoretical abstraction. This is why, apart from my own eclectic enjoyment, I consider a 
spectrum of films rather than focusing solely upon the popular narrative dance films that 
I first watched when growing up. In considering what Spanish flamenco, disabled 
dance, avant-garde feminist screendance, and popular Hollywood dance film all have in 
common, I will work to break down these simplistic oppositions between high and low 
art.  
 
This historical devaluation of dance (and dance in film) has also led to a relative dearth 
of scholarly work that specifically researches screendance, (or dance film, cine dance, 
and dance in film as it is also variously known). As Lesley Vize discovers in her 
exploration of music and the body in dance film, ‘[a]lthough there is a considerable 
literature about film music, Hollywood musicals, music video and MTV, little work has 
been produced on ‘dance film’ (Vize 2003: 24, my emphasis). Whilst this does appear 
to be gradually changing, particularly with the (2010) launch of The International 
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Journal of Screendance, there are still only a handful of academic texts that focus 
exclusively on screendance.14 These include Stephanie Jordan and Dave Allen’s (1993), 
Parallel Lines. Media Representations of Dance, the first (and only) anthology of 
essays to explore how dance has been represented on British television. Yet however 
interesting in its scope, considering as it does the role of dance in a variety of practices 
that range from pop-videos, popular dance programmes, and experimental dance, it is 
aimed principally at a dance audience, and largely focuses its debate around the 
translation of “live” dance to the televised screen. As a result, dance that has been made 
specifically for the camera is only touched upon. 
 
Sherril Dodd’s (2001), Dance on Screen: Genres and Media From Hollywood to 
Experimental Art, addresses the absence of contemporary scholarship examining the 
links between dance and film, providing a comprehensive introduction to the rich 
diversity of screen dance genres, and an interdisciplinary exploration into moving 
bodies, the camera and spectator. She considers a wide range of mediums, including the 
Hollywood blockbuster, adverts, music videos, dances commissioned for television, 
broadcasts of live performances, and digital dance, but is less concerned with a 
multisensory approach to dance film, and more interested in framing her book in 
response to critical perspectives that prioritise theatre stage aesthetics. She thus works to 
challenge the assumption that live dance is superior to dance on screen, and importantly 
explores dance in film as an art in its own right, with camera and editing creating the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Intended for practitioners, researchers, curators and activists engaged with screendance, The 
International Journal of Screendance is ‘a new peer-reviewed publication, [and] the first-ever scholarly 
journal dedicated to the growing area of the inter-disciplinary practice of screendance.’ Quote found on 
the journal’s website, at: http://journals.library.wisc.edu/public/journals/6/pages/about/  
Accessed: 08/08/13. 
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dance as much as the dancer. Whilst this has undoubtedly paved the way for my own 
research, I am more interested in examining the intimate relationship between film and 
viewer.  
 
Judy Mitoma et al’s (2002), Envisioning Dance on Film and Video, is the first 
comprehensive and illustrated reference guide to the history of dance on camera. It 
contains fifty original essays by dance film professionals, including choreographers, 
filmmakers, film editors and producers, archivists, historians, critics, and scholars, and 
is accompanied by a DVD featuring excerpts of forty films and videos. It is thus an 
invaluable pedagogical tool with fascinating and difficult to find audio-visual 
documentation. However, its primary objective is in creating a historical record of the 
significance of dance on film, and in building a dance on film/video community, so 
essays are around general themes that aim to help elucidate the process of making dance 
film and video. In this sense, it is directed more towards dance film practitioners than it 
is to film scholars interested in a more theoretical approach to screendance. 
 
Although it is not specifically about screendance, Karen Pearlman’s (2009) book, 
Cutting Rhythms, is more in tune with my own research interests in that it covers a 
number of theoretical approaches to rhythm in film editing, both describing them and 
illustrating their practical application. And by drawing upon her experience as a dancer, 
Pearlman deepens these understandings and definitions. Of most interest and 
significance to me is her chapter on editing as choreography, since it investigates how 
film moves, and specifically how its rhythms, both physical and emotional, can affect 
viewers’ embodiment. Or in other words, the shape and form of a film’s rhythms works 
to shape and form its viewer. So whilst her book is undoubtedly intended as a practical 
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guide for filmmakers, developing viable creative strategies for the enhancement of their 
(rhythmical) process, it is also relevant for scholars ‘interested in an integrated somatic, 
kinaesthetic, and cognitive approach to the study and creation of rhythms in film’ (252). 
 
Erin Brannigan’s (2011), Dancefilm: Choreography and the Moving Image, is more 
helpful to my research, in that not only does it provide an elegant historical context of 
dancefilm, tracing its history from the silent film era through to the avant-garde, 
musicals and music videos, and to contemporary experimental dancefilms, but it also 
attempts to reconcile theoretical approaches drawn from both dance and film studies. 
This interdisciplinary approach neither privileges one nor the other as it investigates the 
impact that choreography has had on the filmic form, and the influence that film has had 
on dance. Brannigan thus argues for the specificity of dancefilm, as distinct from either 
art form, and thereby fills a gap in academic research. Of particular import to me is the 
relation she makes between kinaesthetic contagion in live dance to ‘similar discussions 
in film theory on affectivity in the cinema’ (13). However, whilst she does address the 
somatic response of viewers, it is more in terms of its historical context as a tool for 
discussing dancefilm, and less about in-depth embodied analyses of films. Furthermore, 
in focusing on form much more than content, she can tend to overlook how it generates 
meaning and operates ideologically, which are pivotal questions in my own sensuous 
approach to screendance. 
 
Finally, Dee Reynolds and Matthew Reason’s (2012) edited collection on Kinesthetic 
(sic) Empathy in Creative and Cultural Practices, is invaluable in that it includes three 
chapters specifically addressing the multisensory experience of and engagement with 
film. Adriano D’Aloia’s chapter on ‘Cinematic Empathy’, focuses on the experience of 
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narrative fiction film; Guillemette Bolens looks at Charlie Chaplin’s kinaesthetic 
communication in his silent films; and through a close analysis, Lucy Fife Donaldson 
considers the way in which Rosemary’s Baby (Polanski, 1968) constructs a sensuous 
form of engagement via the materiality of Mia farrow’s performance, and its filmic 
presentation. Whilst this collection is most in line with my own research interests, 
drawing upon very similar embodied discourses, it does not consider the specific 
combination of dance and film where they are both integral to a work.15 And 
considering the fact that they share many characteristics, the chapters of this thesis will 
investigate the combination of these two mediums, exploring how they can enhance one 
another as well as heighten the emotional/physical and political effect on the audience, 
increasing somatic interconnectedness between dance, film and viewer. 
 
Breakdown of chapters  
In chapter one I will explore how the presence of dance functions politically in two of 
the films from Carlos Saura’s “flamenco trilogy, ” both expressing and disrupting 
norms and ideologies concerning Spanish national, cultural, and gendered identity. In 
order to grasp how these films work as a form of embodied politics, it is necessary to 
ground my analysis in the socio-political and historical context in which they are 
situated. Therefore, I begin the chapter by considering the legacy of both colonialism 
and Franco’s long dictatorship on Spanish identity. 
 
Chapter two will examine the potential for screendance performance to challenge (and 
perhaps change) exclusionary perceptions of physical disability, through a haptic 
visuality that encourages a sensuous engagement. I will also be drawing upon disability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Whilst there are chapters covering kinaesthetic empathy in relation to dance, they only consider “live” 
dance performance. 
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politics and theory, and particularly Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s (2009) contention 
that the ‘baroque’ stare can unravel familiar ways of looking at disability, offering a 
means of creating new understandings of embodied presence. In order to establish 
exactly how these films work to counter normative and dominant representations of 
disabled bodies, a brief history of Hollywood’s depiction of disabled bodies and 
movement will be provided. 
 
In chapter three I will consider key interpretations, distinctions and similarities between 
the work of four female avant-garde dance filmmakers, Maya Deren, Yvonne Rainer, 
Amy Greenfield and Sally Potter. Despite the differences between them, particularly in 
terms of their desire to/not evoke a cathartic response and elicit kinaesthetic 
identification, I argue that they are all inspired by a similar feminist sensibility, using 
cinematic movement (as well as stasis) to extend the language, spatiality, and motility 
of the female body and thus move away from (historical) objectification. With an 
emphasis on feminist phenomenology, my embodied analysis will be layered with more 
abstractive film studies practices, in an attempt to find a middle ground between a 
purely bodily and a purely conceptual reading and response to these films.   
 
Finally, I aim to bring together a discussion of all of the key themes and issues already 
examined in my fourth chapter, which looks at a contemporary and globally popular 
(albeit independent) Hollywood dance film, Black Swan (2010). Sensitive to the often-
contradictory politics of representation, and how cultural texts are open to multiple 
interpretations, I shall use a multi-disciplinary approach in order to explore the nuances 
of this multi generic, hybrid film. This will include a phenomenological exploration and 
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analysis of how cinematography and sound combine to literally “touch” the viewer with 
the central character’s psychosis, and a consideration of the ethical implications of this 
embodied assault/experience. I will then utilise feminist psychoanalytic tools of analysis 
in order to investigate the film’s construction of femininity, and its complex negotiation 
between misogyny and feminism. And to conclude, I will explore how the unstable 
ontological level of the protagonist’s world can be seen to relate to and be placed within 
a wider socio-cultural context of American national identity. 
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Chapter One 
Deconstruction In Motion: Interrogating National, Cultural, and Gendered 
Identity through Flamenco Dance and Film 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the ways in which ideologies of national identity, and their 
complicity with gendered and colonial stereotypes, can be questioned and challenged 
within/by screendance. Carlos Saura began his collaborative “flamenco trilogy” with 
Bodas de sangre (Blood Wedding, 1981), a depiction of a dress rehearsal for legendary 
choreographer Antonio Gades’s flamenco adaptation of poet/playwright Federico 
García Lorca’s play.16 Also the first in his trilogy of rural Andalusian tragedies, Lorca’s 
play tells a passionately tragic tale (based on a true story) of ill-fated love, duty, deceit, 
betrayal, and vengeance. The intensity of his language is, however, replaced in the film 
with dance. The second film, Carmen (1983), was Saura’s biggest international box-
office success and a self-reflexive exploration of the legend of Carmen based upon 
Prosper Mérimée’s (1845) novella and Georges Bizet’s (1875) popular opera. Much like 
the first film, it shows a modern ensemble of dancers and singers as they rehearse for 
their flamenco interpretation of the Carmen story, led, once again, by Antonio Gades 
playing the director/choreographer/principal dancer, Antonio. We see him search for, 
discover, and get intimately involved/obsessed with his neophyte lead dancer, also 
called Carmen (Laura del Sol), as their social “reality” begins to mirror the myth. This 
multi-layered depiction of life imitating art thereby reveals the power of myth, and how 
its internalisation can eventually penetrate into everyday life. The final film in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Henceforth, Bodas de sangre will be referred to as Bodas.  
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trilogy, El amor brujo (Love, the Magician, 1986), is Gades’s modern take on 
Andalusian composer, Manuel de Falla’s melodramatic gypsy ballet. This is unlike the 
first two films in that it is not a staged rehearsal of the ballet, but its filmic enactment, 
depicting many traditions and rituals of Gypsy life. This creates more of a sense of 
(heightened) realism as opposed to the documentary/backstage “feel” of the first two 
films, despite a deconstructive opening credit sequence that highlights the artificiality of 
the set in which it is filmed.  
 
The first in this flamenco trilogy of films was made six years after the death of 
Francisco Franco, a time of great change as Spain (and Spanish cinema) began to 
emerge from the political censorship and coercion imposed by his dictatorial regime. 
During his long reign, Franco had used film as a tool for perpetuating his unreflective, 
authoritarian, and oppressive ideas about Spanish national identity, culture, and people, 
imposing a formal hegemony upon all films regardless of whether their content 
supported him ideologically or not (Higginbotham: 1988). Saura’s trilogy thereby 
works to address, unveil, challenge and provide alternatives not just to the political 
mythologies created and perpetuated by Franco, but also to the mythologizing power of 
film. In their formal complexity, both Bodas and Carmen interrogate how power 
operates in the production of meaning, thus exposing the fabricated nature of Francoist 
myths more through filmic form than content. 
 
I will explore the exceptionally inventive opening sequences to Carlos Saura’s Bodas de 
sangre (Blood Wedding, 1981), and Carmen (1983), because in immediately addressing 
the means by which colonial and patriarchal stereotypes have been imposed upon 
Spanish national, cultural, and gendered identity, they effectively set out the principal 
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aims and objectives of the films and are thus vital for contextualising how the following 
dance scenes function politically. Furthermore, a politics of movement (both of the film 
and the dancers) is used as a tool for viscerally connecting with the viewer. Therefore, 
despite the opening credit sequence and arrival/dressing-room scene being fourteen 
minutes (of a total of eighteen minutes) of Bodas that does not feature dance, filmic 
conventions and rituals of performance combine in order to demystify both the dancers 
and the dance. This serves to construct complex characters, orientating the viewer 
towards the performative and transformative nature of identity and of cultural 
performance, and thereby disrupting prescriptive ideological norms. I would argue, 
then, that the filming of these “everyday” rituals in a Spanish context and setting are as 
much a part of the dance film as the dance itself, and moreover, are a crucial element of 
the film’s originality and specificity as a dance film. However, because this opening 
sequence foregrounds and interrogates the construction of “truth” via a combination of 
image, cinematography, and language (as it is the only section of the film with 
dialogue), it is littered with signs that make for a more semiotic-inflected interpretation 
and analysis, as compared to the rather more sensuous approach to Carmen.  
 
I am only considering the first two films of Saura’s “flamenco trilogy” mainly for the 
sake of space, but also because whilst Bodas and Carmen attempt to interrogate and 
liberate the notion of Spanish national identity from the legacy of colonialism, from the 
Manichean politics of Franco’s long dictatorship, and from the internalisation of these 
imposed identities through filmic form and the rhetoric of dance, El amor brujo (Love, 
the Magician, 1986), is more of a straightforward, positive, and traditional narrative 
adaption of a flamenco ballet. Therefore it does not contain the same kind of innovative 
cinematic disruptions that characterise the earlier films, and as a result is much easier to 
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“suture” into. So whilst it does have a deconstructive credit sequence, it is not as 
essential for understanding how the rest of the dance film functions politically, as is the 
case with the first two films.17  
 
I am thus primarily interested in the political message embodied in the aesthetics of 
these opening sequences, and how successful they are at intervening in an 
understanding of history and of Spanishness through their visceral impact on the 
viewer. But in order to understand how they work as a form of embodied politics, I 
must first consider the socio-political and historical contexts against which they are 
reacting. 
 
The legacy of colonialism: Orientalism, history, “truth”, and power 
The conqueror will write the body of the other and inscribe upon it his 
own history.                                                         (de Certeau 1984:112)                                                                                                                                                     
 
Both films address the myth of the Spanish Gitano/a (Gypsy) and their association with 
flamenco culture, most explicit in the second film’s questioning of its (French) 
“fathering” artists, Prosper Mérimée and Georges Bizet. Both Romantic novella and 
glorified opera betray a colonial vision of Spain and Spanish flamencas (female 
flamenco dancers) as alluringly exotic yet dangerous “dark continents”: part of Europe 
and yet Other due to the ‘symbolic centrality of Gypsies in Spain’s collective imaginary 
(as opposed to their actual marginality in society)…the crucial but repressed non-white, 
non-European, and non-Christian elements that are the legacy of its Jewish and Moorish 
past’ (Colmeiro 2002:130). It is precisely this (Islamic and centuries-old) history that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 However, this is not to assert that El amor brujo is without (political) merit in its own right, and indeed, 
Rob Stone (quoting Saura) makes an interesting suggestion when he writes that its formal superficiality 
was a way of ‘reflecting the lack of imagination of his contemporary Spanish audience, who, says Saura, 
“don’t know how to use their freedom” and were increasingly unwilling to engage in a process of national 
self-analysis’ (2002: 79).  
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complicates any generalizations of (Spanish) Orientalism, and Edward Saïd’s (1978) 
distinction between the “Orient” and the West (the “Occident.”) This is because whilst 
the trajectory, conquest and settlement of Gitano’s Moorish culture up into Spain from 
North Africa is, according to Saïd, a key part of the “Orient,” the cultural and ethnic 
hybridity that resulted from this ‘eight-hundred-year Muslim presence’ and coexistence 
has meant that ‘Islam is not outside Spain but inside it, thus different from the 
conditions in France or England’ (Aidi 2006: 68; Taboada 2006: 121, my emphasis).18  
This proximity and intimacy thereby problematizes a Spanish Orientalist (and 
distanced) fascination/objectification of its Moorish ‘Other,’ since Spanish views of the 
Orient tend to be ‘far more heterogeneous’ (Taboada 2006: 121). However, ‘like views 
of other European nations – [they are] not devoid of imperialistic tones’, and at different 
periods in Spanish history the “Oriental question” has been approached from varying 
ideological standpoints, which have both romanticised and denigrated its Moorish past 
(ibid).  
 
Despite this internal complexity, Spain’s Oriental and African genealogy undoubtedly 
led to its Orientalization and marginalisation as “les European,” more sensual and 
therefore inferior by its European rivals. And the French imperialist, class-based 
fascination with Spain, perceived as a primitively passionate culture based upon myth, 
instinct, nature, magic and superstition exemplifies the Romantic Movement’s cultural, 
social and political approach that was born from the embers of the French Revolution 
(Williams: 1983). After this epic period of radical social and political transformation not 
just of France, but across Europe, art and literature would no longer be solely concerned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Saïd has responded to the criticism that he didn’t say enough about Spanish orientalism in Orientalism, 
by noting Spain’s exception within the European general context of Orientalism in his forward to the 
2002 Spanish translation. See: 
Saïd, Edward. (2002). “Prólogo a la nueva edicion española.” Orientalismo. Barcelona: Random 
House/Mondadori, 11-12. 
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with the nobility, upper classes, and clergy. Instead, interest turned towards 
marginalised “common” people (although of course there were no commoners enjoying 
the privilege of making such work themselves.) Combining this with an emotional 
reaction against the reason and rationality of Enlightenment, along with a sense of 
French nationalism and a colonial vision perhaps buoyed by the legacy of Napoleon’s 
1808 invasion of Spain (Laurence: 1994), Othered Gypsy/Andalusian traditions were 
appropriated in order to satiate a European hunger for Orientalism, paradoxically 
silencing and negating a culture through ‘giving it voice’, since this “voice” was 
actually the imposition of both a colonising gaze and a colonising language. Thus, as 
Edward Saïd writes, this period of history was marked by the ‘appropriation of one 
culture by another’ (1978: 42), and in this way the French Romantic Movement falsified 
its Spanish object of desire into an exoticised and enduring fiction, perfectly illustrating 
the dichotomy of mythopoeia by which a culture is simultaneously celebrated and 
subjugated. Furthermore, these ideologically loaded expressions of the españolada19 
came to stand as a synecdoche for Spanishness, revealing how the “history” and identity 
of a nation is constructed through its telling: entangled in a web of power and desire, 
always ideologically loaded, and never to be taken as “truth”. Or, as more eloquently 
articulated in the words of Walter Benjamin, ‘[h]istory is the subject of a structure 
whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now’ 
(1969: 261). 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The españoladas are the exaggerated and clichéd representations of ‘the Andalusian folk and gypsy 
tradition glorified in the works of nineteenth-century romantic writers and painters, and exported abroad 
in theatrical, pictorial, and cinematic renditions’ (D’Lugo 1991: 192). An example still popular today 
(with tourists at least) are the kitsch postcards that represent archetypal flamencas dressed in their traje de 
gitana – traditional flamenco dress, which is often embroidered over and completed with all the clichéd 
accoutrements including the mantilla, a fan, and a rose worn in the hair. 
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Whilst the rhetoric of colonialism has been the most powerful of ideologies informing 
the flamenco/Spanish stereotype, Spaniards themselves have contributed to and 
internalised this exoticism. Created in the second half of the nineteenth-century, 
Costumbrismo (from the Spanish costumbre, “custom”), related (and arguably catered) 
to Romanticism, in its literary and pictorial interpretations of folklore, festivals, 
customs, and everyday life in the Spanish South. But it was the four decades of 
Franco’s dictatorship that served to cement a people in time and space through the 
shrewd manipulation and propagation of an internal exotic Other: deeply embedding a 
foreign and Orientalist image of Spain as the ‘other to European modern identity, the 
same position of internal alterity that, ironically, the Gypsy has come to hold within 
modern Spanish culture’ (Colmeiro 2002: 129-30).  
 
Following the devastation of the Spanish Civil War and over ten years into the 
dictatorship (during which time flamenco had been silenced), ‘the Franco regime 
ransacked the past in search of symbols upon which to build a new and unified Spanish 
identity, an identity that might be attractive enough to lure tourists and centralized 
enough to be tweaked as needed for promoting the national interest’ (Washabaugh 
1995: 94). And of course the Romantic vision of the ill fated, passionate, dark and 
deadly flamenca and macho flamenco born to suffer and then to punish the female 
source of his suffering had already been proven to whet a foreign appetite for exoticism. 
Thus, between 1939 and 1975 Franco’s government set out to appropriate these motifs 
of Spanish culture by ruthlessly closing down traditional café cantantes, the bars and 
taverns of “ill repute” in which flamenco had been performed and professionalized, and 
moving it into the more “respectable” tablaos, peñas, and festivales, where it was 
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sanitised, commercialised, and depoliticised.20 The less charmingly manufactured and 
more “genuine” cante jondo (the deep song considered to be “authentic” flamenco 
song) and baile (dance) were pushed underground, where they thrived on the oppression 
and hardship that they were (and had always been) subject to as the creative expression 
of a marginalised Gypsy and impoverished Andalusian culture.  
 
This appropriation and propagandist distortion of flamenco certainly served the Spanish 
hegemony whilst adding insult to the injury already suffered by its ethnic Other, who 
had not only undergone a ‘history of violent assimilation’ (Smith 2000: 164) but would 
now suffer grotesque levels of exploitation and marginalisation under Franco.21 Films 
and theatrical shows displaying bastardised folkloric musical melodrama emerged in the 
españoladas, functioning not only to disenfranchise Gypsy performers from their own 
culture, but to indoctrinate audiences into the belief that there was a “natural” order of 
society, and that despite being the reputed originators of flamenco, Gypsies and lower 
class Andalusians belonged strictly at the bottom of this hierarchy. These 
representations, and particularly the archetype of Carmen, also served as a warning for 
Spanish women who might be independently minded, and perhaps for the men who 
might be “tolerant” of this, since the Francoist ideal woman was always glad to suffer 
for her (inherent) “sins.” Indeed, ‘the age-old Spanish male’s view of his own 
superiority and of women’s inferior station…were both heightened during the 
dictatorship’ (Edwards 1995: 17). The intervention of Hollywood between 1910-1929, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 A Tablao is a commercialised flamenco bar catering for and popular amongst tourists and American 
servicemen stationed in Spain, peñas are private clubs where flamenco is performed, and festivales are 
flamenco festivals. 
 
21 As Hishaam D. Aidi writes, this mobilization and manipulation of history and geography ‘richly 
illustrates Edward Saïd’s argument about the political power of “imaginative geographies” and how the 
hardy, seemingly ageless, entities we know as “Europe,” “the West,” and “the Orient” are, at bottom, 
“ideological confections” whose contents and borders are shaped by conflicting state interests and 
nationalisms’ (2006: 69).  
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and then again in the 1950s did nothing to help in terms of challenging these 
stereotypical perceptions, and in fact fed them to a much larger audience.22 However, 
despite the popularity and ideological weight of these combined representations, there 
was a counter-cultural resistance within Spain and nacionalflamenquismo ‘was the 
sneering name […given] to the franquista promotion of meretricious spectacles that 
celebrated the richness of Spanish art while hiding both the poverty and the regional 
allegiances of the artists’ (Washabaugh 1996: 103).  
 
After Franco’s death in 1975 and the transformation of Spain into a democracy, it 
publicly sought to politically distance itself from his fascistic legacy, and flamenco was 
both trivialised and dismissed as a quaint culture that had no real relation to modern 
Spain. Conversely, it also signified the shameful and embarrassing rape of a 
marginalised and disenfranchised culture, but whichever way one’s politics swung, 
flamenco was (once again) largely derided and silenced. The country was also on the 
brink of entering into a new age, as the mid-1980s would witness its emergence from a 
post-Franco recession and entrance into a culture of capitalism and consumerism as it 
joined the European community. Therefore, the bleak and intense expression of 
suffering and pain so associated with flamenco was for a time no longer suitable for 
representing the mainstream nation’s mood. However, since nothing is without 
complexity and contradiction, “authentic” flamenco remained (for some) a cultural and 
ritualistic expression of identity rooted in the past but relevant for the present as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Between 1910-1929 Hollywood catered to a persistent American desire for exoticised Latina women, 
by making a total of seven filmic versions of Carmen, whose qualities would inform the Hollywood 
Latina stereotype of the dangerously duplicitous/desirable harlot/dark lady (Berg: 2004). Three of these 
starred Charlie Chaplin, Theda Bara, and Geraldine Ferrar, indicating the level of their popularity. A 
resurgence of interest in the 1950s saw Hollywood producers recording Spanish flamenco legends such as 
Carmen Amaya, José Greco, Rosario and Antonio, and Pilar López.   
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for the future, since it provided a philosophy and identity for a nation that was gradually 
being subsumed into a homogeneous Europe.  
 
This then, is the socio-political and historical context in which Saura’s flamenco trilogy 
is situated, with the first film, Bodas, marking the beginnings of the 
reappropriation/celebration of flamenco as an ever-evolving art form that could be 
‘retrospectively defined in the light of a variety of community-oriented agendas’ 
(Washabaugh 1995: 99) not limited to romanticism, Franquismo, Gitanismo, or 
Andalucismo, but also adopted by non-Gypsy/Andalusian artists for the exploration of 
individual/community identities, as well as for nationalistic, academic, and commercial 
interests.23  
 
Politics in/as aesthetics 
Bodas opens on a sepia-hued wedding photograph with the washed-out quality so 
associated with photographs of the 19th/early 20th centuries, which, along with the old-
fashioned “look” of the clothing and hairstyles, immediately presents the viewer with a 
sense of history, community, and ritual. With the slow zoom-in as the credits roll, it is 
as if we are gradually getting nearer to and almost “inside” this community for a closer 
look, which serves to simultaneously distance us from its celebratory veneer. The 
camera gradually begins to bring El Novio (the groom) into central focus: the only 
person sitting, legs spread wide open with each arm bent at the elbow and resting on 
each thigh, his commanding pose conveying an attitude of conventional machismo, with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Franquismo: a term used to refer to the years of Franco’s dictatorship/style of government; Gitanismo: 
Gypsy civil rights; Andalucismo: regional Andalusian rights/identity/fight for autonomy. 
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his exposed crotch facing the camera and signifying the source of his power.24 Framed 
either side by La Madre (his mother) and La Novia (his bride), each with a dutiful hand 
on each of his shoulders, and surrounded by their guests, we are left in no doubt as to 
the phallocentric nature of this society. With stern and serious expressions on all three 
of their faces contradicting any sense of joyful celebration, it would appear that this 
phallocentrism does not provide happiness for either gender.  
 
Immediately after this still we cut to a mobile camera following the stage manager, 
José, as he walks around the space, switching on numerous light bulbs that are framing 
multiple dressing-room table mirrors, opening up a chest filled with individual 
toolboxes, removing the door of a travelling wardrobe, opening up and extracting a 
bridal veil from a box, and recovering a bouquet of flowers from a basket – the 
exaggerated sound of which, as he arranges them, signifies their rigid plasticity and thus 
their artificiality. As he places the veil and bouquet on one of the dressing-room tables 
the off-screen sound of footsteps approaching and people’s voices are heard, and as José 
looks up, smiles, and walks toward the door the camera cuts to the dance company 
entering the room, led by Antonio Gades/Leonardo and Cristina Hoyos/La Novia. 
Straight away, then, the choreography of the camerawork reveals the ideological 
undercurrents of the film, as we follow the vision of a camera that has no interest in 
keeping a superficial distance but rather draws us into the room by panning after José’s 
movements, and by zooming-in for a closer look beneath the surface of an idealised 
image. Things once closeted and repressed are now being opened up, light is shed on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Whilst this word, machismo, effectively describes El Novio’s pose, it is important to acknowledge the 
problematic and ‘Latinist’ nature of this term (Berg: 2004), since it denies heterogeneity and thus 
supports essentialist notions. As Savigliano writes, ‘”Macho” is the Spanish word for “male,” but it has 
been adopted by other languages/cultures to refer to a “wrong” kind of maleness – an unmanly 
maleness…Machismo is a synonym for the barbaric, uncivilized “virility’ attributed to Latinos’ (1995: 
46). It is thus a word providing evidence of a pervasive foreign and colonising gaze, which has been 
dangerously naturalised, universalised, and eternalised. 
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the regulatory and distorted nature of ideal mirror images, and the factitious nature of 
apparently beautiful objects/images and what they symbolise is (aurally and sensuously) 
indicated. Translating what can be seen into what can be felt, then, the viewer is left 
with an overall sense of openness and proximity, which correlates to the liberal and 
revisionist post-Franco context and politics of the film. 
 
A hierarchy of outcasts 
Whilst a hierarchy is indeed still present within this world, as evidenced by the control 
and gaze of the camera, the order of the dancers’ arrival, and José’s assignation of 
dressing-room tables for select dancers, it is no longer a right-wing dictator who is in 
control but a community of “outcasts.” They are led by a dancer/choreographer who 
was renowned for his integrity, for being a communist and open defender of the 
revolution in Cuba, and for his minimalist and humble style of dance ‘inspired by the 
poor people of his childhood background and in contrast with the 
españolada...promoted by the Francoist regime’ (Simonari 2008: 189). Closely 
following Gades into the room (and in the hierarchy) is Hoyos, the company’s primera 
Bailarina who grew up and learnt how to dance in the kind of poor Andalucian 
neighbourhood so plundered by Franco, and who was/is similarly regarded (by some) as 
an “authentic” representative of traditional baile flamenco.25 And to top it all, this film 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Using the word “authentic” with reference to flamenco is deeply problematic, and it is important to 
acknowledge that the history and origins of flamenco continue to be fiercely disputed both within and 
beyond Spain, involving arguments as to its cultural “ownership.” Emerging from a fusion of cultural 
influences including (but not limited to) that of the Romany Gypsies, Spain’s Moorish past, its Jewish 
roots, the regional traditions that originated in the Spanish south, and influences from Caribbean and 
African styles due to the Spanish colonisation of the Americas, it becomes clear why a definitive history 
is impossible, and how ‘[t]he differences between the stories betray the agendas behind each narrative and 
the anxieties those narratives encompass’ (Heffner Hayes 2009: 4). Indeed, Richard Handler speaks of 
authenticity as a Western construct premised upon individualism and ownership, effectively saying ‘more 
about us than about others’ (1986: 2). And as Said (1978) suggests, post-colonised (or marginalised in 
this case) peoples can internalise Orientalism so much so that they come to believe in and attempt to 
reclaim their (imaginary) cultural heritage, which has been (in part) constructed by their oppressors rather 
than based upon any historical “truth.” Furthermore, how can there be an “authentic” Gypsy culture when 
they were once a nomadic people, travelling through and most probably adopting multiple cultural 
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is an adaptation of an adaptation of a play by a seminal Spanish queer anti-doctrinaire: 
marking the gently camp affectation of José, the man behind the scenes and “running" 
the show, as a deliberate homage to Federico García Lorca in this multi-layered text, 
despite the fact that this may perhaps only be visible to a “knowing” spectator.26 It also 
serves to add a certain resonance to his “opening up of the closets,” the epistemic 
object/space that has historically represented the concealment of queer visibility, since 
the public face of Spain’s gay and lesbian liberation movement, like that of so many 
groups who were ostracised and discriminated against, gradually became more visible 
after the death of Franco.  
 
As the company enters the dressing room, one of the musicians calls José “guapo” as he 
affectionately grasps his chin. There are multiple meanings of guapo, but here I am 
interested in its translation as ‘the handsome and brave one’, or ‘ladies man’ as this can 
either be interpreted as a friendly flirtation acknowledging the courage it takes to stand 
outside of the heteronormative majority, or as a playfully ironic comment as to José’s 
sexual preference.27 Rather than interpreting this as homoerotic, I prefer to see it as an 
affectionate embrace of a queer identity lovingly accepted as part of a community, 
which is marked in its opposition to the fervent and violent homophobia of Franco’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
practices from diverse areas? What is clear, however, is the fact that flamenco’s capacity for evolution 
has ensured its survival, and so rather than having to give it a creation story, it may be more appropriate 
to consider it a hybrid and transnational art form/expression that has both been interpreted and infused 
with different discourses.  
 
26 Although this is not to assert that heterosexuality and camp are mutually exclusive, or that queer men 
are, by definition, camp, since there is no “truth” to homosexuality. Yet a camp style of performance has 
undeniably been a historically queer aesthetic, making visible identities largely rendered invisible due to 
their ‘dangerous’ illegality.  
 
27 Interestingly enough, neither guapo nor the exchange between José and the second affectionate 
musician are translated into subtitles. 
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regime.28 This sense of acceptance is reinforced as another musician puts his arm 
around José and warmly draws him in to kiss his cheek, symbolising the 
contemporaneous Spanish cultural awakening to and acceptance of gay and lesbian 
rights. Furthermore, to add weight to this contextual reading, Lorca’s homosexuality 
was only beginning to be openly discussed in 1983/4 (two years after Bodas was made), 
with the publication for the first time of his heavily homoerotic work, Sonnets of Dark 
Love, which had hitherto been suppressed by his family.29 This perhaps accounts for the 
subtlety of the film’s queer representation and for the fact that its embrace takes place in 
the private space of the dressing room, since even in the years after Franco’s death his 
legacy endured, and homosexuality remained at variance with the (still) dominant 
Catholic morality.  
 
However, the space (or lack of it) between the camera and performers affects the 
viewer’s engagement with the characters on screen, and in turn, this affects the 
relationship between the bodies on (as well as the body of) the screen and our own. 
Filming with a hand-held camera as if through the (highly subjective) eyes of a member 
of the troupe, technology rather than didacticism elicits an empathetic response in the 
viewer. Not only does this serve to inform us that this is not a documentary, despite its 
documentary “feel,” but more importantly it draws us into this anteroom. Both the 
movement of the camera and its close spatial relationship with the performers enables 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Lorca is believed to have been executed during the Spanish Civil War (August 1936) by Nationalist 
anti-communist death squads seeking to silence his outspoken liberal views, including his public and 
artistic support of Andalusian and Gypsy traditions, his rebellion against the bourgeois Spanish society, 
and for his homosexuality. Franco was publicly proclaimed Generalisimo of the National army and head 
of state in October 1936 (Beevor: 1982), imposing a general ban on Lorca’s work until 1953 and 
effectively silencing information concerning his death for close to forty years. 
 
29 The first (published) study to explore Lorca’s homosexuality and its relevance to his works was Paul 
Binding’s (1985) book, Lorca. The Gay Imagination, swiftly followed by the more scholarly (1986) 
doctoral dissertation by Angel Sahuquillo, Federico García Lorca y la Cultura de la homosexualidad 
masculine, or Federico García Lorca and the Culture of Male Homosexuality, eventually published as a 
book in 1991.  
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access to interiority, and it is this proximity that can lead to the emotional affect or 
duplication in the viewer, as we immediately feel part of this company and therefore 
begin to embody the values of its community by feeling the warmth between its 
members. Although better known for his work on intellectual montage, Sergei 
Eisenstein was also interested in the ‘emotional shocks’ (1942: 231) that a film can have 
on the body of its (politicised) spectator, prompting the political action that may 
contribute to the transformation of society. Therefore, as Jane Gaines writes, ‘politics is 
not exclusively a matter of the head but can also be a matter of the heart’ (1999: 88). 
 
As well as the deconstruction of ideologically loaded expressions of Spanishness, then, 
one might argue that the affective choreography of the camera, even in the scenes not 
featuring dance, works towards encouraging a more liberal and celebratory coming 
together of a nation, thereby restating the relevance of flamenco for an early-eighties 
post-Franco Spanish society.  And for a contemporary and international audience, it 
welcomes us into an expression of a culture, reflecting how, once a (flamenco) culture 
is transported outside of its national borders, it ‘becomes part of a global dialogue 
intertwined with new histories, stories and contexts’ (Washabaugh 1998: 4). The 
multiple ways in which a film is received both nationally and internationally mirrors the 
ways in which cultures/societies/people are spaces in a constant state of flux, serving to 
problematise any notions of “authenticity.” The sense of openness in Bodas, therefore, 
serves to make flamenco accessible to all, whilst maintaining a great respect for its 
histories and orthodoxies. 
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“History” as a form of representation 
If the slow zoom-into the still of the wedding photograph serves to draw the viewer in 
for a closer look at this community, then an illusion is immediately shattered as the 
company enters the dressing room. The characters framed in the photograph, under 
control, static and powerless, come to life in a 1980s context and thus reveal the 
fabricated nature of idealised images. It has not been a historical and rustic Gypsy 
community captured and frozen in time (as is suggested by the title of the film and its 
connection to Lorca’s play), but a still of the company in full costume and make-up, 
manipulated in order to appear old. This silent and still image gives visual expression to 
an exoticised and idealised vision of Spanish “Gypsies”, giving viewers limitless space 
to recreate what they think they see in their own terms. As beauty is fixed in The 
Picture of Dorian Gray (Oscar Wilde, 1891), so too can a culture be fixed by the 
portraits that are made of it, powerless images upon which a myriad of (colonial, post-
colonial, and patriarchal etc.,) fantasies may be projected. However, by contrasting the 
still with the living dancers/actors, the film refuses to conform to (and thus 
deconstructs) the fantasies inspired by it, suggesting that Spanishness is not coterminous 
with these kinds of romanticised images, but that there are many different ways of being 
Spanish. Furthermore, through revealing the performative nature of this “aged” image, 
it eloquently articulates Walter Benjamin’s words quoted previously, visually alerting 
its viewers to the fact that “historical” representations cannot be fully trusted since 
“history” is (literally in this case) ‘time filled by the presence of the now’ (1969: 261).  
 
It is interesting that the film ends on an identical slow zoom-into the same wedding 
photograph, conveying a sense that despite the work done in the main body of the film 
to deconstruct the ideologies that are represented in histories, thus revealing history as a 
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form of representation, these kinds of exoticised and ahistorical images have been 
eternalised: the effects of power and desire that are deeply embedded within both 
national and international consciousnesses. The use of this still to open and close the 
film, then, can be read as a reference to how repetition tends to normalise stereotypical 
constructions, which leads to them not only being believed but endlessly reinforced and 
reiterated. However, on a more optimistic note, because the film has (potentially) 
provided its viewer with knowledge about the Other and the stereotyping process, which 
is the only antidote to stereotyping, it is easier to see beneath the surface of this still 
when confronted with it for a second time, since we have gained an understanding of 
how and why it works.  
 
The performative and constructed nature of identity 
With the company’s arrival the rituals of preparation begin: costumes are retrieved from 
the opened wardrobe, cosmetic toolboxes are unlocked and make-up, wigs, and good 
luck charms are laid out on the dressing-room tables. Pictures (of Jesus, a saint with the 
baby Jesus, a photograph of a child, and Gades’s military photograph) are affixed to 
mirrors, infusing the room with a sense of the sacred.30 The dedication of dancers to 
their performance is bordering on the religious, enlightening the viewer as to the hard 
work that goes into the merging of performer with role. As if to accentuate this point we 
hear a dancer asking for aspirin, indicating the physical labour and pain involved in this 
level of devotion, and later on in the film we also hear about dancers’ blistered feet, 
twisted ankles, and damaged knees. If you believe (as I do) that freedom can only come 
through discipline, then the (Gypsy) dancers who reputedly have flamenco “flowing 
through their veins” have actually learnt it through being part of a community and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Bodas de sangre was filmed in the Amor de Dios studio, which not only translates as ‘Love of God’ but 
is also ‘one of the most respected flamenco schools in Madrid’ (Schupp 2003: 91), where many of the 
great “masters” of flamenco have rehearsed and performed.  
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through the observation of their elders, just as this company has learnt Gades’s 
choreography. Therefore, even the most apparently spontaneous or inherent expressions 
of cultural identity have been learnt, rehearsed, and perfected, a fact which serves to 
avoid the negation of artistic expression that may otherwise be dangerously 
dehistoricised.  
 
This scene also serves to offer a fleeting insight into the social reality of the dancers 
before they quickly shed their identities, identities that are multiple and fluid even 
before the donning of costumes and accoutrements necessary for the performance of 
culture, as revealed in the familial, religious, and political images reflected back at them 
as they gaze into their mirrors. Rather than seeing identity as a single unitary self, we 
are encouraged to view personal and cultural/national identity as multi-faceted, 
acknowledging that there are always a number of selves or identities dependent upon 
context and setting. This sense of multiplicity is heightened by the myriad framed 
mirror reflections of the dancers seated at their tables: there are no Lacanian ideal and 
whole mirror images, which is in sharp contrast to the singularly fixed (and false) 
representation of national identity, as perpetuated in the españoladas.  
 
Another revealing moment during this densely packed prologue involves the making-up 
of the musicians as they rehearse a song. Dark brown powder is applied to their faces as 
they “black up” in order to resemble the darker skinned archetype of the Gypsy. They 
are, however, (audibly) marked as Andalusians, reputedly the equal originators of 
flamenco.31 Even those praised for their “authenticity” are not regarded as “authentic” 
enough, having to adopt and perform the familiar and colourful portrayals of Spanish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Although I cannot distinguish regional Spanish accents myself, Hopewell writes that ‘Saura eavesdrops 
on the Andalusian twang of the musicians as they chat in the make-up room’ (1986: 259, n.51). 
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flamenco culture. After the warm-up and rehearsal that follow this prologue there is 
another brief (and final) scene that does not depict dance, but the costuming of the 
dancers before the full dress rehearsal. With no scopophilic intent evident, the female 
dancers are filmed getting undressed at a respectful distance. The camera then zooms in 
closer to hear them laughing, discussing both their own and Gades’s anxieties about the 
performance, asking each other how they look, commenting on each other’s sweat, and 
complaining about their shoes. Just as Gypsy/Andalusian/flamenco culture is 
demystified, so too are the dancers, as we briefly get a sense of who they are as well as 
the blood, sweat, and tears that are poured into their performance. Then, in a Brechtian 
style gestus, they put on their costumes and immediately “become” their characters.32  
 
From this moment on the use of mirrors is suspended until the final scene of the film, 
connoting the sense that once their make-up has been applied and costumes donned the 
dancers shed their own individual identities and are transformed physically, 
consciously, and completely into performers of culture: bound by a fixed and defined 
role.33 These representations are not multi-faceted like the performers portraying them 
or the culture(s) they are depicting, and through highlighting these performative aspects 
of cultural/national identity, this kind of “staged authenticity” is shown to be a socially 
constructed concept: used as a central tool in the marketing of Spain, but actually a 
difficult and complex concept that is open to many interpretations that are both 
negotiable and relative. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In relation to acting, a gestus is best understood as a physical action or a spatial configuration which 
expresses an attitude revealing the ideological, social and economic construction of a character (Brecht: 
1974). 
 
33 Gades and Juan Antonio Jiménez/El Novio are also filmed as they dress, choose their knives, 
compliment each other, and discuss injuries. We also see Gades circling into his fajín (sash) as it wraps 
around his waist, literally binding him into the role of Leonardo. 
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A mobile camera tracks after a close-up shot of what looks like a military duffle bag 
being dragged along the floor, the pronounced sound of which conveys its burdensome 
weight. As it comes to a halt the camera pans up to reveal Cristina Hoyos unlocking it, 
and it is this imagery that immediately connotes a sense of the cultural/emotional 
baggage that Spaniards were carrying due to the dictatorship, baggage that was 
hindering their freedom of movement and expression as well as any intercultural 
dialogue. The locked bag, wardrobe, and cosmetic toolboxes can thus be seen as 
metaphors for the españoladas, within which lie the artifice of flamenco culture that 
will be taken out and put on by these performers. The fact that this duffle bag also 
resembles a laundry bag heightens the sense that Bodas is airing Spain’s dirty laundry in 
public, as it was, at the time of this film, a nation coming to terms with its new-found 
freedom as well as the horrors of its past. 
 
The fragmentation of identity 
Identification is not about denying the difference between the self and the 
other, the mirror moment that produces normalcy. It may be more about 
using differences, about accumulating possible selves – a process, in fact, 
that is more accretive than anything else and thus offers a direct challenge 
to the rule of one identity per body.                                 (Gaines 2001: 112)  
 
The above statement by Jane Gaines offers a valuably concise reading of the final part 
of the film’s prologue, which has Gades seated at his dressing-room table applying 
make-up whilst his voice-over narrates the story of his life but his image does not speak, 
with the camera cutting to various other fragmented shots of dancers applying make-up, 
false eye-lashes, etc, and then finally returning to Gades as he lights a cigarette and 
observes himself in the mirror as Leonardo. This separation of voice and body 
contributes to the deconstruction of Gades himself, who, as choreographer is in a 
powerful position, and as Leonardo, the only named character in Lorca’s play and thus a 
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figure of (patriarchal) authority, represents a Lacanian ideal image if ever there was one, 
particularly since the company learn their moves through observing his mirror image! 
Furthermore, he is a flamenco ballet dancer/choreographer in a post-Franco context 
before its (more mainstream) cultural reappropriation, and so potentially symbolises, on 
the surface level, a Francoist ideal image. However, as he lists the various jobs he had to 
take from the age of eleven despite wanting to stay at school, leading up to his 
discovery as a dancer, not only do we hear about his different incarnations but we see 
him simultaneously transform into yet another role through the application of make-up, 
and all this interspersed with numerous multilayered mirror reflections of other dancers 
transforming themselves. The combination of filmic conventions and Gades’s 
monologue thus constructs his complex character, shattering any sense of a complete, 
singular, and idealised image by revealing the fragmentary nature of identity.  
 
This is augmented through a play of mirrors as mirror is replaced with camera. Gades 
applies his make-up whilst peering into a small hand-held mirror and then turns to the 
dressing-room table mirror affixed to the wall to check his reflection, which is replaced 
by the lens of the camera. The disorientated viewer is thus presented with an illusory 
reflection, provoking a questioning of the “reality” of what we see which thereby 
enhances Gades’s self-deconstructing monologue.34 Are we to believe in this illusory 
reflection, or is this supposed to be read as a documentary-style reality that has Gades 
looking directly into the camera? The symbolism of Saura’s recurrent use of mirrors is 
thus revealed: the Francoist mirror/camera reflected propagandist and regulatory images 
back to a Spanish (and international) audience, and when ‘[p]rojection and reflection 
take place in a closed space…those who remain there, whether they know it or not (but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 This juxtaposition of what is real and what is imaginary is essentially cinematic. 
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they do not), find themselves chained, captured, or captivated’ (Baudry 1970: 352). So 
just as we see/hear multiple representations of Gades but never actually see his 
reflection, so too did the españoladas project a tradition of distorted, limited, and 
pejorative ‘images but not “reality”’ (ibid).35 Gypsies/Andalusians and by association, 
flamenco culture, had been the object of the (Francoist) gaze, denied agency by being 
constructed and positioned for the visual and narrative pleasure of the “norm,” 
depriving them of any “real” reflections of themselves whilst producing and defining 
the cultural ideals that would provide the necessary ideological justification for race, 
gender, and class oppression. Therefore, whilst a narcissistic identification with these 
images may have momentarily provided an audience/nation with a powerful sense of 
complete superiority/inferiority, or transmit an impression that “complete” 
understanding of another nation had been achieved, this feeling was/is inevitably an 
illusion, exactly the point that this revisionist and interrogative use of the mirror/camera 
makes, since camerawork and editing elucidate how racial ideology has worked so 
effectively. In this way, the paradoxical and ideological nature of the cinematic 
apparatus is exposed, and Bodas’s formal duplicity works to reveal how ‘art is not 
necessarily a mirror to reality. [Is it ever?] Events or figures differ substantially in their 
artistic and social significance’ (Hopewell 1986: 153). So whilst Gades may well be the 
object of our gaze he returns it in a direct address to the camera/spectator, refusing to be 
a passive racial or ethnic object by asserting his own subjectivity and visual power in an 
oppositional gaze whilst speaking his multiple “truths,” and thereby breaking away 
from existing stereotypes and myths. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 These multiple representations of Gades include his younger self, as described in the jobs of his youth; 
the future of this younger self, signified by the retrospective monologue; his present self as we see him 
seated at his dressing-room table; his illusory reflection/self peering into the mirror/camera; and his 
transformation into the character of Leonardo by the end of the sequence. 
	   60	  
As if to substantiate this deconstruction of Gades and of the other dancers in the 
company, they are then reconstructed in the following warm-up and rehearsal. As the 
dancers watch and copy Gades’s instruction whilst looking at their own mirror 
reflections, they don’t master the choreography immediately and have to ask questions 
whilst making mistakes, particularly Cristina Hoyos who is the primera Bailarina and 
thus on a par with Gades in terms of being a supposed “ideal image.” We hear Gades 
make numerous comments such as “so so”, “what a mess, no offence”, and “what a 
disaster”, and we are thus presented with a company of Spanish dancers who do not 
aspire to a false ideal, but are happy to reveal the hard work that goes into a 
performance, the mistakes that are made, and the good humour with which this is taken. 
Furthermore, a hand-held camera constantly moves with the dancers, aligning the 
viewer’s point-of-view with theirs so that instead of a framed, distanced, and idealised 
image of the company, we become part of it and part of the dance. Any elitist, idealised, 
or “authentic” notions pertaining to flamenco are thus shattered, as the camerawork 
transmits the message that it is an art form/expression that is open to all. 
 
Carmen’s “ballet rats” 
Carmen, the second film I shall discuss here, opens on a high-angled shot looking down 
upon a static group of female dancers dressed in an array of colourful flamenco skirts, 
tops, shawls, and legwarmers, headed by Antonio Gades who is marked in his position 
of power, by being the only man in frame, and by the drabness of his grey trousers, 
jumper, and shoes.36 With the camera positioned just to the side rather than directly 
behind the dancers, we get a diagonal view across the space that captures either the 
backs of the dancers or their side profile as they face the mirrored wall in front of them, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Whilst writing about Carmen I shall refer to Antonio Gades by his first name, since this is also his 
character’s name in the film. 
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the corner of which is just visible in the top right-hand corner of the frame. Along with 
the heavy black curtain that spans the width of the background, the mise-en-scene 
informs us that we are observing a rehearsal in a dance studio, and the composition of 
this shot is reminiscent of Degas’ sketches and paintings of ballerinas shown backstage 
and in rehearsal, immediately hinting at the French precedents of the Carmen myth. 
 
Degas’ preference for colours such as ultramarine blue and various shades of brilliant 
pink are reflected in the costuming of the dancers, and the way that the key source of 
(soft) light comes from above, both illuminating the bare shoulders of some of the 
women and endowing the scene with a hazy/wispy quality, can be read as a reference to 
the pastel-like ethereal and intoxicating quality of Degas’ dancers, who were similarly 
lit from above by the staged lighting of the theatre. Degas never painted the prima 
ballerinas of his time, preferring instead the everyday dancers known derogatively as 
“ballet rats,” which adds a certain resonance to the fact that we later hear Antonio 
referring to these dancers as not “bad, but I don’t see any of them as Carmen.” And 
furthermore, the dancers hold their opening position for five seconds before Antonio 
counts them in and they begin to move, thereby adding to the painterly quality of this 
opening shot. However, it is not so much the aesthetics of this comparison, or the fact 
that it provides further evidence for the French origins of the “flamenco myth” that 
interests me most about this reference to Degas, but the fact that he was widely reputed 
to have been a profoundly conservative and misogynistic bachelor whose most intense 
examination of women took place from within a box in the theatre, a privileged position 
from which he would look down upon the ballet in a most productive voyeurism, 
imposing a male discourse onto a (silenced and objectified) female world. And it is 
exactly the Francoist appropriation and distortion of the archetype of Carmen in the 
	   62	  
service of the phallocentric system, a system whose powerful imposition of chauvinistic 
patriarchal discourse had conditioned Spaniards’ vision of themselves and of each other, 
thereby making them complicit in their own victimisation, that this film both 
interrogates and reacts against in its version of the Carmen myth.  
 
Patriarchal drill 
Having counted them in, Antonio leads and the dancers follow by stamping their left 
foot down and then moving in-synch to the left of the screen, back to the right, left and 
right again in a formation resembling a military-style drill in which hips sway and feet 
stamp in strong and dynamic rhythms, with the camera gently sweeping after them from 
its high-angled perspective. As the only source of either diegetic or nondiegetic sound, 
the dancers’ snapping fingers and marching feet add to a sense of growing intensity and 
tension, reflecting the way in which military exercises can serve to escalate hostilities. 
After the fourth “march” back to the right-hand of the screen, Antonio turns around to 
look directly at the dancers as they advance towards him for six counts and he retreats 
backwards; they then stamp their feet on the spot for a count of four and then proceed 
towards him again for another six counts, backing him up against the mirror behind. 
During this sequence the camera very slowly pans down so that it is positioned amongst 
the massed rank of dancers before gradually zooming into a close-up of Antonio, 
thereby bringing their reflections into view and creating the impression that Antonio is 
surrounded on both sides. Paul Julian-Smith has commented on the fact that ‘the story 
boards for Carmen resemble military maps, with sweeping arrows plotting the 
deployment of dancers’ (2000: 169), which not only indicates the intense discipline, 
strength, and control of flamenco dance, but more importantly articulates a political 
dimension of the film. 
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In command of a battery of fifteen female dancers, Antonio begins by effectively 
performing Carmen for them to copy as they all face the huge mirror, thus revealing 
both the narcissistic and masochistic construction of this idealised fantasy-woman, and 
the male omnipotence in this female-dominated space. Antonio sees his ideal Other in 
his own reflection, conveying the fact that female archetypes are the 
products/projections of male fears and fantasies and not anything to do with real 
women: illustrated by a series of crosscuts between subjective medium shots that pan 
across from one dancer to the next, and then back to a close-up of an increasingly 
disappointed and anxious-looking Antonio, revealing his POV as he tries to imagine 
each of them as Carmen.37 Towards the end of this prologue a discouraged Antonio 
gives up and swiftly walks over to the side of the stage, asking Cristina (Hoyos) to “take 
care of them.” As she asks “the same step?” the level of his disheartenment is palpable 
as he shrugs his shoulders and replies, “whatever you feel like,” and then proceeds to 
ask Paco de Lucía, both the musical director within the film and a hugely respected 
flamenco guitarist, to “check the dance academies” in Seville for a suitable Carmen, 
marked for being the birthplace of Mérimée’s Carmen and thus revealing the 
inculcation not only of Spanish patriarchal discourse, but also of the ubiquitous foreign 
and Orientalist construction of Spanishness.38  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Antonio performing as Carmen for Carmen to copy is repeated later on in the film, as she is instructed 
in how to be more feminine, and this idea that the perfect “woman” is merely ‘the split of the single 
subject … into himself’ is nothing new, as explored in an interesting book by Anne Callahan, Writing the 
Voice of Pleasure. Heterosexuality Without Women (2001: 53). In this, she charts the Western literary 
tradition of ‘the troubadour effect’ that dates back to the twelfth century, in which the heterosexual couple 
is presented as the romantic norm. However, when you look a little closer, ‘[t]he woman in narratives of 
desire is an illusion, a representation of a male artist’s desire to transcend conventional masculinity and 
express his difference from other men. The perfect woman of western romance is a man, and the sexual 
arrangements in narratives of desire in Western culture are most aptly described as heterosexuality 
without women’ (195). Thus the misogyny and heterophobia apparent in Antonio’s attitude are 
‘landmarks of modern and postmodern culture’ (ibid).   
 
38 Furthermore, the fact that Cristina Hoyos was born and learnt how to dance in the Alfalfa district of 
Seville, ‘has the racial look of a Gypsy’ (Colmeiro 2005: 101), is, to quote Antonio in the film, “the best 
dancer,” and to quote Saura, has dancing ‘in her bones’ (in Schupp 2003: 93), not only makes her the 
most obvious choice for the title role, but arguably the best since her personal identity is closest to the 
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Conditioned, then, by his phallocentric and colonial education to believe that this 
dangerously exotic and passionate myth made-flesh actually exists, the quest for his 
femme fatale is ultimately masochistic not only because she is fictitious but because he 
already knows, since it is written, that she will punish/castrate him: an offence against 
patriarchy for which she will “justifiably” be destroyed. Yet he searches for her 
regardless, and Antonio’s role as choreographer/controller of movement and behaviour 
can thus be read as a metaphor for the ideological militancy with which the Francoist 
regime worked to indoctrinate Spanish women (and men) into the roles prescribed by 
patriarchy. Antonio attempts to construct his fantasy and it attacks/surrounds him, 
illustrating the crisis in masculinity that occurs when men become victims of their own 
phallocentric myth making. Just like the slow zoom-into the (unhappy) wedding still in 
Bodas, the choreography disrupts a simplistic, ahistorical, and transnational 
generalisation of patriarchy that constructs all men as oppressors and all women as 
victims, by acknowledging the effect that discourses of masculinities have upon men’s 
lives as well.39 In this film’s post-Franco context, when ‘women’s liberation, like 
regional nationalism, became an issue at the same time as Spain was moving from 
dictatorship to democracy’ (Hooper 1995: 165), dance works to elucidate the stake that 
Spanish men had in the transformation of gender, encouraging an examination of 
masculinities that could potentially both complement and inform feminist strategies for 
change. After all, Antonio’s search for, discovery of, relationship with, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cultural construction of Carmen. Indeed, in the stage version of Gades’s Carmen Cristina played the title 
role. Therefore it is no coincidence that in the film Antonio cannot see what is right in front of him, 
passing over the experienced Cristina for “someone different and younger,” and thereby revealing how 
the internalisation of idealised images can distort the judgement of women, and how the silver screen has 
been used to service patriarchy in its perpetuation of these stereotypes at the expense of “real,” or more 
specifically, older women.  
 
39 However, this is not to say that men and women are equally victimised under patriarchy, or that men 
revolt against patriarchy for the same reasons as women; and thus their victories may not be counted as 
victories for women. Yet there is a danger in labelling all men phallocentric because whilst this word is 
important and does have its use, it should be used carefully because not all men are phallocratic otherwise 
nothing would ever change in the world, and likewise, neither are all women anti-phallocratic. 
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jealousy/“murder” of Carmen do not bring him much in the way of happiness. Indeed, 
his intensely pained expressions throughout the film signify quite the reverse, revealing 
him to be a ‘prisoner of traditional male attitudes which see women as sex objects, as 
possessions which are theirs and no one else’s’ (Edwards 1995: 110). 
 
A fissure in power relations: bodies that do politics 
As well as being a choreographic reference to the way in which patriarchal ideologies 
drill discipline into women, increasing both the psychological and physical control over 
their bodies as they are trained to submit to male hegemony, this initial dance sequence 
can also be read as a reference to the burgeoning movement against patriarchy’s 
silencing and disempowerment of women. As Hooper writes, ‘the social revolution of 
the eighties was about gender. It was the decade in which Spanish women flooded into 
higher education and on to the labour market’ (ibid: 168). So whilst their shaping into a 
mass-moving pattern arguably averts the threat that a single woman might pose in her 
demand to be acknowledged as a person, it also gives language to an embodied politics, 
affecting a sense of their intersubjective and corporeal experiences of togetherness and 
strength as they move in-synch against and into the space of oppressive 
constraints/Antonio, who aims to set them apart in competition.40 This sense of their 
emotional bonding through rhythmic coordinated movement is an example of how 
dancing bodies (and cameras) can do politics, a politics that has ‘little to do with 
thoughts…that is unintentional, inadvertent, but no less effective than conceptual 
politics’ (Washabaugh 1995: 87), and can have, in turn, a psychological, emotional, and 
visceral affect on both participants and audience.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Because coordination and synchronization are ubiquitous within flamenco culture, it is an art form that 
has been appropriated by various politically oriented groups/agendas, and Carmen’s (danced) 
representation of Spanish womens’ fight for freedom ‘is allied to the vindication of flamenco. [Since] 
[h]er independence challenges and exposes Antonio’s own crumbling ideology in accordance with the 
changes in contemporary Spain’ (Stone 2002: 78).  
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Stemming from his own ‘sense of pervasive well-being…[and] more specifically, a 
strange sense of personal enlargement’ (1995: 2) thanks to his participation in close-
order drill as a draftee of the United States army in 1941, William H. McNeill 
investigates the historical affects of ritualised movement on group identity in Keeping 
Together in Time:  
Obviously, something visceral was at work; something, I later 
concluded, far older than language and critically important in human 
history, because the emotion it arouses constitutes an indefinitely 
expansible basis for social cohesion among any and every group that 
keeps together in time…”Muscular bonding” is the most economical 
label I could find for this phenomenon, and I hope the phrase will be 
understood to mean the euphoric fellow feeling that prolonged and 
rhythmic muscular movement arouses among nearly all participants in 
such exercises.41                                                                         (ibid: 2-3) 
 
As Antonio ceases to lead and turns around to watch “his” dancers they do not descend 
into undisciplined chaos, but advance towards him with a physical unity that reflects 
women’s growing power and his increasing isolation in the face of it, offering an 
example of how this kind of ‘muscular bonding’ can be appropriated for political 
purposes. Indeed, it is interesting that both novella and opera present Carmen’s dancing 
as seductive solo performances, whereas Gades largely represents her as part of a 
female group, neither the centre of attention nor sole object of the gaze, but part of a 
coordinated “mass” working in parallel. So whilst agreeing with Rosella Simonari’s 
contention that this ‘use of the group is paradigmatic of Gades’s political interpretation 
of the myth. Carmen is aware of her class, she is a worker and as such she lives and 
fights with the people from this same background’ (2008: 199), I would add that their 
somatic interconnectedness also works to ally her individual fight for freedom to the 
wider socio-historical and political context of women’s liberation. And thus, ‘her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
41 McNeill does, however, acknowledge that ‘isolated individuals can indeed consciously repress the 
euphoric affect of keeping together in time when compelled to take part in something they dislike or fear 
or hate’ (1995: n. 2, 159). 
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dancing should be recognised as the politicised expression of female identity’, revealing 
how feminist ideologies may be conveyed through motion and physicality (Stone 2002: 
77-78). 
 
A shared somatic experience 
As the sweeping, gliding camerawork and slow zooms of this initial sequence reflect 
and imitate both the fluidity and mobility of the dancers’ bodies, it is as if the 
phenomenological sense of the film’s body draws me into the dance, intimately 
submerging me into the flow of movement through my alignment with the camera’s 
point-of-view. A physical relationship is thus established between three bodies, those of 
the dancers’ on screen, the film’s body, and my own, and in watching I ‘can see the 
seeing as well as the seen, hear the hearing as well as the heard, and feel the movement 
as well as see the moved’ (Sobchack 1992: 10, my emphasis). The euphoric feeling of 
moving in-synch that McNeill writes about, then, is not restricted to actual participants 
of the filmed dance, but can kinaesthetically extend to viewers who respond physically 
and with ‘heart’ to movement both on and of the film (op. cit. Gaines: 1999).  
 
Therefore, the strength of this experience is, for me, heavily reliant upon the activation 
of my body, signalling the inseparability between our bodies and our minds and thus 
revealing how our thinking is dependent upon our corporeality. “Meaning” is, after all, 
layered, with some levels not always literally and cognitively intelligible but sensually 
and muscularly felt and understood. However, this is not to say that either process of 
understanding negates the other because they are inseparable, always working together 
in the creation and enhancement of meaning whether paradoxical or not. In Julia 
Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language (1984), she criticises the fixed and static 
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model of traditional semiology in which the linear and logical realm of the symbolic 
provides the rules and codes that constitute the building blocks of meaning. Instead, she 
posits that all signifying practices, like human beings, are complex, contradictory, and 
forever changing over time and space, and are thus processes that contain both the 
symbolic and the semiotic realms: or what Kristeva terms the chora. This realm, 
deriving from the Greek word for womb, relates to our internal rhythms, to our 
somatically felt, emotional, and oftentimes abstract experience of meaning that is more 
fluid and less precise than the symbolic, and a space of meaning that has been Othered 
by the supremacy of binary logic. Thus, through giving credence to a form of 
(nonrational) perception, Kristeva’s chora is potentially subversive since it encourages a 
transformation in the way that we privilege meaning making processes, and can 
therefore lead to the ‘production of a different kind of subject, one capable of bringing 
about new social relations’ that are not dependent upon the mind/body, nature/culture, 
subject/object, and interior/exterior oppositions (Kristeva 1984: 105). 
 
Despite differences in terms of their respective grounding in Lacanian psychoanalysis 
and philosophy, Kristeva and Sobchack are thus similarly concerned with the materiality 
of meaning, and since Sobchack calls for more attention to be given to our direct bodily 
experience specifically of cinema, I shall now articulate my own bodily response to this 
initial synchronised dance sequence.  
 
The first five seconds of quiescence inspire in me a feeling of subordination, as I “stand” 
to attention, waiting expectantly for something to happen, just as the dancers wait for 
Antonio’s direction. As we are counted in, the camera immediately begins to mirror the 
dancers’ graceful and confident movements in an inclusive gesture that serves to gather 
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me into their community: a feeling that is accentuated by the tight framing of the scene, 
as well as the camera briefly positioning itself amongst them on its trajectory towards a 
close-up of Antonio. The poise and strength of the simple and clean choreography is 
spelt out by the sound of the dancers’ feet and fingers stamping and snapping in the 
same rhythm and with the same intensity, so that even when the camera cuts to 
Antonio’s POV, I remain interconnected with the synchronised dancers because I am 
feeling the compás, or rhythm, inside my body, as my own internal rhythms, my ‘heart, 
lungs, pulsing fluids, and firing synapses receive, respond to, and reenact the rhythms of 
cinema’ (Barker 2009: 3). The visceral nature of this relationship is both mesmerising 
and somehow deeply moving, and I am transformed into an emotional participant who is 
not only observing but also now feeling the dance resonate throughout my body-mind.42  
 
Without thinking I pull in my abdominal muscles and hold my pelvic floor, internal 
adjustments that improve my sense of core strength as I mirror the attitude of the 
dancers/dance/film, feeling more upright, grounded, elegant and proud, despite the fact 
that I am not discernibly moving. It is this kind of ‘muscular engagement’ with the film 
that enables me to ‘straddle that threshold between “here and there,” body and image. In 
the cinematic experience, we inhabit both places at once, with varying degrees of 
success’ (ibid: 72). This affirmation of my body as part of the group moving in-synch 
and in kinetic exhilaration endows me with a sense of self-confidence and of belonging, 
something that Sobchack refers to as the ‘carnal subversion of fixed subject positions’ 
(2004: 67). This, in turn, creates a form of empathy that shapes my understanding of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Aficionados and flamencólogos believe that flamenco can only be understood instinctively, by the 
irrational, emotional body-mind. Whilst this kind of passion has undoubtedly played a major role in the 
production of exoticism, passion and emotion are undeniably highly valued in flamenco, since it is not a 
half-hearted dance but one that encourages an intense release of self. The compás, or rhythms, are to be 
felt and lived, not counted, and as the audience participate by playing palmas (clapping their hands), or 
through jaleo (spoken or shouted comments), the dividing line between performers and audience is 
blurred. This impulsive, emotional, and embodied way of experiencing the film is therefore arguably 
more in tune with traditional flamenco, supporting the need for a sensual analysis of this film. 
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film. Through listening to the dancers’ rhythms with my body in this way, it is as if we 
share the present moment, and therein, a simple (yet illusory) sense of freedom: no 
longer feeling the exertion of the film’s or Antonio’s power over us, we are able to 
collectively transcend the gendered hierarchies that have produced and now direct and 
survey “our” movement. This is because I have become part of a “mass” body that 
moves in space and in relation to other bodies, simultaneously in my body and feeling 
the sensations of this movement, whilst my spacious body is “everywhere,” becoming 
space, and thus, feeling “free.” And although of course I know that I am not dancing 
with them in the same place and time, ‘I still do have a partially fulfilled sensory 
experience of these things that make them both intelligible to me and meaningful for 
me’ (ibid: 76), enhancing my critical understanding of the film through the meanings 
that are conveyed through motion and physicality as well as through cognition and 
emotion. Merleau-Ponty proposes that there is a stage in an infant’s development in 
which the divide between real and imaginary space does not exist, correlating with 
Lacan’s account of the mirror stage. He writes that, 
The child knows well that he is where his introspective body is, and yet in 
the depth of the mirror he sees the same being present, in a bizarre way, in a 
visible appearance. There is a mode of spatiality in the specular image that is 
altogether distinct from adult spatiality.                                         (1964: 129) 
 
Perhaps, then, this imaginative and creative feeling of spaciousness and freedom is just 
that because it ruptures pre-existing forms of (learnt) subjectivity, granting us moments 
of escape/challenge to and from rational/adult understanding and constructs in order to 
experience a more phenomenological conception of time and space, in which any one 
dimension is not privileged over another. Through internalising the rhythm and 
synchronising with the bodies on screen and with the camera, a feeling of empowered 
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and celebratory revolt is expressed and embodied, and as such, this dance symbolises 
the fight for liberty and the independence from patriarchal authority.  
 
Encouraging solidarity?  
Whilst moving “with” these women is, as Deidre Sklar’s ethnographic work on dance 
communities suggests, ‘a way to also “feel with” them, providing an opening into the 
kind of cultural knowledge that is not available through words or observation alone’ 
(1994: 11), I cannot ignore the fact that I am interpreting this dance, and indeed the 
entire film, through the prism of my own socio-historical, cultural and somatic 
experience. Therefore, I can never claim to know what the dancers were feeling or to 
speak on their behalf, or for Saura or Gades for that matter, since I can only speak for 
myself. Not all, or indeed any viewers will respond to the gestures of the dancers/film in 
kind, and may consciously resist what I feel to be the physical (and feminist) pull of the 
film. This is partly why film is so exciting, because meaning is never fixed or static; it 
does not reside solely in my body, in the cinematic representation, or in its context, but 
in their conjunction. And this conjunction, for me, makes the prologue to Carmen a 
powerful and political form of tactile communication, helping to produce Kristeva’s 
notion of ‘a different kind of subject…capable of bringing about new social relations’ 
(1984: 105).  
 
In exploiting the audiences’ emotional and physical response to mass synchronised 
movement (coterminous to the time of its release), the film encourages solidarity 
between Spanish women (and men) striving for equality on a subrational level, thus 
making the collective task of feminism more effective in 1980s Spain. The repeated 
representation of keeping together in time may have also encouraged and/or supported a 
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sense of national solidarity, as Spain was beginning to challenge the legacy of 
Francoism as well as attempt to exorcise foreign conceptions of Spanishness.43 And so 
for a contemporary audience, this bodily synchronicity can aid an embodied 
understanding, without the need for words or didacticism, of feminism as a complex 
generational movement, shedding light on the struggles and battles waged in the past in 
order to understand how we have reached where we are today, and thereby connecting 
to a history of women’s strength and power. In not taking for granted how much has 
changed for women due to these struggles, whilst also remaining aware of persistent 
inequalities, we may learn to address the powerful backlash against feminism, and the 
resulting misperceptions that many young women, in particular, have about feminism. 
And although this film deals specifically with Spanish feminism, these lessons transcend 
national and cultural borders. 
 
The credit sequence: foreign perspective/male discourse 
This simple yet incredibly rich introduction to Carmen ends with an abrupt cut to the 
credit sequence after Antonio has expressed his disappointment, as noted earlier, in the 
dancers featured in this prologue. Accompanied by Bizet’s choral music and projected 
against a series of engravings that depict the French artist, Gustave Doré’s, 1862 
journey through Spain, we move directly from Antonio’s failed attempts at inflicting a 
false ideal upon “real” women, to a series of false images/sounds of Spanishness, 
‘bound up as [they are] in the colonizing aesthetics of foreign perceptions of Spain’ 
(D’Lugo 1991: 205). As the first title acknowledges the inspiration of both Mérimée 
and Bizet, the camera focuses on a group of men looking up as they are seated around a 
table, upon which we can see the feet of a woman. Straight away then, Mérimée and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 This is also evident in the rehearsal that comes straight after the prologue in Bodas: as the dancers 
gradually synchronise their steps they are transformed into an ensemble working together, as opposed to 
the (deconstructed) individuals that we have just witnessed getting ready. 
	   73	  
Bizet are associated not only with a foreign perspective of Spain, but with a tradition of 
male discourse, since this image of woman is one seen through the eyes of the men who 
are looking up at her. This focus on the feet of a woman is repeated in four shots of 
different engravings, connoting a sense that despite being her creators, men are 
subordinate to their own fears and fantasies as they blindly worship at the feet of an 
archetype. This articulates the truly subversive element of the film, because in 
representing Antonio in crisis, he is shown to be a victim of his own (narcissistic, 
phallocentric, and colonial) quest for the “authentic” Carmen when there is no truth but 
only representation – even Carmen doesn’t measure up as Carmen! Surely then, this 
story can never actually be about Carmen because she has never existed and so she 
cannot die? The real story, or stories, are those of her creators and the internalisation of 
these creation stories, which have served to galvanise the attributes of this dangerously 
sexualised dancing archetype/Latina Other.  
 
Therefore, as the camera pans up to reveal a woman standing atop the table 
triumphantly, it is as if this movement articulates the film’s political embodiment. 
Because it is only through the movement away from these (male-created) foundational 
myths of “woman” that an autonomous female identity may be asserted. And just as the 
film attempts to disentangle Carmen from a web of false and exoticized representations 
in order for this to be possible, so too does it deconstruct a notion of Spanish national 
identity that has been bound up in the same web of lies, damaged and distorted at the 
hands of foreign bias as well as the dictatorship.  
 
This is why the images of this “French” title sequence are immediately juxtaposed in 
the following scene with the everyday setting of the dance studio, just as they were 
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preceded by the prologue’s emphasis on “real” Spanish women who do not comfortably 
fit into the role prescribed by patriarchy/Orientalism. In this studio scene, the camera 
dollies through the dancers, both men and women, as they work hard at their craft in 
order to reinterpret exoticised interpretations of themselves and of their culture, a task 
that becomes most apparent when Paco de Lucía uses his ‘authentic Spanish musical 
instrument’ to transform Bizet’s Seguidilla into a traditional bulería – ‘a genuine 
Spanish musical tradition’ (Edwards 1995: 104).44 These historical 
titles/representations, then, are framed on either side by Spanish artists: director, 
choreographer, dancers, and actors, who all work together in the process of creating 
their own, specifically Spanish, version of a Spanish myth: and in so doing, deconstruct 
both colonial and patriarchal constructions of what it means to be a Spaniard. 
 
Conclusion 
The innovative combination of politics in/as aesthetics that merges signs with affective 
camerawork in both of these opening/credit sequences, can thus successfully intervene 
in the understanding and “authority” of history, of what it means to be Spanish, and of 
female identity, by drawing the viewer into an intimate relationship with the company 
of dancers. Inclusive gestures, the proximity of the camera to performers, rhythmic 
coordinated movement, and a sense of the multi-faceted nature of individual, cultural, 
and national identity, all contribute towards a feeling of openness, fluidity, questioning, 
and emotional bonding that makes “their” battles and victories (against patriarchal, 
homophobic and historical authority/fixity), “my” battles, through an intersubjective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 A bulería is a typically high paced palos, or style, of flamenco. This simultaneous quoting and 
displacing of Bizet’s music is also apparent in the title sequence’s use of his choral music written for the 
tobacco factory fight scene, whilst during this actual scene in the film, a flamenco song is used. Thus, 
Bizet is connected to false images, whilst flamenco is associated with a process of national and cultural 
reinterpretation and reclamation. 
 
	   75	  
and corporeal sense of togetherness and strength. I am thus welcomed into the liminal 
space of the dressing room/dance studio, an ‘Other’ space in which to build up a sense 
of community whilst reinventing sets of relations with the more dominant “outside.” A 
collective ideal thereby informs both films, simultaneously consolidating (through the 
juxtaposition of both credit sequences), as well as anticipating a more liberated time. 
And whilst Jane Gaines acknowledges in her brilliant article on ‘Political Mimesis,’ that 
it is impossible to quantify whether politically inflected cinema can effect social change, 
the ‘element[s]…that make a visceral impact’ can produce ‘a powerful mirroring effect’ 
in sympathetic audience communities who, as a result, ‘want to kick and yell. … want 
to do something’ (1999: 98-9, 90, my emphasis).45 This sense of persuasion through 
embodied mimesis is thus far more effective than didacticism alone, because it goes 
‘beyond the abstracting intellectual to produce a bodily swelling’ (ibid: 91), that, in the 
case of these films, endows me with a sense of what it is like to go beyond myself and 
become a part of a mass body/movement. Whether acted upon or not, this sensually 
conveys a political idea: that however innovative, committed, or powerful they may be, 
no single individual can effect change alone. For large-scale social change to take place, 
broad cooperation and coordination is required.  
 
However, whilst these films scrutinise the stereotypes of flamenco through flamenco in 
order to assert a felt sense of collective liberty, they can still be read as the expression of 
familiar stereotyped forms. Indeed, it is interesting that, as Pietsie Feenstra writes, 
‘Carmen was not seen by a large audience in Spain while it was still selected to 
represent Spain abroad for the Oscars. Carmen is an image that sells itself very well 
outside the borders’ (2011: 93). So whilst one could argue that it is precisely these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Although Gaines is specifically writing about political documentary, cinema, and in this case, 
screendance, can work in a similar way. 
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audiences that need “educating” the most about Spanish stereotypes, however much 
they attempt to question and deconstruct them, both stories embody (and perhaps 
encourage) a colonial gaze. And whilst this is more obvious in the case of the French 
precedents of the Carmen myth, Lorca can also be accused of romanticising flamenco, 
particularly in his (1928) collection of poetry, Romancero gitano (Gypsy Ballads). Thus 
his treatment of gypsy culture in Bodas is not exempt from ideological critique. So 
however much these filmic adaptions may be imbued with radical politics and potential, 
if the viewer does not meet the film with the same ethics, values, and political 
dispositions, then their power of sensual subversion is rendered null. And particularly so 
if they are watching without any knowledge of how the films’ socio-historical and 
political contexts have shaped them.  
 
Furthermore, they would not have subrationally and corporeally collectivised Spanish 
audiences in the fight for women’s equality if they weren’t widely watched. And despite 
the merit in the above argument that audiences outside of Spain need to be educated 
about Spanish stereotypes more than the people who “live” it, the myth of Carmen’s 
“otherness” has undoubtedly been entrenched in Spanish culture as well. Thus, whilst 
Carmen makes an excellent attempt at demystifying the myth of “Carmen,” it does not 
ultimately reinvent the language and subjectivity of woman. Rather, in showing her to 
be the construction of colonial/phallocentric fantasy, she is without a position because 
she doesn’t exist, and so there is no move away from being the object of male desire to 
a subject position. In a balanced critique of the film, Andrés Lema-Hincapié 
acknowledges that whilst ‘Saura laments the inescapable cliché’, he ‘never imagine[s] 
that it is within his power to destroy it. He remains a prisoner in it, and therefore, his 
criticism is still timid’ (2005: 162). In contrast, the films explored in my chapter on 
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avant-garde feminist screendance, and particularly Amy Greenfield’s Tides, provide 
example of a more complete and embodied expression of female liberation and 
subjectivity.  
 
However, despite all of these caveats, I would argue that the films’ combination of 
innovative cinematic reflexivity with sensuous screendance pleasure at the very least 
renders these colonial stories “strange,” and thereby, to re-quote Laura Mulvey, ‘get[s] 
us nearer to the roots of our oppression’, helping audiences ‘begin to make a break by 
examining patriarchy [and Orientalism] with the tools it provides’ (1975: 59).  
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Chapter Two 
Dancing with Difference: Challenging (Disabling) Perceptions of Disability in 
Screendance Performance 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall explore the potential for screendance to challenge exclusionary 
Western societal perceptions of physical disability, working towards transforming a 
historical (and cinematic) tendency towards objectification into embodied interaction. It 
is not merely the presence of a disabled dancer performing their own identity on screen, 
nor narrative content alone that shape the meaning(s) of disability and dance, but the 
specificity of their filmic mediation. I shall therefore use Laura Marks’s (2000) concept 
of haptic images and visuality to examine how camera placement (in relation to 
dancers), mise-en-scène, lighting, framing, sound, and editing technique, all contribute 
towards physically arousing the viewer to meaning. I thus aim to show how the 
sensuality of filmic form can potentially bring the film object closer to the viewer’s 
body, connecting (and incorporating) them with/into the body of the dancers and with 
the body of the film, in a tactile and mimetic relationship that can elicit empathy rather 
than pity and/or fear. But I shall also consider how, despite best intentions, screendance 
can fail, since not all of the films considered are as successful as others in challenging 
and disrupting prevailing notions about disability, and in foregrounding the agency of 
disabled subjects. Through the intersubjectivity inherent in the act of Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson’s (2009) notion of baroque staring, which is distinct from the 
oppressive and disciplinary gaze that seeks to subordinate its object from a “safe” 
distance, I shall also investigate how screendance can encourage a circuit of 
communication and meaning making that broadens expectations of who can and should 
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be seen, and who “looks back.” In this way dominant viewing strategies are disrupted 
by refusing exotic spectacularization.  
 
My main object of study is a short film made by DV8 physical theatre company, The 
Cost of Living (2004), adapted for the camera from an earlier stage production and the 
recipient of numerous dance-film awards.46 It is set in various locations in a deserted 
Norfolk seaside resort, where main characters and friends Dave (David Toole) and 
Eddie (Eddie Kay) are street performers trying to make a living as the summer season 
comes to an end. Accompanied by a small cast of what can only be described as misfits 
and social outsiders, character and “story” are told more through dance than dialogue 
(although there is spoken dialogue as well), in a series of interlinked scenes exploring 
the dynamics of how we look at and judge others, and how we, in turn, value ourselves. 
Whilst many of these characters and all of the scenes are deserving of an in-depth 
analysis, my focus will be on Dave since he is the only character/dancer/actor/person 
who is visibly disabled, being without any legs.47   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Henceforth and for the sake of space, I will refer to this film as TCOL.  
 
A full list of the film’s awards can be found on DV8’s website at: 
http://www.dv8.co.uk/projects/costoflivingfilm 
 
 
47 These “misfits” are deserving of analysis because they represent different kinds of 
physical/emotional/mental health/learning disabilities, which are not as easily (or as visibly) identifiable 
as Dave’s. Briefly, I read Eddie’s insightful intelligence, anger and aggression, struggle with society, and 
nervous tics as a representation of a man living with a mental illness. Rowan sports a perpetually blank 
face whilst locked into performing mechanic and repetitive movements (until his fabulous and liberatory 
dance to a Cher song), and does not utter a word throughout the film. He thus seems to represent a man 
on the autistic spectrum who only feels “free” when he dances. Tom is a repressed homosexual, furtively 
seeking out anonymous sex away from the prying and aggressively homophobic eyes of Eddie. And Viv, 
although eventually empowered, allows Eddie to construct her into the object of his desire. It seems to 
me, then, that all of these “disabilities” profoundly affect these characters’ physical position in the world, 
although unlike Dave, they don’t necessarily affect their access to the world in quite the same way. And 
just to clarify, it is Tom’s repression and certainly not his homosexuality that I regard as a disability. 
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Various scenes explore his encounters with ignorance and prejudice; his dependence, at 
times, upon his friends; and also his independence and fierce refusal to let his disability, 
or other people’s prejudices, disable him. An extensive and detailed analysis of a pas de 
deux with an able-bodied ballerina in a ballet studio context will form the main body of 
my analysis. This is because in terms of the internal hierarchies within dance genres, 
along with the hierarchical “ideal” of the balletic dancing body, ballet undoubtedly 
occupies the most privileged position in the world of dance. It is the foundation for 
virtually every genre of Western dance, and therefore its strict enforcement of body type 
has transcended the ballet world and created a corporeal standard/orthodoxy for (many) 
professional dance practices (Novack: 1993, Bull: 1997). This is why I also consider 
how a momentary doubling of another (able-bodied) female dancer/character, Viv 
(Vivien Wood), just before Dave enters the studio, both establishes and destabilises 
these patriarchal orthodoxies. In order, then, for disabled dancers (and women) to 
challenge these exclusionary norms and standards, and to be accepted as genuine and 
professional performers, it makes sense that the stereotypes created by ballet are the 
ones most in need of deconstruction. This is why a great deal of attention is focussed on 
this densely packed scene, because in placing a disabled man in a ballet studio context, 
TCOL takes on the hierarchical world of dance and offers its viewers the possibility of a 
different and accommodative world, transforming professional dance into an art that is 
accessible to all. 
 
I shall also be bringing two other films into the discussion, Outside In (1995), and 
Water Burns Sun (2009), two short, non-narrative and experimental dance films that 
feature professional disabled dancers taking (various levels of) control over their own 
representation on film. But first, in order to establish exactly how these films work (or 
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not) to counter more normative and dominant cinematic representations of disabled 
bodies, I shall give a brief history of the changing relationship between mainstream 
(Hollywood) film and disability.  
 
Dominant cinematic expressions of disability 
Paul K. Longmore’s (1985) foundational and influential article on ‘Screening 
Disability: Images of Disabled People,’ as well as Martin F. Norden’s now canonical 
text, The Cinema of Isolation (1994), have both documented these negative stereotypes 
of disability. Norden divides the history of Hollywood’s fascination with disability 
roughly into three periods: between the late 1890s and the late 1930s early cinematic 
representations tended to be highly exploitative, sharing as they did a visual aesthetic, 
historic place, and cultural position with the Freak show. Disabled women and girls (but 
boys and men as well) were largely represented as thoroughly “good” and angelically 
“pure,” desexualized tragic victims in desperate need of pity, protection, charity, and a 
miracle cure.48 One such paradigmatic example is the beholden and nameless young 
blind girl in Charlie Chaplin’s City Lights (1931), defined solely by her disability. In a 
sentimentalised romantic comedy, Chaplin’s iconic character, the Tramp, falls in love 
with this ‘”Sweet Innocent”’ (Norden: 33), who never adapts to her disability by 
developing her non-visual perception in order to “see” without sight, or by using a cane 
to help her navigate her environment. Instead she is powerless and vulnerable, forever 
groping around or relying upon the Tramp to lead her home. Treated reverentially and 
ultimately rescued, the Tramp raises the money for the “miraculous surgery” that 
restores her sight. The subtext, then, is hardly subtle, as her blindness/disability is an 
affliction to be cured, and “womanhood” is only achieved once she is “whole.”  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Rather than the self-advocacy, autonomy and civil rights that could (and would) be won through 
challenging educational, medical, and social institutions that deny/stifle disabled people. 
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Disabled men, on the other hand, were generally presented as either ‘Comic 
Misadventurers’ using ‘slapstick humor (sic) to trivialize issues of physical disability’, 
or ‘”Obsessive Avengers”: an egomaniacal sort … who does not rest until he has had 
his revenge on those he holds responsible for his disablement and/or violating his moral 
code in some other way’ (ibid: 20, 52). This sinisterly embittered and pathologically 
vengeful monster/freak is arguably one of the most popular, and certainly one of the 
most enduring stereotypes in our cultural imaginings, as evidenced by the cult status of 
Tod Browning’s (albeit, interestingly ambiguous) Freaks (1932).49 A more recent 
incarnation can be found in the character of Two-Face from The Dark Knight Rises 
(2008). His dualistic “good” battle with the criminal “dark” side of Gotham City leaves 
him facially disfigured and his fiancée dead, thus transforming him into a crazed and 
horrific coin-flipping murderer bent on revenge. As Longmore asserts, since ‘the final 
and only possible solution [for both monstrous and criminal disabled characters] is often 
death’, Two-Face gets his “just” punishment when Batman kills him at the end of the 
film (1985: 5).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
49 Norden refers to Freaks as ‘one of the most disturbing films ever made … alternat[ing] between 
cloying sentimentality and outrageous exploitation’ (115), but I would argue that this appraisal does not 
tell the whole story. Although the (real-life) cast of physically and mentally disabled people do indeed 
enact revenge upon the non-disabled aerialist and her strongman lover, it is the latter two that are 
presented as the murderous, money grabbing “monsters.” This, then, subversively hints at the fact that 
historically, it has been ‘non-disabled people who have at times endeavoured to destroy people with 
disabilities. [And] [a]s with popular portrayals of other minorities, the unacknowledged hostile fantasies 
of the stigmatizers are transferred to the stigmatized’ (Longmore 1985: 4). Scenes are shot from the 
perspective of the disabled performers, and they are shown to be a sympathetic community of outsiders 
who look after each other and lead relatively “normal” lives (for freak show circus performers), until an 
attempt is made on one of their lives. However, the (exploitative) sight of their disabled bodies was 
undoubtedly intended to evoke a particular response (of curiosity/disgust) in the audience, and the film 
resorts to a familiar visual rhetoric of horror as the “freaks” gang up and kill the strongman and mutilate 
the acrobat so that she becomes “one of them.” But the film’s lack of disabling binaries that usually and 
unproblematically construct the “normal” characters as inherently “good,” against the disabled and abject 
personifications of “evil,” makes identification with either disabled or non-disabled characters neither 
straightforward or easy, and thus helps explain the cultural unease that led to a long history of censorship 
and outright bans.  
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Largely due to a cultural anxiety concerning the return home of disabled veterans, the 
second period of Hollywood’s discourse on disability tended towards more sensitive 
and progressive portrayals. Between the years of World War II and the 1970s, disabled 
characters were often portrayed as remarkable heroes, triumphing over the terrible 
burden of their particular disability with awe-inspiring tenacity. No longer inextricably 
associated with “evil,” innocence, or comic buffoonery, Hollywood would now 
propagate the supercrip stereotype, whose success is always (mis)understood as being 
despite rather than because of their disability.50 An example of this can be found in 
‘[o]ne of Hollywood’s best-loved and most commercially successful movies,’ The Best 
Years of Our Lives (1946) (Gerber: 1994: 545). This cathartic drama/melodrama tells 
the story of three veterans struggling to adjust to civilian life. Although all “disabled” in 
different ways, only Homer Parish (Harold Russell) is actually physically disabled (both 
in the film and in real life), being a bilateral hand amputee who uses two metal hook 
prostheses. Despite, then, breaking new ground in casting a disabled and non-
professional actor to play the role of a disabled character, the film fails to challenge 
long-standing stereotypes of disability that provoke pity and fear. This is because whilst 
the dexterous use of his prostheses is empowering, they are also undeniably ‘freakish 
and menacing’ (ibid: 552). His parents pity him and struggle to accept his disability, just 
as he struggles to accept himself, or to believe that his childhood sweetheart is not 
mistaking pity and duty for love and devotion. Whilst his angry outbursts are both 
understandable and sympathetic, they are simultaneously frightening (especially to the 
children in the film). And although the camera does focus on his body, it serves to 
symbolise what Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell refer to as ‘the threat toward the 
integrity of the able body’ (2010: 186). Therefore, rather than promoting a respectful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The word ‘crip’ is a counterword used within some sections of disability culture, and works to reclaim 
and rename with pride the violence and damage done to disabled people through the ‘master’s’ language. 
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understanding of difference, it elicits/processes audiences’ anxieties concerning their 
own vulnerability. Furthermore, Homer’s struggle is “magically resolved” in a 
formulaic happy ending, marriage. And whilst this may well have sent ‘a powerful 
message of hope and reconciliation’ (op. cit. 1994: 546), it ultimately (and over-
optimistically) deflects attention away from a social model of disability.51 The 
underlying (and pernicious) ideology behind this “well intentioned” stereotype is, then, 
that the problems faced by disabled characters are the result of their individual 
“problem” bodies, which have individual solutions that have nothing to do with 
society’s disabling perceptions and/or environments. 
 
The final period that Norden covers is from the 1970s to today, when depictions 
gradually begin to present more three-dimensional characters who have a disability but 
are not defined solely by it. Or as Norden puts it, filmmakers began ‘showing characters 
trying to live ordinary, post-rehabilitation lives often within the mainstream of 
American society. The characters may still face problems connected to their 
impairments (attitudes, mostly), but nevertheless they frequently pursue goals that go 
beyond basic rehabilitation issues if indeed they deal with the latter at all’ (1994: 264). 
It was largely the aftermath of the Vietnam War that gave rise to these multidimensional 
representations, which can be seen in films like Coming Home52 (1978), The Deer 
Hunter (1978), Apocalypse Now (1979), and Born on the Fourth of July (1989). 
However, this period also features the saintly sage, wise prophet, or blind seer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 This message of hope was much needed at the time, evident in the fact that the film won seven 
Academy Awards in 1946, two of which went to Harold Russell, the only ever actor to receive two 
Oscars for one role. One was for best supporting actor, and the other was a ‘Special Oscar’ ‘for bringing 
hope and courage to his fellow veterans’ (Berg 1989: 427).  
 
52 Importantly, Coming Home was one of the first, ‘if not the first’ Hollywood film to explicitly depict a 
disabled person as a sexual being, in a mutually satisfying sexual relationship. Thus, it ‘set the stage for 
movies of the 1980s and beyond to explore the concept further’ (Norden 1994: 268). 
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stereotype in films like The Elephant Man (1980), and Mask (1985). Whilst these films 
are based on the real lives of disabled people who were isolated, or worse, abused, 
exploited, and exhibited, these saintly figures never seem to express anger with the 
treatment they receive at the hands of a deeply prejudiced society. Instead, they are 
always able to rise above their oppression in order to forgive their oppressors and teach 
the world humanity and compassion. Furthermore, they always die at the end, which 
conveniently and cathartically absolves the audience of any guilt or sense of social 
responsibility, whilst simultaneously propagating the message that social integration for 
severely disabled people is impossible.  
 
Whilst this brief and generalised history serves to acknowledge that Hollywood is not a 
straw figure doing everything wrong when it comes to representing disability on screen, 
and that its depictions have been diverse, nuanced, and variable over time, both 
reflecting and contributing towards changes in societal attitudes and beliefs that have 
generally moved in a positive direction, it is important to note that negative stereotypes 
continue to resurface with alarming regulatory. For example, the pernicious ‘Obsessive 
Avenger’ stereotype reappears in Hook (1991), Speed (1994), and Wild Wild West 
(1999). And regardless of the huge success and international acclaim of Million Dollar 
Baby (2004), the protagonist’s desire for and actual assisted suicide after a spinal cord 
injury reaffirms the durable and pervasive message that disabled lives are not worth 
living. These films, then, continue to reflect more about the prejudices and fears of 
mainstream society than the realities of disabled peoples’ lives. Using disability as a 
‘politically charged commodity’ to sell to (predominantly) able-bodied audiences (ibid: 
x). 
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The filmic mediation of disability 
At the same time as acknowledging the seminal contribution that Longmore and 
Norden’s work has made in detailing, contextualising and understanding the history of 
Hollywood’s relationship with physical disability, and how its depictions/stereotypes 
have shaped our perceptions/prejudices, there is in their work little engagement with 
how the medium of film itself creates meaning.53 Disabled characters have been further 
isolated through various cinematic devices that accentuate their disability, including 
(but not limited to) stationary cameras that shoot intrusive close-ups, thereby 
encouraging a gratuitous gaze not dissimilar to a freak show set up. Long, static shots 
have been used to put physical distance between disabled characters and others, as well 
as between disabled performers on screen and viewers, which does nothing to bridge the 
gap between them, or to draw the viewer into the disabled character’s experience. This 
has the effect of “fixing” them in a position from which there is no hope of escaping. 
Long takes can (negatively) emphasise the time-consuming nature of disabled 
characters’ needs, and of navigating an ableist world. Shots are rarely taken from 
realistic wheelchair height eye-lines, invariably positioning the spectator as able-bodied 
whilst keeping the disabled characters “in their place,” as they are literally looked down 
upon. And by casting half of a character’s face in near darkness, lighting can be used to 
connote the “sinister” nature of disability. Therefore, in the following analyses, I shall 
consider the kinds of stereotypes and disabling attitudes that my chosen films are 
working against, as well as the ways in which they achieve their effects cinematically 
and choreographically. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Neither does their work consider the possibility that however negative and damaging these stereotypes 
may be, some disabled viewers may “reclaim” and even revel in these monstrous stereotypes, reading 
against the grain as a recuperative and defiant strategy for survival. However, despite these limitations, 
Norden and Longmore’s foundational contribution to the study of disability and film is particularly 
valuable when considering that despite frequent discussion, ‘especially on academic listservs and at 
scholarly meetings, omnibus publication about the relationship between film and disability is scant’ 
(Chivers & Markotić 2010: 13).  
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A moment for self-reflexivity  
But first I would like to take a brief moment for self-reflexivity. Whilst I agree with 
querying and disrupting the binary divisions between fixed categories of embodiment 
such as disabled and nondisabled, and fully subscribe to the idea (or rather, the fact) that 
all bodies are in a constant state of flux and are thus vulnerable to (temporary or 
permanent) disablement at any time, particularly if we live long enough, I have to 
acknowledge that I am writing about the meanings of dancing disabled bodies from a 
privileged position as a nondisabled person. Therefore, I have had to ask myself some 
uncomfortable questions, such as whether I am perpetuating the ‘disability ghetto’ by 
writing a chapter on disabled screendance. However, after extensive research in the 
field of disability studies, I am confident that disability does make a huge difference, 
and in assuming otherwise, for whatever reason, is to dangerously ‘limit[] the (real) 
difference that disability can make in radically refiguring how we look at, conceive of, 
and organise bodies in the twenty-first century’ (Albright 2001: 60). It is not the task of 
this chapter to argue the effect of these films on disabled identities, nor to establish a 
disabled gaze. This is not intended to ignore or negate the viewpoint of viewers with 
disabilities, but to focus instead on the dominant, able-bodied audience, and the ways in 
which screendance can provide a self-reflexive commentary on our cultural beliefs and 
assumptions about physically disabled bodies. 
 
The foregrounding of (sexual) subjectivity 
The assumption that sexuality is somehow inappropriate or impossible for disabled 
people, as established by the ‘Sweet Innocent’ stereotype, is both confronted and 
subverted in a scene from TCOL. Sitting on top of a bar in a nightclub, Dave transfers 
his gaze from the woman who has just walked past, to look directly into the highly 
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mobile camera as he says, “Hello, name’s Dave.” Having spun around on his hands and 
arms and seductively reclined on the bar, he returns our gaze once again to ask if we’re 
“impressed?” He then moves across the bar and closer to the camera, raising himself up 
onto his hands and arms so that his eye-line is matched with the viewers, and utters the 
classic pick-up line, “What winks and shags like a tiger?” He pauses, and then winks 
directly at “us.” Dave then goes on to both pre-empt as well as answer the kinds of 
questions/thoughts that we might not actually ask or voice, but may well secretly 
harbour, reversing the power dynamics inherent within the viewer’s (ableist) gaze: 
“Would you like to dance … Don’t be embarrassed … can you imagine these wrapped 
around you? [Opening out his arms] … It can’t be the legs … I bet you’re wondering 
what’s it like … Well, I’ll tell you, its small, but its peachy … I saw you looking … I’ll 
be looking for you”. 
 
The fluidity of the camera mirrors the graceful fluidity of his bar dance, and it is this 
simultaneous movement of the frame and the action happening within it that 
momentarily obfuscates my sense of orientation. This endows the scene with a haptic 
quality, as I am sensuously drawn into an embodied interaction rather than a distanced 
and static objectification. Dave is not fixed or disabled by his disability, just as I am not 
“fixed” in my position or intentionality towards him/the film. Instead, he is confident 
and at ease in this nightclub, a liminal social space imbued with the possibility of 
transgressive sexuality/encounters. And since this is a space that has not been 
traditionally associated with inclusivity or easy accessibility for people with disabilities 
(as indicated by the steep stairs Dave has to climb down in order to enter the club), his 
confident presence is doubly subversive. The combination, then, of cinematography and 
his ability to gracefully manoeuvre himself so that he can come closer and look directly 
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into my eyes, creates a sense that we are meeting each other on a level playing field. 
This is because camerawork neither diminishes nor “disappears” his disability, and I am 
not positioned “above” him looking down. As he winks at the camera/me, this tightly 
framed medium shot provides an insight into his multifaceted character and sexually 
suggestive sense of humour, and thus encourages empathy and identification with a 
whole character with a range of thoughts and desires, not merely a disability. Therefore, 
Dave’s confident display of himself as a sexual object not only works to foreground his 
(sexual) subjectivity, but also to subvert his social invisibility as a disabled person. And 
through his direct address, he reverses his own objectification by reflecting it back onto 
the viewer, thereby encouraging a self-reflexive awareness of our own gaze and 
attitudes.  
 
This interaction, then, ‘affords a spontaneous moment of interpersonal connection, 
however brief, during which two people have the opportunity to regard and to be known 
to one another’ (Garland-Thomson 2009: 33). Because Dave (as well as the medium of 
film) gives us “permission” to stare at him, and because he “stares” back, the 
viewer/film may engage with what Garland-Thomson refers to as ‘baroque staring’ 
(ibid: 50). This is distinct from the oppressive and disciplinary gaze, in that it is a form 
of open wonderment that is not concerned with or contained by rationality and a desire 
for superiority and control. Instead, a ‘baroque stare is unrepentant abandonment to the 
unruly, to that which refuses to conform to the dominant order of knowledge’, and as 
such, ‘baroqueness resides not in a visual object, but rather in the encounter between 
starer and staree. Baroque staring entangles viewer and viewed in an urgent exchange 
that redefines both’ (50). In this way, then, baroque staring has much in common with 
haptic visuality, which ‘draws upon the mimetic knowledge that does not posit a gulf 
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between subject and object, or the spectator and the world of film’, and ‘allow[s] us to 
reconsider how the relationship between self and other may be yielding-knowing’ 
(Marks 2000: 151). In teaching the starer how to look in a way that acknowledges, 
rather than closes down, the staree’s full humanity, TCOL’s combination of baroque 
staring with haptic visuality can thus help shift our focus away from curiosity and 
towards ethical knowledge and embodied interaction. 
 
Visual activism 
This sensuous form of visual activism is also foregrounded in Water Burns Sun. The 
film begins with a high-angled shot zooming into a close-up of Neil Marcus’s head and 
bare chested torso as he is seated on the floor, immediately connoting a sense that this 
will be both an intimate and dynamic encounter rather than a distanced and superior 
observation. The proximity of the (highly mobile) camera to his body creates a presence 
of texture, as I can see the folds of his flesh as he moves. Writing about the body of the 
film, Vivian Sobchack asserts that its (cinematic) vision ‘knows what it is to touch 
things in the world … [and] thus perceives and expresses the “sense” of fabrics like 
velvet or the roughness of tree bark or the yielding softness of human flesh’ (1992: 133, 
my emphasis). Therefore the film both expresses and evokes in me a sense of touch 
through my own body’s ‘intersensory links,’ as my (embodied) vision allows me to 
caress Neil’s skin and the contours of his twisted body (Marks 2000: 213). In this way, 
the film immediately invites my bodily interaction, as a haptic reciprocity is established 
between us. 
 
As the camera pulls back the scene cuts to quoted text of Butoh, a 
Japanese/transnational movement form that typically explores playful and “grotesque” 
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body imagery/patterns with slow, hypnotic, and controlled motion, thereby subverting 
the classical aesthetics of (professional) dance practices.54 Then the rest of the film 
proceeds with a montage of enigmatic images as Neil, a playwright, poet, actor, and 
dancer with generalised dystonia, is both positioned and shot with a camera on ground 
level. With his wheelchair looming large in the background, he proceeds to disrupt 
viewers’ preconceptions of severely disabled bodies and dance, firstly by getting out of 
the chair, and then by exploring his own unique spastic movement vocabulary. 
Displaying his body in close-up without shame or embarrassment, the film not only 
explores the interesting shapes that his body can make, but also investigates 
interdependence, permeability, and tenderness in his exchanges with three female dance 
partners. These moving (but not patronising) scenes do not pathologise his movement 
patterns by signifying dysfunction, but instead explore his way of being in the world 
through his lived experience of disability, using artistic expression as the vehicle of his 
communication.  
 
One of these images shows Neil tenderly stroking the hair away from his dance 
partner’s face, as she places her head on his lap and closes her eyes in contentment. 
The film then cuts to a close-up of his head and chest in side profile as he lies 
horizontally across the floor, gazing directly into the camera as his dance partner 
sensuously places her head on his, then slowly rolls it along the side of his neck and 
arm. The closeness of the camera as well as the warm tone of bluish/purple light 
increases the temperature and proximity of their mutual and sensuous exchange. 
Jennifer Barker explains that physicists describe light ‘either as a particle or a wave, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The text is accredited to the founder of Butoh, Tatsumi Hijikata, and reads: “When I begin to wish I 
were crippled – even though I am perfectly healthy – or rather that I would have been better off born a 
cripple, that is the first step towards butoh”. 
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terms that aptly describe light’s touch upon the skin’, and thus I am also warmed by the 
film/their exchange, as ‘[t]he substance of cinema touches [me] in the same way … 
leav[ing] a trace on [my] skin[]’ (2009: 30). The abstract, tonal and experimental 
soundtrack has an otherworldly quality about it, and this interesting and exploratory use 
of sound accentuates the dancers exploration of each other, as well as the film’s broader 
exploration of Neil’s dance movement. In the same way, then, that space was once the 
final frontier, perhaps by “boldly going where no man has gone before,” and engaging 
with this “strange new world” of disabled screendance, disability will not be so alien, 
frightening, or unknowable as it has been historically constructed.55  
 
A dissolve momentarily blends this image with a medium shot of Neil now intertwined 
with both his original partner and another female dancer, against whom he is leaning 
whilst touching her mouth with his fingers. The other dancer continues to recline on the 
floor with her head on his lap. The sensual connection between them is thus exemplified 
by the choice of “soft”, permeable editing, which works to dissolve the stability of 
categories by subverting the cultural rules that attempt to fix Neil in the role of 
dependent sufferer. He is not passive in these relationships; the dance is an equal 
exchange in which he caresses, comforts, and cares for his partners as much as they care 
for him. This works to reveal how physical disability is not automatically accompanied 
by emotional, intellectual, sensual, sexual, or spiritual regression. Disabled people can 
have balanced and fulfilling relationships as well.  
 
What is more, he forthrightly denies his asexual objectification as he is caressed in 
close-up, by looking directly into the camera with a powerfully expressive intent, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 These lines in double quotation marks are taken from the voiceover spoken at the beginning of many 
Star Trek television episodes and films. 
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seems to me to speak of his desire, his sensuality, and his appetites/enjoyment as a 
sensual/sexual being. Just before the “threesome” fades to black, he glances directly 
into the camera once again, and this is followed with another image of him alone, 
staring intently at “us” for almost all of the forty-nine seconds of this scene, which feels 
like a long time. At one point, he leans his head forward towards the camera and 
appears to smile with a glint in his eye, expressing a sense of his selfhood through the 
mobilisation of his direct gaze/address/contact with the viewer. In this way, Neil/the 
film invites me to activate the baroque stare as he/it meets me half way in the 
interaction. Through the generative potential in this staring exchange, along with the 
hapticity of the images, I am touched by the emotional and physical intimacy of the 
dancefilm. This creates the opportunity of recognising Neil’s humanity, which can, in 
itself, be transformative, as we discover how his unique physical diversity need not be 
disabling. 
 
A closed and regulated world 
After a scene in TCOL that shows Dave and Eddie literally and humorously barging 
through the environmental and attitudinal barriers that can exclude disabled people from 
the social world, the film cuts to a low angled close-up shot of the legs (from the knees 
down) and feet of dancers’ lined up as they perform ballet step exercises at the barre. 
Shot with a camera at ground level, this close-up not only highlights Dave’s difference, 
but also draws attention to one of the foundational principles of ballet technique: the 
proper placement of the legs/feet. Every single step in classical ballet is performed with 
hips, knees and feet as turned out as possible, and it is this turnout that distinguishes 
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ballet from all other forms of dance.56 With an emphasis, then, on aesthetic and 
ephemeral qualities such as purity of line, weightlessness, smoothness, and fluidity, 
(professional) ballet is the only dance technique that demands a certain physique and so 
symbolises yet another exclusionary space and ideology, and not only for disabled 
people. Writing about the ‘primacy of seeing’ in ballet, Cynthia Jean Cohen Bull 
explains that: 
Students who do not possess “a good line,” that is, a slender, long-
limbed body which can form geometrically proportioned shapes, know 
that they will never be successful performers and are told so by 
teachers and administrators of professional schools. They may enjoy 
studying ballet, but they know that they do not “have the body” – the 
physical appearance – to be a “real” (professional) ballet dancer. While 
having the body by no means provides sufficient basis for success, it is 
the necessary prerequisite.                                                     (1997: 272)    
 
As if to emphasise the refusal of ballet as a dance practice to acknowledge any 
difference, light streams through a large window separated into smaller panes, 
spotlighting the dancing legs and feet that are executing the same prescribed movements 
in synchrony, and containing them within a grid/prison of light. In this way, camera 
placement, choice of shot, lighting, and synchronicity of movement, all work together to 
express the closed and fiercely regulated nature of the ballet dance studio, in which the 
policing gaze of the ballet world demands absolute control and conformity of both steps 
and bodies. And as intimated by the prison film’s shafts-of-light-through-barred-
window shot, freedom lies beyond the confines of the window/studio. 
 
However, as we cut to a shot of the outside of the studio, whilst we may hear the 
evidence of the ballet teacher’s strict surveillance as he counts out the dancers’ routine, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 A perfect turnout is the “effortless” outward rotation of the leg, starting from the hips and knees down 
to the feet, which should be turned out to the sides of the body at a 180° angle – an unfamiliar position for 
most people. 
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the door is surprisingly wide open. Perhaps then, this world is not as closed after all, 
since an open door undoubtedly connotes a sense of invitation. Instead of going straight 
through it, though, Dave wheels himself directly to the shut window and uses his hands 
and arms to prop himself up onto the ledge in order to have a look inside. Thus begins a 
brief (sixteen-second) but visually eloquent scene that further explores the division of 
spaces and their stability.  
 
The division and transgression of space 
A cut to Dave’s head and shoulders looking in, centre frame, from outside the barred 
and slightly opaque window, makes him appear pale and ghost-like whilst also 
reinforcing a sense of the dancers’ imprisonment within (as well as his exclusion from) 
the confines of this “high art” culture. This ‘ghost effect’ brings to mind Terry Castle’s 
notion of The Apparitional Lesbian and her historical haunting of Western literature and 
culture.57 Like lesbians (and many queer identities), disabled people have never been 
‘with us, it seems, but always somewhere else: in the shadows, in the margins, hidden 
from history, out of sight, out of mind, a wanderer in the dusk, a lost soul, a tragic 
mistake, a pale denizen of the night’ (1993: 2). Through this effective process of 
‘derealization’ then, the lesbian/disabled person is safely made to disappear, drained of 
‘any sensual or moral authority’ (6, 32). In the pas de deux that follows, this ghostly 
metaphor is simultaneously affirmed and undermined, as Dave crosses over from the 
space “outside” in which he has been historically enclosed, to dance with a woman in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Robert McRuer’s compelling Crip Theory explores these intersections between queer and disabled 
identities, politics, cultural logic, and pathologised pasts, by theorising ‘the construction of able-
bodiedness and heterosexuality’ and how ‘”compulsory able-bodiedness”…in a sense produces disability 
…[just as] the system of compulsory heterosexuality…produces queerness’ (2006: 2). 
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space where his presence has previously been displaced or ignored.58 Instead of 
signalling his continued marginality and invisibility, then, this ghosting serves to 
highlight an act of transgression.  
 
This is because space is one of the things that helps to ‘tell us who we are in society’ 
(Cresswell 1996: 8), in that certain spaces expect certain behaviours and so when these 
spaces are unexpectedly transgressed, behaviour thought to be “natural” to it is 
unmasked as a spatial/cultural construct. In this way, ‘normative geographies’ are used 
to ‘delineate the construction of otherness’ (ibid: 9) and can therefore be transgressed in 
order to challenge dominant ideologies. This is why we get the close-up of the legs and 
the shot from outside the studio, or the “introduction” to the actual floor-dance, because 
as well as revealing how dance and film can enhance one another, it establishes the 
orthodoxies of the ballet studio space as well as signalling its susceptibility to 
transgression.  
 
Whilst the profusion of windows and mirrors signals the need for constant monitoring 
and improvement, and along with the use of lighting, serves to parallel the space of the 
ballet studio with that of a prison, these are also, along with the open door, frames 
within a frame, liminal spaces that appear to divide inside and out but simultaneously 
threaten this very division. This ballet studio is not a secure world, but permeable and 
open to new things, experimentation, and difference. These tropes, then, suggest that 
protagonists can escape the way in which they have been “framed;” and by going 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Furthermore, this duet is not drained of any sensuality. To quote two YouTube comments posted in 
response to this (2.25 minute) clip of the pas de deux, this scene is ‘sensual and it touches my heart’ 
(Hala33400), as well as ‘the most sensual dance I have ever seen’ (Isabellerose). Accessed 10/02/12 and 
found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLe9ZSwU4aQ 
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through the literal and metaphorical threshold of the open door, Dave shows his 
willingness to leave behind a fixed sense of (disabled) identity through his ability to 
enter into another/the Other’s space.  
 
The spatial element of this scene, then, or the crossing from one space to another, is also 
part of the “meaning” of this pas de deux, because it encourages the viewer to challenge 
and reconsider accepted notions of grace and perfection. It is more subversive, after all, 
to transform rather than attempt to escape the discipline and conventions of the ballet 
world, because this insists that another world is possible within rather than always 
outside and on the margins.  
 
Woman as a multiple subject 
Another interesting aspect of this cut to the inside of the studio as Dave momentarily 
looks in, is that its visual emphasis on windows and mirrors is a common trope of the 
dance film genre which leads to the construction of complex looking relations. Whilst 
the window takes up three-quarters of the frame, foregrounded in the extreme left-hand 
corner is a medium shot of the back of a male dancer’s head and torso exercising at the 
barre, and in the right is a female dancer’s side-profile as well as her double/mirror 
image, reflected in the mirror affixed to the studio wall.  
 
In striving towards “perfection” (and pretence), the ballerina’s intensive training 
paradoxically leads to the denial of her real corporeality, and so ‘[t]raining thus creates 
two bodies: one, perceived and tangible; the other, aesthetically ideal’ (Foster 1997: 
237, my emphasis). In traditional ballet gender ideology, this tension between what one 
has to do and what one is required to look like is not imposed upon the male dancer to 
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the same extent, because although of course there are aesthetic and artistic requirements 
of his movement vocabulary, qualities such as vigour, power, endurance, and 
athleticism are valued, as opposed to sylph-like delicacy and grace. This is undoubtedly 
because a powerfully athletic body and performance style can serve to distract from, or 
to compensate for, the feminising implications of a dancing-man-as-spectacle.59 So 
whilst the ballerina is lifted, propelled, and turned, or in other words created, 
‘[m]asculinity is the strong jumper, the narrative’s driving force, the creator rather than 
the created’ (Daly 1997: 112). This is why we only see the doubling of the female 
dancer, Viv, in the space of the ballet studio, since she ‘has long been inscribed as a 
representation of difference: as spectacle, she is bearer and object of male desire’ (ibid: 
111). The centrality of the mirror and the gaze can thus signal the disjuncture between 
seeing and being ourselves; between subject and object; between the kind of self 
scrutiny that can be both affirming and alienating, whilst also implicating us, the 
spectator, more directly in these looking constellations as we gaze at her as well. This 
association between ballet, mirrors and ontological crisis, and the traumatic 
juxtaposition of self/other, is repeatedly highlighted in the Hollywood dance/horror 
film, Black Swan, which I consider in my final chapter. 
 
It is no coincidence that a brief cut to the outside of the studio shows Eddie leering in at 
Viv, as he joins Dave to look in from outside the window. Since this operates as a kind 
of screen within the film, Eddie’s looking can be read as a metaphor for what is 
probably one of the most argued premises of feminist film theory: that the ideological 
apparatus of (mainstream) cinematic address manufactures a masculinised viewer by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 However, it also, rather contradictorily, highlights the self-conscious performativity of gender. Steven 
Cohan (1993) explores these tensions in his chapter, ‘’Feminizing’ the Song and Dance Man. Fred 
Astaire and the Spectacle of Masculinity in the Hollywood Musical’, in Steven Cohan and Ina Rae Hark 
(eds), Screening the Male. Exploring Masculinities in the Hollywood Cinema, London and New York: 
Routledge, pp. 46-69. 
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positioning the woman as object of the (phallocentric and hetero-normative) gaze. The 
sense of Viv having two bodies, one subject/material and one object/ideal, is elegantly 
established in an earlier scene in which Eddie introduces her, as his new girlfriend, to 
his friend Rowan. He describes the features that initially attracted him, including her 
“mass of long blonde hair” and “extraordinarily large breasts”, which jar considerably 
with the brunette woman with average sized breasts standing, increasingly 
uncomfortably, right next to him. He also directs her to perform a dance step and to tell 
a joke, interrupting and silencing her whilst taking over and thereby revealing how the 
actual woman by his side does not marry with the “perfect” construction he has of her 
in his own head: a narcissistic and Oedipal investment in his illusory “ideal.” 
 
This doubling of the woman, then, serves to highlight the parallels between the social 
meanings attributed to female bodies and disabled bodies, in that both of them are cast 
as deviant and inferior by being defined in opposition to a norm that is largely 
considered superior: ‘man’ or ‘able-bodied.’60 Just as the ballerina/woman is split into 
two bodies, so too is the disabled performer, whose ‘image is already loaded with the 
desire to be other, projected onto her by the audience’ (Kuppers 2003: 55). However, an 
important difference is that whilst a woman’s social capital is increased by her 
feminisation or to-be-looked-at-ness, disability undoubtedly reduces it (for all genders), 
eliciting, more often than not, a different kind of gaze altogether.  
 
Despite (or because of all of this), there is something subversive at work in this 
momentary doubling of the female dancer, just as the setting up of an exclusionary 
space is established in order to articulate Dave’s transgression into and transformation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Although not the “same”, disability as a social category is structurally similar to gender, race, and 
sexual orientation, since they all rely on constructed (biological) binaries. 
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of it, as well as (potentially) challenging the way a dancing disabled body is stared at. 
This is because the barred window that is also reflected in the mirror, framing her 
double, connotes a sense that the Lacanian/balletic ideal and “whole” mirror image is in 
fact a trap and a form of imprisonment. Indeed, as Lacan says himself, ‘[t]his illusion of 
unity, in which a human being is always looking forward to self-mastery, entails a 
constant danger of sliding back again into the chaos from which he started; it hangs over 
the abyss of a dizzy assent in which one can perhaps see the very essence of anxiety’ 
(2003: 302-302). It is, after all, the narcissistic identification with this illusory ideal 
body that leads to the well documented and disturbing prevalence of eating disorders 
within the ballet world.61 This is not to negate the fact that ballet dancers can and do 
achieve professional “perfection,” but what is the material cost of this ideal? Once 
again, Black Swan makes this its subject, viscerally charting the prima ballerina’s 
descent into a psychosis of paranoia as her broken identities ultimately destroy each 
other. More commonly (and also either highlighted or alluded to in Black Swan), this 
material cost includes the frequency of injuries, often serious, a fiercely competitive 
environment, the abuse of one’s own body through drugs and addiction, and the 
aforementioned pervasiveness of anorexia, bulimia, and body dysmorphia.  
 
Ballet is, then, a hierarchical organisation that has always been dominated by men, its 
‘patriarchal underpinnings’ (Daly 1997: 112) encouraging/enforcing the internalisation 
in women of the ‘panoptical male connoisseur’ (Bartky 1988: 72). Therefore by framing 
Viv as not looking at her mirror reflection in a space where self-scrutiny is the law (of 
the father), it is as if she refuses to see herself as something that she isn’t (yet), and so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See Evan Alderson’s (1997) chapter, ‘Ballet as Ideology: Giselle, Act 2’, in Jane C. Desmond (ed) 
Meaning in Motion. New Cultural Studies of Dance, Durham & London: Duke University Press, pp. 121-
132, for a theorisation of the links between anorexia and ballet, particularly p. 129-30. 
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does not deny her own materiality for an image: an image from which she will always 
be distanced.62 Through engaging with a subjective sensory and non-visual experience 
of her body, she does not merely look at but arguably feels the exercises, resulting in a 
more grounded and holistic experience/performance that is counter to the idealisation of 
‘a strangely disembodied female’ (Wolff 1997: 95), and can thus be read as a feminist 
political gesture.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that her refreshingly healthy and well-trained dancer’s body does 
not conform to the excessively slender and weightless balletic ideal, signals her/the 
film’s political rejection of ‘centuries of patriarchal codification about gender 
difference’ (Daly 1997: 118, n8). In offering an alternative to the “fragility” of the 
ballerina (against the “power” of the male dancer), ‘the asymmetrical equilibrium of 
patriarchy – which does not offer equality at all’, is directly challenged (ibid: 114). So 
just as Dave does not let the ideal image of a male ballet dancer stop him from entering 
the space, dancing, and transforming it by questioning the very hegemony of that ideal; 
so too does Viv question and challenge the ideal of the classical ballerina. Although of 
course, in both cases, this depends upon the viewer and how prepared they are to 
challenge and let go of a deeply ingrained ableist/phallocentric gaze in order to open up 
new ways of seeing and of interpreting dancing bodies that do not conform to the 
classical aesthetic.  
 
In this way, then, a momentary shot of a dancer’s body and her mirror image can work 
to destabilise the patriarchal orthodoxies of ballet culture. This sense of subversion is 
reinforced towards the end of the film, as Eddie asks Viv, “Why do you drink so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Not looking at her mirror reflection could also signal fear of the desiring self, or a reflection of the self 
denied, but I prefer to read this doubling and rejection of the idealised body as a means to understand and 
interrogate social and political relationships in the ballet world. 
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much?” to which she replies, “You try listening to you all day.” Finally, in a 
demonstration of her ever-increasing empowerment, Viv responds to Eddie’s question 
of “What’s wrong?” with “You are”, and proceeds to walk away from him. In doing so, 
she symbolically rejects the male constructs that have attempted to “create” her in their 
image. In this wonderfully subversive world, then, women can be ballet dancers and not 
look like delicate and fragile sylphs, just as men can dance without any legs. 
 
Confronting and subverting disability  
Having swung out of his wheelchair and entered the studio, a shot from Dave’s vantage 
point foregrounds the row of legs exercising at the barre, with two female dancers 
sitting and stretching in the background. Through placing the camera at his eye (or 
ground) level, the cinematography immediately ‘refuses the implicit ideology of 
standing upright’ and thereby ‘break[s] up (by literally breaking down) an ablist gaze – 
the one that is forever overlooking people who aren’t standing (up) in front of its nose’ 
(Albright 1997: 80). Not only does this cinematic angle serve to complement the pas de 
deux that is to follow, but it also conveys a sense of his everyday lived experience, as he 
has to negotiate his way through a forest of disembodied legs that (literally and 
figuratively) stand in the way of his dancing with an able-bodied dancer in a ballet 
studio context. Just as he approaches her, the female dancer he has set his sights upon 
moves away without seeing him, and indeed, at this point nobody in the studio has cast 
a glance in his direction. This articulates the dichotomy of the disabled performer, who 
is at once both marginalised, invisible, and excluded from culture and our critical 
discourses, as well as being hypervisible (to the viewer) due to his difference.  
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However, despite this paralysing lack of acknowledgement, Dave does not give up and 
follows her as we cut back to a shot of Eddie leering in from outside the window. As he 
turns to walk away he is immediately drawn back, seemingly surprised, to look (at Dave 
and his new partner) in a different way, with a concentrated and respectful interest that 
belies a grotesque spectacle. Since this window acts as a screen, this moment highlights 
the different modes of looking that viewers may engage in, and in demonstrating an 
alternative to the oppressive and disciplinary voyeuristic gaze, perhaps encourages its 
viewer how to look at the duet that is to follow, whilst importantly neither denying the 
spectacle making tendencies of the filmic medium nor the fact that ‘[t]he appearance of 
disability in the public sphere makes…for a stareable sight’ (Garland-Thomson 2009: 
20). Furthermore, when the pas de deux actually begins with a low-angled shot of Dave 
and his ballerina in full camera frame, Eddie can be seen in the background looking 
through the window, centre frame. Once again, then, questions are raised about scopic 
regimes, as we are made aware of our own looking, since his viewing position directly 
reflects our own and thus encourages us to think about the way we look at others and 
judge them. 
 
Far from pretending that Dave’s disability does not exist, this combination of his body, 
cinematic angle, choreography, and emphasis on the gaze, all work to highlight it, and 
more importantly, show that it need not be an insurmountable barrier to his dancing. 
Dave has no fear, and instead of accepting the obstacles that block his path he moves 
through them to get to where he wants to be. In not giving up, he is represented as a 
determined motivator who actively seeks collaboration on equal terms despite his social 
isolation, which undermines the culturally pervasive biomedical model of disability that 
has defined, named, and fixed him as a tragic, passive victim without any choice. In 
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representing a multi-faceted human being whose disability is not intrinsic to who he is 
but just one of his attributes, the (liberated) viewer is thus encouraged to consider 
disability as being ‘depend[ent] upon perception and subjective judgement rather than 
on objective bodily states’ (Garland-Thomson 1997: 6).  
 
Incorporating disability into dance  
As Sarah Whatley writes in her excellent analysis of TCOL, the pas de deux  ‘upholds 
traditional dance values in its structure: combining strength, control, athleticism, and 
smooth, effortless performance’ (2010: 47). But importantly, it does not attempt to 
emulate or replicate the movement vocabulary of classical ballet. In other words, Dave 
is not forced into conforming to an able-bodied aesthetic. Instead, and like Neil in 
Water Burns Sun, his movement throughout the film appears to come from the 
workshopping and (collaborative) development of his own body and experience, rather 
than it being choreographed (or “written”) for him. In this way, his disability is 
incorporated into the dance so that instead of focusing on his shortcomings, the viewer 
is encouraged to recognise his unique movement abilities.  
 
Supported by his hands and arms, Dave uses his upper body strength to shift weight and 
release, balance, pull, counterpull, leap, slide, swing, turn, lift and extend with a 
graceful fluidity, freedom, and power; and it is his articulate movement vocabulary that 
leads and shapes as much of the movement as his nondisabled partner. So instead of the 
able-bodied dancer facilitating the disabled dancer, or the male dancer manipulating the 
female, they are both autonomous agents immersed in creative collaboration, permitting 
the full and equal expression of both individuals. Therefore, whilst the structural values 
and emotional weight of a traditional pas de deux are upheld, ‘one of our culture’s most 
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powerful modes of patriarchal ceremony’ (Daly 1987: 16) is simultaneously subverted 
on two counts! Neither the woman nor the disabled man are denied their own agency; 
neither is “displayed” by the other; and both represent themselves as strong and 
assertive dancers who sensuously explore the identification between them by grafting 
their substance onto each other. The liberating potential of this unique pas de deux can 
thus be found in, to paraphrase Laura Mulvey,  ‘the thrill that comes from leaving the 
past behind without simply rejecting it, transcending outworn or oppressive forms … in 
order to conceive a new language of [dance]’ (1975: 60).  
 
As the pas de deux begins, this new language of dance is filmically mediated with a 
lateral tracking shot executed from a dolly at ground level, which gently and fluidly 
glides after their action, adding motion to the motion of the dancers. This parallel 
relationship between dancers and camera suggests a sort of mirroring or partnering 
between dancers and film, and in effect, between the dancers/film and me, since the 
spatial configuration and mimetic faculty of an involved camera connects me to the 
choreography. Therefore, the calmly relaxed but dynamic pacing of the dance and 
camera, or the film’s body, expresses itself in a tactile way, “touching” me so that I 
interact with a concentrated interest. This interaction promotes the sense/idea that there 
is time and space for this kind of duet to happen, for dance between abilities, and for 
disabled people to enter the world of ballet. This is further reinforced by the light, 
spaciousness, and openness of the studio: qualities that can facilitate change.  
 
The camera’s gliding movement also places me aesthetically in constant motion and in 
accordance with the rhythm of the elegant ¾ waltz time music, synchronising my body 
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with the rhythm of the dance. I am thus caught up in the gracefully swirling and flowing 
auditory movement, which infuses a felt sense of calm, ease, and lightness. There is, 
then, nothing “out of the ordinary” about this pas de deux, and it certainly does not feel 
like an ‘exotic spectacle,’ something that the dichotomy posed by integrated dance can 
(sometimes) create, where in disabled people are ‘categoris[ed] as sub-human, giving 
definition to their non disabled counterparts’ (Campbell 2009: 27). Indeed, a classic 
fairground waltz, often used in horror films due to its slightly sinister edge, would most 
certainly create a sense of the carnival freak show, propagating a “freak display” 
reading.63 Perhaps, then, the conscious choice of a different kind of waltz, but a waltz 
nonetheless, comments upon as well as subverts this traditional association. Another 
interesting note about this ¾ waltz time, also known as triple time, is that it has three 
beats in each bar, something that I like to think represents the three “bodies” involved in 
the dance: that of the dancers, the film, and my own. 
 
The fact that the pas de deux is shot in one long take has great impact on my experience 
of the movement, because contrary to the seduction of fast cuts with lots of rhythms, the 
emotional energy of the shot is allowed to flow in the same way as the choreography 
and music.64 This induces a feeling of flow within (rather than an assault upon) my 
body, as I am carried along by the film and therefore able to fully submerge myself into 
the experience without interruption. Furthermore, the fact that this is immensely 
enjoyable contributes to the film’s ability to arouse an emotional response in me. And 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Dave’s dancing can undoubtedly invite a ‘freak-show’ style of voyeuristic and exploitative gaze, as 
ever-curious viewers are potentially thrilled by the spectacle of the ‘Other,’ and “roll up, roll up to watch 
half a man dancing”. Indeed, evidence of the kind of career David Toole might have had if he had been 
born at the beginning of the twentieth century, can be found in his remarkable similarity both in body and 
style (or means) of movement, with American freak show performer Johnny Eck (1911-1999), who co-
starred in Tod Browning’s 1932 cult classic, Freaks. 
 
64 This fast paced editing with lots of different cuts and rhythms is commonly found in Hollywood dance 
films, as well as in advertising. 
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what better way to challenge preconceived ideas about disability than through evoking 
an embodied emotional response (that has nothing to do with pity or awe) to the 
freedom and flow of a performance? This perfectly illustrates how cinematography is 
intrinsic to the affect of the dance, and how film itself is a form of choreography.  
 
The intimacy and ethics of tactile images 
There are three moments in the pas de deux when the dancers’ axis of movement 
changes, as they turn and move vertically towards the camera. As a result, extreme 
close-ups of parts of their bodies appear to touch the camera, and by extension, pull me 
close and evoke a sense of touch in my body as space literally expands and invites me 
in. When Dave’s body is so close it is no longer objectifiable, separate, and complete, 
but almost becomes part of me, ‘mudd[ying] intersubjective boundaries’ (Marks 2002: 
17). Although I cannot understand what it is like not to have any legs, as I ‘los[e] 
myself in the intensified relation with an other that cannot be known’, I edge closer to a 
somatic understanding of disability as an experience, as a lived thing and not a 
stereotype or a clinical diagnosis (ibid: 19). This is exactly how haptic visuality can 
complement and enhance the more obvious ideological work and intellectual pleasures 
going on in the film. Because through encouraging my sensuous interaction and 
immersion into the dance, into the “now,” the film crosses time and space. And through 
its ability to create this embodied space, I am able to cross the boundaries between it 
and myself, encouraging this feeling of connectivity rather than difference. The fact that 
for me, this sense is powerfully evoked, means that the film is more persuasive in its 
blurring of the boundaries between (so called) disabled and able-bodied, film object and 
viewer subject, establishing instead ‘a continuum between the two, with the possibility 
of one becoming the other’ (Marks 2004: 80). 
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In giving up our ‘own mastery’, and responding to, accepting, welcoming and 
respecting the Other as different but equal in this way, haptic visuality can thus engage 
the viewer in what is both an ethical and erotic experience (op. cit., 2002: 20). And as 
Audre Lorde writes, the erotic can be a liberating as well as a transgressive force:  
The erotic functions for me in several ways, and the first is in providing the 
power which comes from sharing deeply any pursuit with another person. 
The sharing of joy, whether physical, emotional, psychic, or intellectual, 
forms a bridge between the sharers which can be the basis for 
understanding much of what is not shared between them, and lessens the 
threat of their difference.                                                               (1984: 109) 
 
 
Subverting the loneliness of the ‘heroic’ disabled dancer 
Throughout the pas de deux, the other dancers in the studio are seemingly oblivious to 
the couple’s dancing, and the ballerina ends their dance by getting up and walking away 
to join another (able-bodied) male dancer, not so much as casting a look in Dave’s 
direction as he exits the studio. The viewer is thus left questioning whether this dance 
has actually happened? Was it a fantasy or a reality? And whether it is the former or the 
latter, sympathy is likely to be evoked for Dave, as he is, once again, left alone and 
unseen. However, like Sarah Whatley, I read this as a deliberate strategy that ‘forc[es] 
the viewer to confront the reality of the disabled hero’, rather than propagate a 
patronising view of a tragic disabled person as heroic outsider/overcomer (2010: 48). 
This is because it can potentially alert viewers to the fact that heroisation can isolate a 
person, preventing them from actually being “seen.” This, in turn, prompts the kind of 
critical reflection that accepts that heroisation says more about the onlooker than the 
person being heroised. So instead of feeling sorry for Dave, viewers are once again 
encouraged to interrogate their own assumptions, and handkerchiefs are no longer 
necessary.  
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As if to substantiate this further, Dave’s initial response to her ending their dance is to 
continue dancing, until he spots Eddie at the window beckoning him to leave. In no way 
then, is he represented as being wounded or vulnerable; this is the fiction. He is neither 
more than or less than human, simply an (extra)ordinary dancer getting on with what a 
dancer does, and so the viewer’s pity is therefore ‘an emotional cul-de-sac that 
ultimately distances starer and alienates stared. A block to mutuality, pity is repugnance 
refined into genteel condescension’ (Garland-Thomson 2009: 93). 
 
Furthermore, this blurring of the boundaries between fiction and reality is a recurring 
motif throughout the film: all of the actors/dancers play a role whilst using their own 
first names; Eddie’s belief in a fictional/fantastical version of Viv is juxtaposed with her 
actuality; the fiction of disability as entrapment contrasts with the reality of Dave’s 
freedom of movement; the fiction of an identity that is collectively imposed upon you 
contrasts with the reality of the complex and contradictory person that you happen to be. 
Ultimately, then, the ambiguity of this dialectic points to the fact that what is “fiction” 
and what is “reality” depends more upon the perspective of the onlooker, as dominant 
fictions can become reality, and realities may be regarded as fiction. This highlights 
exactly why screendance can function politically, because whether this pas de deux has 
actually taken place in the diegetic world of the film or not is not as important as the 
fact that it has represented the possibilities of what is perhaps not there, but what could 
be – and it is this that can be seen again and again. As Judith Butler writes, ‘[f]antasy is 
what allows us to imagine ourselves and others otherwise; it establishes the possible in 
excess of the real; it points elsewhere, and when it is embodied, it brings the elsewhere 
home’ (2004: 29). 
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Instead, then, of completely immersing the viewer into a utopian fallacy, this ambiguity 
reminds the viewer not to lose sight of the exclusionary reality of the hierarchical dance 
world, or indeed, of the world, whilst simultaneously enjoying the possibilities of 
travelling to another reality. This, in turn, gives us a taste of what we are missing out 
on, and thereby acts as a conduit for changing existing Western societal perceptions of 
physical disability and dance.  
 
Different but passive bodies in motion 
However, despite best intentions, not all of integrated screendance performance 
achieves the full and equal expression of both able-bodied and disabled dancers. Whilst 
acknowledging that Outside In was ground-breaking at the time it was made and in its 
destabilisation of both the invisibility and hypervisibility of the disabled dancer, there 
are some scenes that undoubtedly work more successfully than others, but it is one of its 
least successful scenes that I wish to briefly interrogate here. This is because it can be 
seen to propagate a sense of tokenism, dangerously damaging the credibility of 
integrated dance as it potentially elicits sympathy for and boredom with the disabled 
dancer. 
 
In a moodily lit scene, two integrated and same-sex couples, one a wheelchair user and 
the other able-bodied, perform the same tango-esque choreography in synchrony, to 
tango music. Whilst the sensual and erotic connotations of a tango between these 
couples is transgressive in itself, since there are (still) so few representations of disabled 
people as sensual/sexual beings, and because their queer pairing works against the norm 
of heternormativity, it is, unfortunately, exceptionally dull to watch. This is because 
instead of incorporating the two wheelchairs into their users/dancers’ bodies and into 
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the dance, the two “facilitative” able-bodied dancers, Helen Buggett and Kuldip Singh-
Barmi, merely turn, roll, pull, tilt and sit on the their passive partner’s laps, whilst all 
Celeste Dandeker and Jonathan French seem to do is execute a series of arm 
movements, some of which look extremely awkward.  
 
Perhaps in an attempt to incorporate the wheelchair into the dance, there is a close-up of 
the wheels being turned around, which again, only works to highlight the dancers’ 
passivity since the chair not only signifies their disability, but also a sense of their 
dependence, when in fact both dancers have use of their arms and can indeed move 
themselves through the choreography. Therefore, ‘the presence of the wheelchair alone 
seems to represent integrated performance, with little investigation into its meaning or 
contribution to the performance as a whole’ (Campbell 2009: 27).  
 
In stark contrast, the now famous BBC hip-hop wheelchair advert provides an example 
of just how thrilling wheelchair dancing can be. Ade Adepitan (ex-Paralympic 
athlete/medallist/presenter and dancer) leads two other wheelchair dancers in an 
incredible choreographed sequence, in which wheelchairs move with the same fluidity 
and staccato, freedom, and expression as the dancers’ upper bodies, spinning, swaying, 
leaning, shifting weight, rapidly changing direction, and jerking backwards and 
forwards as they mirror the rhythm of the music. Far from being an obstacle to their 
dancing, an instrument of containment, and a symbol of dependence, then, the 
wheelchair becomes an object of liberation, a part of or an extension of their bodies and 
the movement style, and thereby works to revise ‘the cultural significance of the chair, 
expanding its legibility as a signal of the handicapped into a sign of embodiment’ 
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(Albright 1997: 83). Importantly, the dancers’ disability is not covered over, but 
becomes a secondary presence to the exciting skill and characteristics of the dance. 
 
However, in fairness to Outside In, which was made twenty years before this advert, 
one could argue that developments in wheelchair technology, along with the continual 
development of disability politics/activism and a concomitant increase in the visibility, 
understanding, and acceptance of disabled identities in mainstream culture, have 
enabled this kind of exciting (and perhaps more risky) way of moving through space on 
wheels. Furthermore, Outside In foregrounds integrated dance partnerships as opposed 
to the all-disabled cast of the advert, which, in some respects, is also a riskier form of 
choreography due to the immediate and problematic dichotomy of (so called) “normal” 
and “abnormal” bodies, which can invoke tired old stereotypes of disabled bodies as 
grotesque against the classical “ideal.”65 Nonetheless, the individual embodiment and 
unique talent of the two disabled dancers is neither explored nor exploited in this scene, 
as they are controlled, manipulated, and displayed by their able-bodied counterparts. 
 
Furthermore, despite my own rather obvious enthusiasm, embodied enjoyment, and 
respect for what I consider to be a sensuously transformative/”moving” film, TCOL, 
like any text, is also open to critique. When watching the ballet class through the 
window before his pas de deux begins, Dave is framed as an outsider, a liminal being 
inhabiting a liminal space. This could indeed evoke pity for the lone ‘supercrip’ who 
longs to join the (able-bodied) world, constructing the kind of oppressive psychological 
stereotyping that says ‘disabled people want to be ‘normal’…den[ying] disability 
culture as a positive experience’ (Kuppers 2003: 51). Therefore, instead of reading all of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Indeed, although I believe that they subvert this formally and choreographically through the 
foregrounding of their unique movement, both Water Burns Sun and TCOL are open to this critique. 
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the obstacles that stand in his way as evidence of his social oppression, this kind of 
ableist gaze will focus on his “desperation” (rather than his compelling interest in the 
potential of dance between abilities); his loneliness (rather than his desire to connect 
with another dancer); and his perceived personal tragedy (rather than the ideological 
prescription of attitudes as the real tragedy). So rather than looking at what is there and 
what a body can do, this kind of critical gaze will focus on what is missing and what 
doesn’t work, thereby maintaining the position of privilege from which the critic 
speaks, whilst shutting down all agency of the disabled subject under a totalising label 
of “disability.” As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson writes, ‘[s]een this way, disability is a 
loss to be compensated for, rather than difference to be accommodated. Disability then 
becomes a personal flaw, and disabled people are the “able-bodied” gone wrong. 
Difference thus translates into deviance’ (1997: 49). 
 
Sexually desiring beings/“monster” predators 
Both TCOL and Water Burns Sun couple a disabled man with (apparently) non-disabled 
female dancers (and viewers), working to construct them as “whole” people who 
experience desire despite their culturally presumed undesirability. However, this pairing 
can also revive pernicious stereotypes dating back to early cinematic representations. 
As Longmore writes, ‘[i]n a sexually supercharged culture that places almost obsessive 
emphasis on attractiveness, people with various disabilities are often perceived as 
sexually deviant and even dangerous … [with] disabled characters convey[ing] a kinky, 
leering lust for sex with gorgeous “normal” women’ (1985: 11).66 Instead, then, of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Longmore goes on to list numerous television and filmic examples, such as ‘Dr. Loveless, the hunch-
backed “dwarf” super-criminal in The Wild Wild West (1965-1970), [who] surrounds himself with 
luscious women. The Nazi “dwarf” in the film comedy The Black Bird (1974) displays a voracious 
appetite for sex with statuesque beauties. Dr. Strangelove salivates over the prospect of having his share 
of nubile young women to perpetuate the human race … “Monster” disabled characters menace beautiful 
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sensuous and ethical interaction with difference, TCOL and Water Burns Sun could 
evoke in the viewer this kind of contemptuous revulsion towards “predatory” disabled 
men/monsters.  
 
Moreover, the heterosexualization of their disabled bodies/desire does nothing to 
challenge the power relations inherent within “normative sexuality,” or to represent the 
diverse sexual and gender identities of disabled people. Something that Outside In, 
despite its limitations, is more successful at doing. And finally, since the (patriarchal) 
hierarchy of bodies and norms at the heart of disability oppression places disabled 
women firmly at the bottom, by only featuring disabled men, both films can be critiqued 
for colluding with and perpetuating the social invisibility and double disablement of 
disabled female bodies and their sensuality/sexuality (see Nancy Mairs: 2002). 
Therefore, despite their political potential, it is important not to become overly 
celebratory and to remain alert to ambiguity and contradiction. 
 
Conclusion 
As Sarah Whately asserts, there ‘are relatively few dance films, readily available, that 
feature disabled dance artists … [and] very few disabled dance and screendance 
makers’ (2010: 43). Indeed, I know how difficult (and expensive) it was to source films 
for this chapter. And so despite welcome shifts in societal attitudes towards people with 
disabilities, particularly after the extraordinary success of London’s 2012 Paralympics, 
disability and screendance (like Dave peering in at the window) unfortunately remain at 
the margins. This undoubtedly levels a great deal of responsibility onto performers and 
choreographers’/filmmakers’ shoulders, as well as diminishing the potential for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
women who would ordinarily reject them … [And] there is always an undertone of sexual tension, of 
sexual danger. We are never quite sure what he might do to her’ (1985: 11). 
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screendance to further challenge exclusionary Western societal perceptions of physical 
disability.  
 
Furthermore, it is not merely the radical motivation behind these films that creates their 
radical potential. If a phenomenological approach stresses the interactive nature of film, 
in which the viewer ‘participates in the production of the cinematic experience,’ then 
just as some viewers may be touched, moved, and potentially “changed” by their 
yielding to the films haptic and political propensities, others may well feel discomfort, 
embarrassment, pity, and/or outright hostility towards this (violating) contact (Marks 
2002: 13). If viewers do not have respect for difference to begin with, then it is unlikely 
they will experience a ‘concomitant loss of self in the presence of the other,’ and 
screendance may thus be experienced as a disabling interaction with/and representation 
of disability (ibid: 20). What is more, some viewers may simply harbour no interest in 
an outsider’s perspective because their position of privilege does not require them to do 
so. And these are precisely the kinds of audiences in most need of “educating,” which 
raises the question of whether these films are merely “preaching” to the already 
converted. Therefore, the question of whether disability and screendance can help 
develop personal and social identities within a disabling society is both complex and 
contradictory, and certainly a matter of more than just the film alone. 
 
However, my own yielding to the radical motivation of this dance film resides in the 
fact that our bodies are invested in the same project, and therefore, I am not ‘other’ to 
what the film’s body assumes, as well as my predisposition for embodied viewing, and 
the powerfully visceral and corporeal responses to film, and particularly dance films, 
that this entails. Therefore, on the basis that I know I am not unique, and despite the 
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potential discussed above for both ambiguity and contradiction, through the 
combination of its radical motivation, the level of viewers’ embodied/political 
receptivity, and the context in which it is seen, screendance can connect the viewer to 
an experience, and thus to an understanding of what it means to be excluded as well as 
connected on the grounds of one’s disability. This, in turn, can potentially help nurture a 
“community” that works to both respect and celebrate difference through a shared 
commitment to political equality. Both TCOL and Water Burns Sun consciously employ 
different ways of filming (by presenting us with both optic and haptic images), in order 
to encourage a dialectical movement between the different ways of seeing/feeling that 
will enable us to emphasise with Dave and Neil both objectively and sensuously. In 
doing so, they can act as a powerful political tool/intervention, encouraging 
(nondisabled) viewers to look at difference differently. And what is more, dance and 
film can enhance one another, potentially reaching a crossover audience from within 
both forms. 
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Chapter Three 
Privileging Embodied Experience in Feminist Screendance 
Introduction 
 
[I]n film I can make the world dance. 
                  (Maya Deren, from the documentary In the Mirror of Maya Deren) 
 
Film just seemed much more pliable and less static.        (Yvonne Rainer 1999: 69) 
 
For me, dance, choreography and video are one thing – they all proceed from the 
dance of electrons.                                           (Amy Greenfield in Elder 1997: 297) 
 
All directorial decisions are also choreographic ones…And film exists only in time 
– like dance.                                                                            (Sally Potter 1997: 90) 
      
 
This chapter takes an approach grounded in feminist phenomenology to consider the 
work of four female filmmakers. Each of them, Maya Deren, Yvonne Rainer, Amy 
Greenfield and Sally Potter, came to film from a background in dance, which informed 
their rhythmic creativity in, understanding of, and approach to screendance.67 This has 
also located their work within an unusual filmic genealogy, in that its female artists 
have enjoyed equal (if, arguably, not more) prominence than their male counterparts. 
All have utilised choreographic form and content, with rhythm being a defining element 
of their work. They have also maintained an interest in the physiological functioning of 
perception, and have privileged the moving body/film, placing it at the centre of their 
aesthetic and technological experimentation.  
 
I shall consider some of the key interpretations of my chosen films, with which I share a 
feminist common ground, in order to highlight how my methodology is both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Maya Deren is the exception (of the four) in that she was not a trained dancer. However, ‘she was a 
born dancer’ (Wodening 2001: 179) who gained insight into the professional world of dance through her 
role as personal secretary to choreographer, dancer, and anthropologist Katherine Dunham. 
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interconnected to these, and distinct. I shall then begin to draw distinctions between the 
work of these filmmakers, arguing that Deren and Greenfield’s creative practice, and 
specifically Meshes of the Afternoon (1943-59) and Tides (1982), is grounded in a 
cinema of the body, in material rather than conceptual thinking. Conceptual thinking, I 
suggest, takes place after the film has been made. They attempt to create a unique 
ritualistic and creative-art form/experience, showing emotion and transcendence 
through the body. In contrast, Rainer conceptualises emotion in order to explore it, and 
in Lives of Performers (1972) is preoccupied with words and with language as 
signifying practice. Influenced by a poststructuralist distrust of language, she 
encourages her audience to reflect more thoughtfully than bodily, using film as an 
alienation technique in order to dissect rather than indulge in emotions and affect. Thus 
Rainer’s work can be seen as a cinema of ideas with a great sense of reflexive humour. I 
shall argue that Potter’s later work, and specifically The Tango Lesson (1997), attempts 
to bridge the gap between these two approaches.68 
 
However, despite the differences between these filmmakers, particularly in terms of 
their desire to evoke or not evoke a cathartic response and elicit kinaesthetic 
identification, I argue that all four are inspired by a similar feminist sensibility. 
Extending Vivian Sobchack’s argument that there is a difference between the fetishized 
body and the lived body, I shall argue that their use of cinematic movement (as well as 
stasis) can extend the language of the body, and can thus be read, or rather, felt, as 
moments when the body performs ‘in excess of the historical and analytical systems 
available to codify, contain, and even negate it’ (Sobchack 1992: 147). This provides a 
means through which the female body can move away from objectification through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Henceforth, Meshes of the Afternoon will be referred to as Meshes, Lives of Performers as Lives, and 
The Tango Lesson as TTL. 
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physical movement and expression, since it is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘clearly in 
action that the spatiality of our body is brought into being’ (1989: 102).  
 
Complicating categorisation: feminist interpretation/neglect  
Deren defies categories. She was neither feminine in the demure sense 
nor feminist in the modern sense.                                (Nichols 2001: 8) 
 
The discourse surrounding Maya Deren’s films is contradictory, occupying, as 
Catherine Soussloff asserts, ‘two places: one of them apolitical and aestheticizing, the 
other political and feminist’ (2001: 105). Although her work has more recently enjoyed 
a great deal of scholarly attention, Bill Nichols attributes its neglect ‘over the last 
several decades’ (2001: 12) to at least five contextual factors that were products of their 
specific time and place. Most importantly for this discussion, her work was perceived to 
have made no significant contribution to the conceptual frameworks that dominated the 
rise of film theory in the 1970s. This is because it stresses a utopian sensibility that 
privileges introspection and embodied experience over ideological analysis, and cultural 
difference over gendered identity. It also contains (on the surface level) a problematic 
celebration of “primitive” cultures, inner (spiritual) experiences, trance, and ritual, 
without an acknowledgement of their essentialist association with women and the 
culturally exoticised, and thus of the dominant oppositions that form Western identity 
and power. As a result, the serious critical feminist implications of her work were 
largely ignored.69 As if it couldn’t possibly be both, Deren’s work was placed within the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Although in some aspects undoubtedly problematic, Deren’s interest in the “primitive” was far more 
complex than an outright essentialist dismissal would allow, and her “utopian sensibility” was the driving 
force behind her desire to and attempts at completely surpassing dualistic thinking in regards to cultural 
difference. Not only, then, did she conduct extensive research into different cultures and social/historical 
contexts – most notably her research into Haitian dance, magic, trance and ritual, which culminated in her 
(1953) book Divine Horsemen: The Living Gods of Haiti (1953), as well as her own initiation as a 
Voudoun priestess – she was also fiercely critical of artists who described their work as “primitive” 
without any understanding of the cultural contexts from which they were stealing. As Bill Nichols writes, 
her ‘efforts to understand hysteria, trance, and ritual as socially situated acts of collective association 
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“avant-garde tradition” rather than the feminist, resulting in ambivalence about her 
place within feminist film history.70 Indeed, ‘[h]ighly influential feminist writers like 
Claire Johnston and Laura Mulvey ignored Deren entirely in their search for pioneering 
feminist filmmakers’ (ibid: 13).  
 
Furthermore, because Deren’s antipathy towards Freudian psychoanalytic (as well as 
surrealist and abstract) interpretations of her work are so well documented, Judith 
Mayne suggests that ‘at least one of the reasons why Maya Deren’s film work has not 
received the sustained critical attention one might expect within feminist film studies’, 
is because Freud has ‘done fairly well within feminist film theory’ (2002: 82).71 
However, what is immediately and seemingly contradictory about this is that her first 
film, Meshes, explores a woman’s interior experiences/dream states in a way that is 
absolutely laden with symbolic imagery: multiple selves, mirrors, doors and windows 
(against which Deren presses as she looks outside in the most iconic “Botticelli” shot of 
the film), staircases, a circular and repetitive structure, a flower, knife, key, mysterious 
mirror-faced figure, and the ocean etc., etc. Instead of understanding woman’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rather than as personal dysfunction … went against the grain of dominant practices; each incurred 
resistance and misunderstanding. Each remains an emblem of Deren’s extraordinary willingness to 
transgress boundaries and reformulate their contours’ (2001: 13-14). 
 
70 Although many female avant-gardists were very successful within the feminist film movement, there 
was also a great deal of (feminist) suspicion about the ‘avant-garde’ during the 1970s/1980s. This was 
largely because some avant-garde filmmakers considered “feminist art” to be explicitly political, where as 
they, ‘like many artists, resist[ed] sociological, collectivist explanations of and responses to their lives 
and their work in favour of more personal, individualistic analyses’. Therefore, as Jan Rosenberg explores 
in her study of the feminist film movement, ‘Women’s avant-garde films pose[d] the greatest problems 
for feminist theory’ (1983: 39, 75). 
 
71 Deren believed that attaching labels such as “surrealist” or “abstract” to her work would limit 
understanding of it, since they dissect, fix, and thereby confine meaning by focusing on individual 
images/scenes rather than on the film as a whole. As John David Rhodes observes, ‘nothing annoyed 
Deren more than what she called a ‘Freudian’ interpretation of the film’ (2011: 95), and in section 3B of 
her Anagram of Ideas on Art, Form and Film (1946), Deren writes that: ‘Psychoanalysis, while valid as a 
therapy for maladjusted personality, defeats its own purpose as a method of art criticism, for it implies 
that the artist does not create out of the nature of his instrument, but that it is used merely to convey some 
reality independent of all art. It implies that there is no such thing as art at all, but merely more or less 
accurate self-expression’ (Deren 2005: 72). 
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subjectivity on the basis of or through adaptation of a Freudian/Lacanian model, 
however, symbols that seem ripe for psychoanalytic analysis can instead be seen to be 
“inverted,” or subversively repeated, in order to speak from the impossible space of 
women’s ‘otherness.’  
 
Since the woman is played by Deren herself, and the film is shot in the actual house that 
she shared with her husband, the filmmaker Alexander Hammid, who not only features 
in but was also a collaborator on the film, it is not difficult to interpret Meshes as a 
feminist autobiography/commentary on gender identity and sexual politics in a WW II 
era when women’s roles were dramatically changing – thereby both predating and 
anticipating the political concerns of feminist filmmaking and film theory.72 Indeed, 
Deren’s “fantasies” are interrupted twice by Hammid, whose mirror image, unlike hers, 
is reflected as “whole” and “complete” (in the third repetition). At first suggesting a 
return to order, the illusion of his stable and unified subjectivity is (literally) shattered 
as she stabs his mirror face, which action, along with the repeated image of the knife 
and the final image of the dead Deren/mermaid, represents the power and violence of 
her subconscious fantasies and desires, as she breaks down the (fragility) of his 
(menacing) male dominance. Therefore these tropes, along with the circularity of the 
“narrative,” can and have been read as the expression of women’s specific anger, and as 
metaphors for their collective yearning for liberation and escape from the monotonous 
everyday existence of imprisonment within the domestic sphere, with all the “dark” and  
erotic frustrations and fantasies that can arise from this gendered confinement.73  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 This is despite the fact that Deren’s ‘antipathy to the claim of the personal and the biographical’ 
(Rhodes 2011: 13) is also well known! 
 
73 For examples of this kind of feminist interpretation, see: 
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Moreover, because it is not clear whether the woman ever wakes up from her dream 
states, and because she is doubled, trebled and quadrupled, Meshes problematizes the 
unified subject of patriarchal discourse, as does At Land (1944) with its own filmic 
images of Deren’s multiplicity. This works to disrupt ‘the law of non-contradiction’ 
(Butler 1990: 122), by suggesting that subjectivity is neither singular nor on a journey 
from infantile fragmentation to a (Lacanian) fantasy of “unity” and “wholeness”, but 
instead, is multiple and in relationship, in a state of becoming. Therefore, a more 
flexible ‘network of multiple possibilities, multiple perspectives, multiple identities, 
where there is no clear split between ‘I’ and ‘not I’’ (Kristeva 1980: 167), replaces the 
rigid masculinization of subjectivity and the idea that there is an essential core to the 
self, a “real me.” In this way the film resides in a liminal space somewhere between the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic, creating an alternative order to that specified by Lacan by 
revealing the instability of, and alterity within, identity (and meaning), and thereby 
responding to the silence that has been projected onto women via a phallocentric 
discourse that characterizes femininity and subjectivity as divergent paths – as either/or. 
This sense of being in an “in-between” place is beautifully articulated in At Land, as 
Deren sensuously slides herself over rocks and driftwood onto a long banquet table, 
around which “high-cultured” men and women completely ignore her presence as they 
continue eating, drinking, and conversing. Caught between the ocean from which she 
has “emerged,” and the sophistication of the dinner party, she is suspended somewhere 
across the nature/culture divide. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Maureen Turim, (1986) ‘Childhood memories and Household Events in the Feminist Avant-Garde’, 
Journal of Film and Video, 38: 3/4, pp.86-92. 
 
Marilyn Fabe, (1996), ‘Maya Deren’s Fatal Attraction: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Meshes of the 
Afternoon with a Psycho-Biographical Afterword’, Women’s Studies: An Inter-disciplinary Journal, 25: 
2, pp. 137-152. 
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Despite all of this feminist potential, however, her films remain contradictory and 
problematic because whilst undoubtedly complicated, mechanisms of patriarchal 
filmmaking – voyeurism, narcissism, and exhibitionism, are all still present. As Lauren 
Rabinovitz acknowledges, ‘female pioneers in their “masculine” fields of endeavour … 
remained prisoners of an ideology that even constructed their positions of resistance’ 
(2002: 73). In Meshes, Deren’s fragmented, exotic body is situated entirely within the 
patriarchal fantasy of the sexualised woman – nearly always on display and thus the 
object of the gaze throughout the film – with the gaze behind the camera largely being 
that of her husband. Therefore it is not simply a film about a woman by a woman. 
However, at the same time the “fantasy” and desire in and of the film are all hers – and 
thus she is not simply either an object of desire or a fetishized other.74  It is undoubtedly 
this complication that left Deren’s work ‘as a nonentity within [Mulveyan feminist] 
critique’ (Soussloff 2001: 115). But it is also this complication that opens up deeper 
levels of complexity, subverting the law from within the law, because whilst she is an 
object, her multiplicity enables her to watch herself through the window, just as viewers 
watch her. In this way, a female object is transformed into a subject/object, (ironically) 
aware of her own objectification and either complicit in or subversively commenting 
upon it – or both. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Considering both Deren and Hammid’s comments on their collaboration, it seems clear that the 
concepts and images for Meshes were born from Deren’s imagination, as evidenced by the repetition 
throughout her body of work of key themes as well as cinematic effects. (See Deren’s ‘Magic is New’ in 
Essential Deren, 2005, pp.197-206, and particularly p.203). Whilst undoubtedly an accomplished 
technical filmmaker, Hammid acknowledged that his strength lay in helping others to realise their work, 
saying in an interview that, ‘I accepted the fact that I am not an originator of ideas, and that I need 
someone else to help me’ (in Clark et al. 1988: 115). 
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Whilst the body will always be an object (for others), it is also always a lived reality 
(for the subject). This relates to the contradiction of the body itself: both our most 
intimate experience of the world and the way in which we are immediately and publicly 
perceived – at once both powerful and powerfully superficial. Through establishing a 
multiplicity of identities and perspectives (rather than a taxonomy) for the female artist 
and viewer, Meshes breaks down categories of opposition – just as the use of multiple 
mirror reflections in Bodas de sangre illuminates the multi-faceted and performative 
nature of Spanish cultural and national identity, and as Viv’s refusal to look at her 
doubled mirror image in The Cost of Living both acknowledges and subversively rejects 
the patriarchal splitting of woman into two bodies – one subject/material and the other 
object/ideal.75 Thus this visual emphasis on mirrors and windows, a trope familiar to all 
screendance genres (and beyond), reflects back to the viewer the reflexivity of film and 
its use as a political tool. 
 
However, whilst this reflexive, fluid sense of (feminist and queer) multiplicity can be 
read into Meshes, it is both interesting, disappointing, and perhaps (yet again) 
contradictory to discover that Deren frequently attempted to control audience reception 
(see Sitney 2002: 11 and Rhodes 2011: 98), often adopting an autocratic style in her 
lectures and writing that spelt out what her viewers were “supposed” to see/feel in her 
films. Despite this defensive (and arguably patriarchal) didactism, Deren was 
undoubtedly a pioneering filmmaker and film theorist, who fiercely refused the 
trivialising label “woman artist” in her fight to be taken seriously in a masculinist avant-
garde world, and within an ideological milieu that ‘celebrated the male artist as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 These discussions concerning the multiple mirror reflections in Bodas de sangre and the refusal to look 
at a doubled mirror image in The Cost of Living can be found in chapters one and two respectively. 
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Romantic hero while configuring women’s roles only in relation to the male artist’s 
greatness – as either wives or lovers’ (Rabinovitz 2002: 74).76 Furthermore, in 
championing more “amateur” independent avant-garde film practice, she promoted 
resistance to mainstream Hollywood film – an industry notoriously ‘cut to the measure 
of [male] desire’ (Mulvey 1975: 68), and thereby created a (female) discourse as an 
alternative to the dominant order. 
 
A diachronic approach: percept and concept/ subject and object  
Perception is, as it were, mid-way between mind and body and 
requires the functioning of both.                      (Grosz 1994: 94)                                                            
 
Of course, the “meaning” of a film/filmmaker and their cultural significance/critical 
appreciation/neglect, is not only polysemic at any given time, it is also diachronic. 
Therefore the metamorphosis from critical neglect of her work to appreciation reflects 
the changing perceptions, models and approaches of its audience, and the society within 
which we live. As detailed in the introduction to this thesis, Feminist film theory (of the 
late 1970s/1980s) drew heavily upon semiotics and psychoanalysis in its aim to restore 
subjectivity to women, strategically distancing us from our representation in films as 
objects of the gaze, associated only with mindless bodiliness and emotions, by focusing 
on the body as a written and spoken sign rather than a material entity. This progressive 
political conviction was, and I believe, still is, necessary, since ‘it works to revalorize 
woman’s speech and to promote her integration within symbolic social and cultural 
systems’ (Del Rio 2003: 11). Yet some of the more confrontational and absolutist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
76 Rabinovitz notes the following comment Deren made to an interviewer in 1947; ‘[It] always comes as a 
little bit of a shock to men when a woman is doing something in a field that has to do with machinery and 
with creating in terms of inventing with a machine’ (2002: 80, n.12). 
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pronouncements and questions, like the contention that women can only ever be trapped 
in and defined by our bodies, and that the enjoyment of our bodies can only ever be 
narcissistic and exhibitionist (whilst in many ways understandable because we will 
always be watched), ‘did not foresee the new imbalance it would foster, as it would 
relegate the sensual and bodily aspects of female subjectivity to a practically irrelevant 
status’ (ibid).  
 
However, this work had to be done, and has enabled a future generation of feminist film 
scholars, like me, to return to the idea of the lived body as opposed to the fetishized 
body. And to the ways in which the “problematic” body may be “undone” by the 
performing body/body of the film itself, in a more liberating countercinema that does 
more than simply deconstruct the patriarchal bias of mainstream film. Thus, what has 
evolved over time is arguably a more measured approach that integrates the ability to 
focus outwards towards a politics of gender, sexual orientation, race, and class etc., and 
also inwards, to characters/the film’s emotional states and transcendence through the 
body.  
 
With this in mind, I aim to layer my own subjective lived-body experience of watching 
Meshes with more abstractive film studies practices, in an attempt to find a middle 
ground between the critiques of Deren. Since this film is neither a purely bodily nor 
purely a conceptual experience, I am interested in where these spheres interconnect. 
Whilst acknowledging that there are no foundational experiences that are unconditioned 
by power and ideology, I would also argue that, as Elizabeth Grosz so elegantly 
articulates, ‘without some acknowledgement of the formative role of experience in the 
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establishment of knowledges, feminism has no grounds from which to dispute 
patriarchal norms’ (1994: 94). 
 
Structure and audience engagement  
The cyclical structure of Meshes is built upon three repetitions (that foreground 
different elements) of the initial series of scenes, with a double ending. After the 
fragmented images of a woman’s hand, feet and shadow have picked up, walked away 
with, and smelt an artificial flower that has been left on the road by a “magically” 
moving/disappearing mannequin’s hand, the shadow of the woman (played by Deren) 
pauses at the bottom of the steps to her home and looks, and the film then cuts to a long 
shot of a dark figure of a man disappearing around the bend in the road ahead.77 
“Naturally” reading this as her subjective POV shot, it is thus confusing when the 
camera pans back to reveal the woman’s fragmented body in the frame, no longer 
subject but object, with her shadow cast behind her. In this way the film works to cue a 
generic perceptual response for it only to be denied, and the viewer quickly learns (or 
perhaps simply senses) that there is nothing “natural” about this world/film, and 
therefore, its “psychological guidance” cannot be trusted.78  
 
This play between subjectivity and objectivity, between real and unreal will be repeated 
throughout the film, and John David Rhodes argues that this is ‘the key to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 In the cycle of repetitions that follow, this figure of a man is transformed into the mysterious mirror 
faced figure. 
 
78 The use of POV camera and editing has long been used to structure narrative discourse by creating a 
spatial relationship between different shots. This gives the viewer some insight into what the character 
sees and how they might be feeling, thereby providing the psychological motivation for what happens 
next. In this way, POV editing is one of the most powerful mechanisms for audience manipulation, and as 
influential theorist of montage, V. I. Pudovkin writes, ‘editing is not merely a method of the junction of 
separate scenes or pieces, but is a method that controls the “psychological guidance” of the spectator’ 
(1970: 75). In Meshes, these familiar rules are shattered.   
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understanding its critical (political) potential … it is the unprepared-for, the casual 
abruptness of these switches in point of view that make them so powerfully unsettling 
and engrossing as we are drawn in and then expelled from a subjectivity that we think 
we share’ (2011: 59). I would add that it is this use of editing, of suggesting continuity 
where there isn’t any, that tacitly encourages the viewer to temporarily abandon their 
more cognitive processes of understanding, and to go more with the flow or experience 
of the film, however jolting or disturbing. Of course, however, it can just as easily lead 
to the viewer’s ambivalence and/or disengagement, because just as some viewers may 
well be captivated, some may feel held captive, whilst some will simply want to escape. 
 
The woman then climbs the stairs, knocks on the door, tests to see whether it is open 
and since it isn’t, takes her key from her purse. This then drops from her hand and falls 
down the stairs in slow motion, which contrasts with the rapid editing as she chases 
after it. In combination with the percussive music that gradually reaches a crescendo, 
but does not “match” the motion of the key falling and hitting the stone steps, an 
uncanny sense of time and rhythm is created.79 Like Deren’s slow motion and dancerly 
ascent of the stairs in the first repetition, this cinematic manipulation of time (and space) 
connotes a Bergsonian sense of the duration of this moment in time through its 
‘freedom from “real [linear and unified] time”’ (Franko 2001: 132).80 Or in other words, 
the combination of rhythm, speed, sound and image work to immerse me, however 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
79 Meshes was originally shot as a silent film, but under Deren’s supervision in 1959, Teiji Ito, Deren’s 
third and final husband, added the musical score that is influenced by classical Japanese music. 
 
80 The intellect, and particularly scientific and mathematical laws, have divided and measured time in 
order to make it quantifiable and thus “graspable” or knowable – advantageous because what is known 
can also be controlled. However, these “laws” are more probable and useful than they are universal, 
moral, or enforceable, and according to Bergson’s theory of duration, time is not immobile in its linearity, 
fixed or divisible. It is instead incomplete, with neither beginning nor end and thus forever in a process of 
becoming. In this way, then, time and consciousness are qualitative multiplicities that cannot be 
understood through symbols, only through Bergson’s (fluid) concept of intuition (Bergson: 1968). 
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briefly, into my embodied experience of the film and further away from habitual 
attempts at “mastering” its meanings – since ‘the rhythm of varying and repeated speeds 
in [Deren’s] films affect perception much more than the symbolic value of the pictures’ 
(Holl 2001: 160).  
 
What this does, in effect, is stretch out the viewers’ sense of time by conveying the 
feeling of complete immersion in an experience – an experience that I am familiar with, 
can remember, and so can “mirror” – that time can feel endless as it slows down – or 
conversely, that it can speed up and pass by in an instant. In this way, the filmic 
apparatus evokes a more ample understanding of time unlike that of the “everyday,” one 
where it is not fixed but forever in process, a process that I am encouraged to “go with” 
– to “surrender” to. Thus, my embodied mind gives meaning to the film through my 
embodied memories – and through this durational aspect of my experience, the film 
impresses the feelings with which I interrelate and which I share, thereby breaking 
down the time and space that divides me from “it”. On this, it is worth quoting Bergson 
at length: 
[A]rt aims at impressing feelings on us rather than expressing them […] [I]t 
seems that we should have to re-live the life of the subject who experiences it 
if we wished to grasp it in its original complexity. Yet the artist aims at 
giving us a share in this emotion, so rich, so personal, so novel, and at 
enabling us to experience what he cannot make us understand. This he will 
bring about by choosing, among the outward signs of his emotions, those 
which our body is likely to imitate mechanically, though slightly, as soon as 
it perceives them, so as to transport us all at once into the indefinable 
psychological state which called them forth. Thus will be broken down the 
barrier interposed by time and space between his consciousness and ours: and 
the richer in ideas and the more pregnant with sensations and emotions is the 
feeling within whose limits the artist has brought us, the deeper and higher 
shall we find the beauty thus expressed.                                     (1910: 16, 18) 
 
This “surrender”, then, is not passive. I am not lost in or “defeated” by the film, but 
rather, through an interested sense of surrender I am able to “move in” deeper. I am 
	   130	  
proactive, fully attentive and receptive as I begin to move in rhythm with the 
choreography of the screen. It is through this process of engagement that the process of 
“letting go” is facilitated, and through this letting go a sense of liberation and discovery 
– of who and what I/the film is, beyond, between and perhaps in contradiction with the 
social and cultural expectations and projections that can confine us. As John Berger 
questioned: ‘[w]hy should an artist’s way of looking at the world have any meaning for 
us? Why does it give us pleasure? Because, I believe, it increases our awareness of our 
own potentiality’ (1960: 16). Thus, I am brought into a more direct relationship with the 
present, moving further away from dualistic thought, from the battle between self and 
other – and to a place of holistic “knowing” that is more relaxed and spacious.  
 
This is because instead of “protecting” myself by keeping myself removed, rushing ‘to 
quote others, and describe [my] objects of study through a range of “floating signifiers” 
that tend to overdetermine and foreclose [my] objects and [my] descriptions before the 
latter have even really begun’ (Sobchack 2012: 22), I am instead “daring” to realise first 
the freedom (from the literal) that lies at my own centre – not disregarding my own 
embodied process of watching, and thereby moving away from the (masculinist) socio-
symbolic order that traditionally “speaks” or externalizes in order to be “right” – or to 
prove others’ wrong. Therefore, in effect, I am addressing and questioning the perpetual 
asymmetries in gendered forms of power and knowledge – precisely one of feminism’s 
aims. And whilst I acknowledge that (perhaps ironically) I am unable to do this without 
quoting the words of other, much more refined thinkers, I am moving somewhere nearer 
to a feminist phenomenological inquiry.  
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Creative possibilities of time: an alternative temporality 
It is significant that the world of Meshes is not governed by 
temporal/geographical/material laws of “here and there”, or of past, present and future, 
but instead different time frames overlap as we see Deren sleeping in a chair whilst 
simultaneously watching herself from above (in the first repetition), or appearing in one 
place then immediately in another without travelling in between, as she strides/jump 
cuts (in the third repetition) across different terrains in order to return home. Through 
this sense of “dreamtime,” I am smuggled out of the familiar, known world and enter 
into a time that is ‘other’ than historical – an imaginative and freer space in which I may 
reconsider long held assumptions/certainties in a new light, and make new decisions.  
 
This is because an alternative notion of temporality works to resist the construction of 
linear time and its equation with historical progress, serving the dominant power 
structures through the concealment of multiple and contradictory histories of any given 
time or space, and thereby ‘recognizing in the mastery of time the true structure of the 
slave’ (Kristeva 1981: 17). Like Meshes, our world is in fact riddled with contradictions 
and confusing signals, yet despite this, our histories are assessed, judged and introduced 
as fact by our dominant ideologies and institutions, which we then learn to accept as our 
cultural foundations and our “imagined” guidelines – resulting in our “entrapment” 
within the meanings we have made. In her eloquent investigation into British 
imperialism, Anne McClintock writes that:  
The axis of time was projected onto the axis of space and history became 
global. With social Darwinism, the taxonomic project, first applied to nature, 
was now applied to cultural history. Time became a geography of social 
power, a map from which to read a global allegory of “natural” social 
difference. Most importantly, history took on the character of a spectacle.                                                     
(1995: 37) 
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Meshes therefore disrupts these ‘masculine, civilizational and obsessional’ (op cit. 
1981: 18) concepts of time, illustrating how politics and “meaning” may be more 
evident in the form rather than the content of a film. 
 
Enmeshment of reality/unreality 
Having re-climbed the stairs and entered the house, gone upstairs into the bedroom, then 
back downstairs to the armchair by the window, an extreme close-up of Deren’s eye 
cuts to the view of the street from the window, then cuts back to her eye closing in sleep 
as both images cloud over. Thus ends the initial series of scenes with which the three 
repetitions interconnect – retelling, varying and ritualising the “narrative” in different 
ways. What they have in common, however, is that they are all initiated by the woman’s 
gaze through the window, they each show the pursuit of an elusive black-robed and 
mirror-faced figure perpetually out of range, and they repeatedly cross different 
thresholds – between dream and reality, subject and object, and between inside and 
outside.  
 
This cyclical and repetitive structure makes the dimensions of ‘reality’ and ‘unreality’ 
so thoroughly enmeshed that a clear-cut demarcation cannot be made. Indeed, as Deren 
said herself, ‘it would seem that the imagined achieved, for the protagonist, such force 
that it became reality’ (2005: 204). In this way, then, the film rises above any fixed 
sense of categorisation, since it is no longer the case that “reality” is assigned only to a 
waking state, or desire only to dreaming. Just as with fairy tales, myth, and art, the 
borders between the imaginary and real are blurred, and anything that can be imagined 
can also become real, just as the “reality” of film is created through artifice. And thus, 
the “magical” power of the imagination/film creates another kind of freedom, a playful 
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and/or serious take on and layering of reality, where things can change at any moment. 
This freedom is not aspired to in a political (or even, in this case, a joyful) sense; it does 
not attempt to teach its viewers a lesson. Instead of didacticism, the freedom comes 
from the film’s dancerly movement, from its repetition with difference.81 It shows us 
several realities, several paths through which we can “feel” our way and try out 
different and multiple meaning(s) as familiar objects are transformed into something 
else, and slight nuances are added every time the woman looks out of the window or 
enters the house.  
 
This non-normative and complex layered temporality/enmeshment of different realities 
offers no certainties, presenting us with a feminist conception of time and reality that 
not only actively resists theories of progressive temporality and a straightforward 
meaning of ‘reality,’ but also renders the mastery of history and of knowledge 
impossible. The past or the present cannot be possessed as an object of knowledge, and 
so the viewer is thus encouraged to challenge evolutionary historicist claims, and to 
question the ways in which the consideration of time (and of history) have entered into 
the constitution of gender, constructing and perpetuating the power relations between 
men, women and gender queers – the powerful and oppressed. And the film’s 
enmeshment of different realities, with its refusal to define which one is real or not, 
promotes in the viewer a creative consciousness and the possibility of new logics and 
new methods of reasoning that can, potentially, transfigure the coherency of our existent 
reality.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 The “dance” is not limited to a particular body or choreographic routine, and instead, the film itself 
engages with dance, creating choreography through structure, camera movements, and editing techniques, 
and thereby freeing the concept of choreography from its limiting definition as an interrelated series of 
(bodily) movements. Therefore, whilst some sections may not necessarily “look like” dance, they have 
the same kinaesthetic impact and “feel” of a dance, and create a time and space that can only exist on 
screen. 
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Entering into the film’s rhythm through sound 
Whilst the film’s pace and rhythm undoubtedly affect my own embodied viewing 
experience in the slow-motion key-falling-down-the-stairs sequence, it is Teiji Ito’s 
dissonant score that draws me in deeper, adding dimension to the duration of what I see. 
On this point and in reference to Derek Jarman’s Blue (1993), Vivian Sobchack 
elegantly destabilises the dominant audiovisual hierarchy by paying attention to the 
phenomenology of sound: 
Film sound (to historically varying degree) surrounds and envelops us 
and is not, like the image, “in front” of us. Merleau-Ponty tells us: “To 
see is to have at a distance.” To hear not only bridges that distance but 
also brings it near so that things resonate on and in our bodies.                                                   
(2012: 30, original emphasis) 
 
Therefore, when image and sound work together to draw me into the film in this way, 
when they combine to evoke a sense of movement and journey within my body and I 
am able to go with the experience, to become attuned to the rhythm of the film, I can, in 
a sense, establish direct contact with it – and enter into its dance. Like deep 
concentration and deep breathing (which are experiences, not concepts), attuning with 
the film’s rhythm, both audio and visual, can (potentially but not necessarily) bring 
about a change in both the viewer’s physical and mental/emotional state – thus 
explaining the hypnotic quality that is often associated with this film. Of course one has 
to be receptive in order to be hypnotised, but through the filmic form’s capacity to 
engender new experiences through its creation of new (and multiple) realities, a 
receptive viewer can experience a sense of “letting go”, which can be both an 
interesting, moving and liberating experience.  
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Ethics, form, experience and intuition 
In her essay on Deren’s ethics of form, Maureen Turim examines ‘structure as defining 
a process of audience engagement’ (2001: 77), concluding that: 
[I]t is perhaps time to pay more attention to the nuances of a 
morality of form that is less absolute, more playful, born between 
ritual and play, borrowing from the classic, from earlier avant-
garde traditions, but forging its own rhythms, its own protagonists, 
its own dance.                                                      (100, my emphasis) 
 
I agree with Turim that engaging with these nuances is just as important as pure 
description and naming, since it seems to me that Meshes is more “about” engendering 
an experience, or rather, a multiplicity of experiences, than it is about “fixing” meaning 
through theoretical interpretation and analysis. The film is playing with different ideas, 
and whilst the images of these ideas are visible, the ideas themselves are not.82 
Therefore, in effect, we are all (film and viewers alike) dancing around meaning(s), 
testing and learning through an inquisitive and enquiring sense of reality, which, like 
the film, is a dynamic structure. So attempting to define and determine something that 
lives and moves will never quite capture its complexity or its “magic”. In a similar way, 
John David Rhodes argues: 
It seems to me that the film becomes less interesting the more we push at 
any of its images or set of images as ‘meaning’ this or that. The flower 
might connote female sexuality, the mirrors might connote narcissism, 
the man might stand in for patriarchal authority, but Meshes will become 
a very uninteresting film if we imagine we can ‘read’ it via some master 
symbolic code. The film’s grounding in and foregrounding of a woman’s 
experience make femininity and feminism necessary and generative 
horizons of interpretation. But we would not want to limit the film’s 
meaning – its connotative reverberation and resonance – to these 
registers alone.                                                                             (2011: 92) 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Deren writes that ‘I came to understand the difference between contriving an image to illustrate a 
verbal idea and starting with an image which contains within itself such a complex of ideas that hundreds 
of words would be required to describe it’ (2005: 204). 
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Furthermore, fixing the meaning of the film will never reflect the creativity and 
complexity of individual interpretation and experience at any one time or over a period 
of time. In her excellent article examining the ontology of photography, Sarah Kember 
proposes that Bergson’s concept of intuition, in contrast to the intellect, be used as an 
alternative method for understanding, acknowledging how, ‘[t]he intellect blocks our 
understanding of life and all things that move and change’ (2008: 176). Although I 
have neither the space nor time here to explore Bergson’s difficult concepts of duration 
and intuition, and so am undoubtedly circling around their edges, I am interested in the 
aim of intuition as the attempt to experience directly ‘the flow of the inner life’, 
signifying ‘first consciousness, but immediate consciousness, a vision which is scarcely 
distinguishable from the object seen’ (Bergson 1968: 34, 36). What I garner from my 
understanding of this is that since intuition ‘starts from movement’ (38) it privileges the 
flow of immediate (bodily) experience, and therefore, in relation to film, intuition as a 
method does not subordinate the filmic experience but offers us a different (and 
complementary) way of “knowing” or interconnecting with the filmic experience/object 
– from the inside. Where as intelligence/concepts, like a gateway, can only ever point 
to this experience, intuition is experience.  
It follows that an absolute can only be given in an intuition, while all the 
rest has to do with analysis. We call intuition here the sympathy by which 
one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with 
what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. Analysis, on the 
contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already 
known, that is, common to that object and to others. […] All analysis is 
thus a translation, a development into symbols, a representation […] the 
always imperfect translation. It is analysis ad infinitum. But intuition, if it is 
possible, is a simple act.            (Bergson 1968: 190-191, original emphasis) 
 
Whilst difficult to sustain and undeniably ‘luxurious and excessive’, intuition can, then, 
compensate ‘for what intellect must leave out, the myriad connections, entwinements, 
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and transformations that make up even the most stable objects of intellectual analysis’ 
(Grosz 2004: 240).83 This seems to me entirely appropriate for a film that is all “about” 
enmeshment, and a scene in Meshes perfectly expresses these ideas in moving images. 
 
The physicality of film: chasing after meaning 
Directly after the iconic “Botticelli” shot of Deren (number two) at the window, 
watching the third version of herself chasing the mirror-faced figure, who (once again) 
disappears around the curve in the road, the film cuts to a close-up of Deren taking a 
key from her mouth, cut to another close-up of it held in her upturned palm.84 We then 
cut to the (third) Deren who is entering the house downstairs, and just as in the opening 
sequence and the first repetition, a handheld camera pans around the living room, but 
this time as it accelerates it captures the mysterious mirror-faced figure heading towards 
and climbing the stairs. There is an incredible physical quality about this shot, due to 
the combination of the camera’s gradually accelerating surveying action and the hurried 
movement of the mirror-faced figure, as s/he seems to want to evade capture by the 
camera’s gaze – and this combined speed is registered phenomenologically. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 As Elizabeth Grosz says, intuition is ‘luxurious and excessive’ precisely because it involves such effort 
– it takes real concentration to really listen to the internal and turn away from the external. Therefore, it 
cannot be maintained for very long and in some respects, intuition ‘is literally useless. It has no utility. Its 
domain is that of philosophy, not science, and it promotes an entirely different kind of understanding that 
Bergson calls “aesthetic”’ (Kember 2008: 182). But in combination with and as a challenge to theory, it 
can be a productive (and holistic) form of practice – ‘a form of understanding which is inseparable from 
doing’ (ibid) – and a (phenomenological) experience of the film that is actually lived.  
 
84 This well known shot of Deren was first referred to as the “Botticelli” shot by Anaïs Nin, who appears 
in several of Deren’s films, including At Land. Referring to its painterly quality, she writes that: ‘When 
Sasha [Deren’s second husband, Alexander Hammid] filmed her, as he loved her and found her beautiful, 
he caught a moment when Maya appeared behind a glass window, and, softened by the glass, she created 
a truly Botticelli effect’ (in Pramaggiore 1997: 20).  
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Having mounted the stairs with ease, we cut to a slower sequence that shows Deren 
desperately attempting to follow mirror-face up the stairs, her journey impeded by the 
tilting movement of the camera. The physicality and violence of the combined 
movement of camera and body going in opposite directions conveys the sense that she 
is being thrown from one side to the other by a rocking staircase, thereby frustrating her 
efforts to get to where she wants to be. This simple cinematic effect is kinaesthetically 
suggestive, and indeed, ‘Deren noted that this sequence caused nausea akin to motion 
sickness in some viewers’ (Satin 1993: 47). It is thus a sequence where rhythmic 
creativity and energy is produced through kinetic camera positioning and movement, 
rather than through any sense of theatrical dance.  
 
As if exhausted by this effort, a medium close-up of Deren has her resting her head and 
hand against the wall, still looking desirously ahead of her as she pauses to regain her 
strength. More effort is then exerted until the film cuts to mirror face in the bedroom, 
placing the flower on the bed, cut to a close-up of Deren’s side profile positively 
straining with effort to see her/him, and then to a series of cross-cuts between mirror 
face turning to look in Deren’s direction, and Deren looking – until the former, like the 
mannequin’s hand in the opening scene, instantly disappears through stop-motion 
photography. The sequence then ends with a rapid series of jump cuts that position 
Deren at different points up and down the staircase. However, because we do not see 
her actually travel between these points, there is no real feeling of movement, and thus 
the editing connotes her passive entrapment. 
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What this sequence suggests is a sense of “our” (ultimately dualistic) need to 
“understand,” to “make sense” of and to find literal meaning in, with mirror-face acting 
as the embodiment of these concepts – always just ahead of us, out of reach, obscure 
and evading our grasp because it/they are constantly moving and changing at such a 
rapid pace. And just as we are about to get a good look, to “get” it, it disappears from 
sight. Yet, if we caught up with and looked directly at mirror-face, what would we see? 
We would see ourselves reflected back at us, connoting a sense of how what we read 
into objects/experiences/others/reality is inextricably part of who we are ourselves, and 
everything that has constructed who we are/have become. Whether it is conscious or 
not, or whether we want to admit it or not, theoretical approaches are embodied, they 
can tell us a great deal about the theorist (even if that is to say that s/he is completely 
disembodied), just as the theoretical discourses that we are drawn to at any given point 
in time also say a great deal about us and where we are, even as this is forever in flux. 
Thus, considering the symbolism attached to the key, and the fact that this sequence 
begins with Deren calmly taking it from her mouth and placing it in her upturned palm, 
Meshes is encouraging us to “unlock” this intuitive experience before we move on to 
conceptualising, privileging a subjective knowledge and understanding that can only 
come from within – through our direct embodied experience.  
 
This is not to say that we have to make a choice of being either embodied or academic. 
The two can work in complete harmony, and I firmly believe that for holistic 
understanding, there has to be a balance of the two. However, under our patriarchal 
system the pursuit and development of more abstract ideas and understanding has been 
more highly valued, thus has more cultural capital, and whilst no longer a privilege 
reserved solely for men, is still the accepted measure of our intelligence and ability. 
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Therefore, we have become more accustomed to not trusting in and/or disregarding our 
inner (intuitive) embodied knowledge, and to instead externalise, to search for meaning 
“outside” of ourselves, as it provides some form of security. However, as the series of 
jump cuts up and down the stairs show, this quest for knowledge, for meaning, can itself 
entrap us within apparent movement, that can, in fact, be stasis. And the violence with 
which Deren is thrown about mirrors a sense of the violence with which different 
epistemological movements and trends can clash and contradict each other, in an 
academic ritual where one approach is so often (ahistorically) debunked for the next 
“big” thing.  
 
Whilst the understanding that the more we learn the less we know can, at times, feel 
overwhelming, it more importantly opens up to us the exciting and inexhaustible world 
of possibilities that exists beyond ourselves. And this relates precisely to the kind of 
feminism that is present in Meshes: whilst there is undoubtedly a wealth of symbolic 
imagery that can eloquently articulate the restrictions placed upon women under 
patriarchy, and the tension between women’s objectivity and subjectivity, it is the filmic 
form’s creation of different times/worlds/places of the imagination that can begin to 
stimulate consciousness of individual and social transformation, where such limitations 
do not exist.  
 
Therefore, rather than relying solely on a didactic form of feminism that enunciates our 
entrapment and dictates change, we are also being “worked on” by and with the film 
through our experience of its timing, rhythm, and structure – which all create a sense of 
creative freedom. This freedom can be felt, mirrored and potentially embodied, as we 
are encouraged to re-evaluate interpretative strategies and “realities” that have both 
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been created. As Elizabeth Grosz writes, ‘[t]his indeed is what I understand feminist 
politics – at its best – to be about: the production of futures for women that are 
uncontained by any models provided in the present’ (Grosz 2004: 255). Through this 
kind of “doing,” this specific way of understanding the world through material thinking, 
meaning is not “fixed” and a sense of becoming, not of being, is made manifest through 
the film. Just as images and objects are constantly metamorphosing into something else 
in each repetition, and just as Deren is also fragmenting and multiplying, the film is 
exposing the indeterminacy of meaning and of identity. Everything, then, is in a state of 
becoming – identity, meaning, film, life, reality, and cinema thus become ‘sensible as a 
materially-embodied and actively-directed structure through which meaning is 
constituted in an on-going sensual, reflexive, and reflective process that, entailed with 
the world and others, is always creating its own provisional history or narrative of 
becoming. In effect, the cinema enacts what is also being enacted by its viewer’ 
(Sobchack 2012: 20-21, original emphasis). This lack of determinacy does not rob the 
film (or the world) of value, but instead, and as I have written above, can potentially 
liberate us from confinement in the meanings that have already been made. 
 
Rejecting conceptualising = conceptual neglect? 
This discussion leads nicely into Amy Greenfield’s work, a graduate of the prestigious 
Harvard University who has written that her ‘”intellectual college training worked 
against a deeper, more fundamental self as an artist’” (Greenfield in Haller 2007: 157). 
Whilst sharing an aesthetic kinship with Deren in terms of their mutual interest in the 
potential of screendance to transform ‘”physical laws of human motion in time and 
space, while … creating a three-dimensional imaginative world which relates to some 
deep area of the human psyche”’ (ibid: 156), her work is even more concerned with 
showing how emotion “moves” the body, working to elicit kinaesthetic identification in 
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the viewer by speaking to widely felt bodily and emotional experience.85 Out of the four 
filmmakers considered, then, I would argue that her work is most about the body, about 
interior experience and catharsis, about attempting to draw the viewer into the film’s 
depths through affective forms and structures that penetrate inwards, and about the 
rewarding and potentially transformative experience that this contact and immersion can 
entail – as we see and feel ourselves through the reflection of her films’ protagonists 
and the tactile dimension of her work. As such, she is less concerned with the 
intellectual engagement of the viewer through the conveyance of ideas and arguments, 
perhaps even striving to bypass the intellect altogether in her alternative to a language-
based cinema. The pedagogical mission of her work: to pass on a particular way of 
seeing/experiencing film that leads to a deeper understanding of our selves.  
 
Perhaps, then, this focus on embodiment and preverbal knowledge, her privileging of 
the art process over any sense of the film object’s ontological meaning, and her own 
reluctance to specifically interpret many of her own films – which rarely contain spoken 
language or traditional choreography – can help explain the relative dearth of scholarly 
material on her work, despite her being an award-winning experimental filmmaker, 
video artist, performer and writer for over forty years. Whilst it cannot be said that 
Deren, Rainer, or Potter have achieved mainstream acceptance and recognition, there is 
a great deal more scholarship on their work, and thus, as Douglas Rosenberg writes, she 
‘must be considered on the margins of the margin. It is in this most marginal of spaces 
that women including Amy Greenfield … and others presupposed Feminism and carved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Making films, as Greenfield was, in the first post-Deren generation, Robert Haller writes that her 
‘pivotal ideas emerged after she saw films by Maya Deren’, amongst others. Furthermore, although she 
had never met her, ‘Deren’s mother gave Greenfield a bracelet that had belonged to Maya in recognition 
of the aesthetic kinship between the two’ (2007: 153). 
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out a territory in cine dance as independent, experimental filmmakers, as outsiders 
enabling themselves to create works that are seminal in the history of Dance for the 
Camera’.86 
 
However, the main scholarly publications that do exist, including Robert Haller’s Flesh 
into Light (2012), the only book to concentrate entirely on her films, tend to focus more 
on the visceral and embodied/kinaesthetic process and experience of watching than on 
their specifically feminist aesthetics. This is because ‘Greenfield is aligned with that 
part of the avant-garde that is more concerned with the politics of vision than the 
politics of social commitment’ (Haller 2012: 23), striving, as she does, to challenge the 
anaesthetizing conventions of popular narrative. Indeed, Greenfield herself cites her 
aesthetic interests as inspiration for her filmmaking, saying in a 1975 interview that, 
‘”I’ve never thought of myself as a feminist filmmaker. I thought of myself as a 
filmmaker…If I felt within myself that that was the only value of my films, then I 
wouldn’t feel good about it at all’ (ibid: 114, original emphasis).  
 
Feminism is not, however, completely bypassed, with the discourses surrounding her 
work tending to agree that whilst her ‘films are not overtly feminist’ (Haller 2007: 162), 
they do work to reverse the usual view/ideal of women’s passivity through the repeated 
use of active and assertive female nudes. Greenfield has used the nude body – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 This quote is taken from an online source, last accessed 22.02.13: Douglas Rosenberg’s Essay on 
Screen Dance. First presented in February 2000 for Dance For the Camera Symposium, Madison, 
Wisconsin, USA, pp.1-9, p.1. Available: 
http://www.dvpg.net/docs/screendance.pdf 
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principally her own in her early work (1970-1981) – as her primary form of expression, 
exploring the emotionally complex tension between power and powerlessness. Through 
presenting the nude woman as both powerful and vulnerable, as accepting of herself, 
courageous, and strong, she is arguably able to transcend her immanence and 
objectification through the combination of the body and the medium’s expressive and 
metaphoric qualities, that can cut across time and space/cultures. In taking control over 
the way she is represented in this way, she challenges the restricted roles for and the 
visual treatment of women, ‘propos[ing] a positive view of the body that relies on the 
body’s capacities as an epistemological agent, for the body grants us knowledge of a 
unique sort’ (Elder 1997: 298). 
 
A feminist politics of the body 
In Tides, as with many of her other films, Greenfield both directs, edits, and performs in 
a twelve minute film that shows her naked body rolling into, rising above, resisting, and 
being swept out by the ocean’s churning waves, ending in her ecstatic emergence.87 
There is undoubtedly something primal in this surrender to, battle with, integration 
with, and emergence from the natural elements – just as in her earlier (black and white, 
silent) film, Element (1973), although in this film her naked body lies down in, rolls, 
crawls, and plunges into a field of thick viscous mud, connoting more of a sense of 
violent struggle than the sensual incorporation/emergence of Tides. Never simply 
submitting to nature in either film, or to the cultural expectations placed upon her as a 
woman, there is an interesting tension between the primal language of her naked body 
in motion, and the enduring identification of women with nature and the physical body, 
an association which has, of course, contributed to the Cartesian spilt between mind and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Tides was photographed by Hilary Harris under Greendfield’s direction. An avant-garde filmmaker 
himself, he was her first mentor, friend, and principal cinematographer on many of her films. 
	   145	  
body and hence the association of women with the non-rational, and men with the 
rational.  
 
Therefore, it is my aim to give specific focus to the feminist aesthetics of Tides, and to 
determine if, and indeed how, Greenfield manages to shatter the oppressive dualism of 
the nature/culture divide through her ‘specifically female sensibility’ (ibid: 306). To 
what extent does her naked movement on, as well as the movement of the screen, 
complicate her reduction to fetishistic object, thereby facilitating a feminist re-visioning 
of the female body? Indeed, Haller has written that ‘Greenfield celebrates the female 
body without eschewing its visual pleasure … [And] she has been regarded with some 
suspicion for that pleasure’ (op cit. 2012: 32). Therefore, how does her (at times) 
obvious enjoyment of the body depart from exhibitionism and narcissism, allowing her 
to speak from the “inside” and thereby avoid/lessen the exploitation of her “outside”? 
 
Intertextuality and verticality 
[A]ny text is the absorption and transformation of another.         
(Kristeva 1986: 37) 
But first, I want to take a moment to acknowledge the intertextuality between Tides and 
Deren’s Meshes and At Land, further substantiating my claim that their work is deeply 
connected in terms of being primarily a cinema of the body. Towards the end of 
Meshes, as Deren shatters Hammid’s face/mirror with a knife, the shards of glass fall 
onto a sandy shore before being washed away by the ocean waves. Then right at the end 
of the film Deren is found (apparently) dead, covered in seaweed as if she is a creature 
of the sea who, after her desperate and repetitive attempts at survival, has perished like a 
fish out of water. At Land begins with waves, and then a series of sensuous images 
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shows Deren on her back being washed up onto shore – a play between death and 
deliverance. As the waves roll away from her in reverse motion, it is as if the ocean is 
her place of origin, delivering her onto land before retreating. So if the vast expanse of 
the ocean can be read as metaphor for uncharted territory, boundless adventure, 
unexplored depths, and the possibility of discovering the limitless self, metaphors and 
signs that have traditionally been assigned more often to men (but to women as well), 
then the final image of Meshes is a warning of what can happen to a woman if she is cut 
off from this ocean of possibility, from the source of her creative and imaginative 
freedom, and from discovering an identity apart from that imposed by a phallocratic 
society.  
 
Deren’s subsequent emergence from the ocean in At Land signifies her rebirth, her 
“second” coming, just as it was Deren’s second film. And in this film, Deren explores 
different territories and boundaries, exploring female identity through female adventure 
that is now freed from the bindings of domesticity and social convention. Deren doesn’t 
get tied down but observes; she meets a succession of different men (and women) on 
her journey, enters and (more importantly) leaves a house that Hammid leads her into, 
breaks the rules of a game, and ends the film by running along the shoreline with her 
hands thrown up in the air – free to continue exploring new and multiple versions of the 
self in a liminal space where old boundaries and restrictions do not apply. 
 
Similarly, Greenfield’s Tides shows us a woman in full possession of her own body and 
her own voice of the body. Shot at various slow motion speeds, she returns to, revels in, 
is tossed about by, and then finally emerges from this “ocean of possibilities.” The 
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images of waves flowing in reverse away from the beach, with Greenfield also moving 
in reverse, are striking in their similarity to At Land, and indeed, ‘Greenfield 
acknowledges these reverse sequences are derived from Maya Deren’ (Haller 2012: 
50).88 This use of rhythmic editing, of creating uncanny motion through taking apart 
both the movement of sea and body and then reassembling it so that what we see is 
different to the sum of its parts, whilst simultaneously reversing time, is uncannily 
entrancing – adding to the already hypnotic quality that has long been associated with 
the ebb and flow of oceanic space. 
 
Just as the rhythmic waves “take” and “deliver” Greenfield and Deren’s bodies, then, so 
too does the film’s rhythmic body “take” and “deliver” mine, as I am immersed into the 
experience through the film’s manipulation of time and space, as well as through my 
own embodied memory and love of being in the sea. The combination of slow motion 
and close-up allow me to see the quality of the movement, both of the waves and 
Greenfield’s body, which would not be visible otherwise, whilst also provoking a sense 
of touch through the proximity of the camera. Through this sense of tactility, I not only 
feel the weight of, but am also carried along with the rhythmic waves both on and of the 
screen, in what is a particularly corporeal experience/transference between moving 
image and audience. In this way, the act of simply watching this film can be likened to 
swimming itself, as I dive beyond its surface into something that is rich in associations. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Although in At Land Deren’s body is washed up onto the shore, whilst Greenfield reverses her body’s 
direction so that it goes towards the sea. 
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As with aspects of Deren’s films, I am able to effortlessly relax into Tides as a whole 
experience, instead of floating around outside it attempting to attach ideas and concepts. 
This is because my sense of intuition as a physical and spatial feeling allows me, to re-
quote Bergson, to be ‘transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with 
what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it’. And what is unique and 
“inexpressible” is my sense of childlike excitement at my/Greenfield’s submergence 
into the film/waves, as well as a common and timeless feeling experienced when by the 
ocean – a sense of peace and well being. The aural dimension of the film undoubtedly 
enhances this, as the immersive and soothing sound of the ocean waves combined with 
the rhythmically fluid editing, lull me into a deeply relaxed, yet concentrated and 
focused state – a state of deep contentment.  
 
It is this material connection, this ability to experience the rich depths and fluidity of the 
film that points to the influence of Deren’s conception of verticality in film. 
Characterised by elements of mood, tone and rhythm that work together to build 
emotional layers and depths, this “poetic” film structure ‘probes the ramifications of the 
moment, and is concerned with its qualities and its depth, so that you have poetry 
concerned, in a sense, not with what is occurring but with what it feels like or with what 
it means’ (Deren in Vogel 1963: 174, my emphasis).89 Thus, both Deren and Greenfield 
utilise the body/body of their films to promote a sensuous engagement with the 
physicality of film, encouraging their audience to watch with an awareness of their own 
bodies and interiority, thereby connecting bodies and collapsing spaces.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Film also works on another axis: the horizontal, which privileges/builds linear narrative, character and 
action. 
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The flow of (female) identity 
What’s the meaning of these waves, these floods, these outbursts?                 
(Cixous 1981: 246)                                                                                                                                           
Ah, Waves, you tell me what I am and what I may yet be.                  
(Naslund 1999: 623) 
As is clear from above, the choice of setting for Tides is significant since the ocean 
cannot be reduced to simple dualisms, enjoying, as it does, a complicated relatedness. 
All complex life on earth, including human life, began in and emerged from the ocean, 
thus marking our relatedness to other species, other shores, and to each other. 
Furthermore, tides, like ‘[s]easons … days, months, years, and the movement of the 
stars are all examples of universal rhythms, and our survival depends on us oscillating 
with these rhythms and functioning as part of a rhythmic environment’ (Pearlman 2009: 
7). Indeed, our own bodies are also subject to internal rhythms and tides, particularly 
apparent in our circulatory system and many women’s experience of the menstrual 
cycle. However, as well as being dependent upon the ocean as a source of abundance, 
connection, well being, and access to other spaces, it is also a place of tragedy, fear, loss 
and limitation – a space in which we are vulnerable and never far from death. 
 
Similarly, in Western cultural tradition the ocean has been imagined as both a masculine 
and a feminine force/space. Representing man’s escape from the confines of married 
life, family, domesticity, and heterosexuality, the ocean has traditionally been 
associated with rugged seamen/sailors who yearn for the freedom and adventure of this 
open expanse. Women, on the other hand, have traditionally been confined to the shore, 
limited and constrained within the essentialist role of earth mother, praised for her 
culturally imposed female virtues of watching and waiting. At the same time, however, 
the sea has also been imagined as both a maternal provider and a dangerous seductress. 
	   150	  
In his essay on water and dreams, Gaston Bachelard writes that, ‘[t]he sea is maternal; 
water is a prodigious milk. The earth prepares in its womb a warm and rich food; on its 
banks swell the breasts that will give all creatures particles of fat’ (1983: 116). Of 
course this feminisation of the ocean as idyllic and bountiful mother has led to her 
dangerous exploitation.90 And the inherent danger of the ocean itself, with its 
mysterious, unknowable, and unpredictable depths, has also given rise to the classical 
myths of corrupting mermaids and sirens, who lure men to their deaths with their beauty 
and song. 
 
Yet despite all efforts to mythologise, understand, control, and fix the ocean, it resists 
classification – it is both female and male and neither, because something that flows 
cannot be dualistic. In this way, the fluidity of its tides can be read as a metaphor for the 
continuous flow of identity, of gender, and as a metaphor for change. Therefore, 
Greenfield’s naked immersion in Tides shows us a woman who is bravely exploring her 
identity, agency, creativity, and adventure via the boundlessness of the open sea. If, like 
the ocean, the female body is unchartered territory, then it is being claimed according to 
her own unfettered female expression and female desire, creating a space that is not 
beholden to, and therefore surpasses and subverts, the phallocentric fantasy and desire 
of woman as passive spectacle/receptacle without voice. In this way, and although 
Greenfield uses a different medium, I see Tides as a response to Hélène Cixous’ seminal 
and enduringly inspirational call for women to write:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Overfished, with human and toxic waste habitually dumped into “her” with little accountability or 
responsibility, the ocean is no longer a bearer of infinite resources. The patriarchal desire and need to 
dominate nature is thus reflected in its domination of women, connecting them in the way they are 
thought about. 
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Woman must write herself: must write about women and bring women to 
writing, from which they have been driven away as violently as from their 
bodies – for the same reasons, by the same law, with the same fatal goal. 
Woman must put herself into the text – as into the world and into history – by 
her own movement.                                                   (1981: 245, my emphasis)  
 
Undoing dualisms: vulnerability as a measure of strength  
The patriarchal system’s insistence that males are inherently dominating, superior to 
nature and to women and thus within their rights to rule over them, fails to acknowledge 
the history of effects and the damage we are inflicting upon ourselves, since men are not 
the sole teachers and/or perpetuators of patriarchal values and beliefs, and can be 
victims of patriarchy themselves. What happens at sea/land, then, affects the land/sea, 
affects us, just as patriarchy’s institutionalized gender roles also damage men – since we 
are all ultimately connected. As Bruce Elder observes, the relation of Greenfield to the 
sea in Tides shows us a different, more respectful and non-dualistic kind of interaction 
with nature, since she ‘does not insist upon the upright position with its connotations of 
aggression, control, and self-assertion, but can accept entering into and being controlled 
by earthly forces or marine rhythms and can tolerate submitting the self to forces that lie 
beyond it’ (1997: 306). In this way, her active vulnerability shows us that our human 
bodies, like the ocean itself, are fluid sites of both vulnerability and empowerment, with 
qualities that are deemed both “masculine” and “feminine” within us all. Furthermore, 
she shows us that this fluidity and vulnerability can itself be a measure of our strength.  
 
Without the courage to be vulnerable, we don’t take risks, and by not taking risks, we 
can get entrenched in limited and limiting beliefs about the world, others and ourselves. 
Indeed, one of patriarchy’s most damaging effects has been its insistence that boys and 
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men have to always be in control, repressing any signs of weakness or vulnerability if 
they do not want to be readily dismissed, and thereby denying them access to full 
emotional expressiveness and well-being. After all, experiencing a sense of one’s own 
vulnerability can be a connective force, since it shows us that instead of being entirely 
autonomous, self-contained or self-sufficient, we are in fact dependent upon each other, 
just as we are dependent upon the forces/rhythms of nature. To be truly “in our power” 
involves relinquishing some of that control and power – being able to go more 
respectfully with the “flow.” In allowing herself to be tossed around by such powerful 
waves, then, Greenfield demonstrates the courage it takes to ultimately experience the 
joy of this merger/vulnerability, since joy is a daring emotion.91 And through her 
fearless incorporation into and movement with the endless flow of the ocean tides, her 
non-essentialist relationship to nature works to show us that: ‘Woman is not a 
completed reality, but a becoming, and it is in her becoming that she should be 
compared with man; that is to say, her possibilities should be defined’ (de Beauvoir 
1997: 66, original emphasis).  
 
This continued identification of women with nature and the body, then, does not 
exclude culture and the mind precisely because Greenfield unites her body, emotion, 
and mind in order to create culture – an avant-garde film that resists either emotional or 
intellectual simplification. If culture, just as the lived body of woman and man, is both 
mind and body, then a dualistic relationship between them simply cannot exist, and 
equal respect is given to both.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Making this film was actually a dangerous experience, as Greenfield writes that ‘over and over I go 
under the water and come up stronger, until at the end, I’m running with a gigantic wave, in joy. Those 
last shots were real risks – in order to have waves high enough, we shot the day after a hurricane’ (in 
Haller 2012: 118).  
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A feminist re-visioning of the naked female body 
According to Iris Marion Young’s seminal essay on ‘Throwing Like A Girl’, gender 
tells us more about our social norms/power structures than it does about “natural” 
differences, subjectivity and identity. However, these power relations undoubtedly have 
a material effect on our bodily comportment, as gender rules and regulations are, to 
varying degrees, internalised and embodied. Therefore, because women have been 
socialized to be objects of the gaze, to think of themselves as bodies that are acted upon, 
they tend to be ‘rooted in immanence … retain[ing] a distance from [their] body as a 
transcending movement and from engagement in the world’s possibilities’ (2005: 39). 
As if in knowing contradistinction, Greenfield throws her whole body into this 
interaction with the waves with ‘uninhibited intentionality’ (37). She is not rooted in 
place, passively waiting for the waves to move her, but begins the film by actively 
rolling out towards and into them. Shortly after there is a (slow motion) sequence in 
which a low-angled shot shows her attempting to stand-up, facing the camera, as a 
breaker wave in the background simultaneously reaches its own maximum (and 
significant) height. Just as she bends forward with her arm raised to help propel her 
forward, the wave breaks behind her at exactly the same time, mirroring her movement. 
Not merely uniting her with her surroundings, this creates the sense that the waves are 
an extension of her own being, or that she is an extension of the waves – thus increasing 
both the action and spatiality of her body. Not only does this challenge the more 
traditional ideas about female motility and spatiality, since she is not ‘mere object and 
immanence’ (31) but a ‘pure presence to the world’ (38), it also problematizes, and 
perhaps even overturns (depending on the viewer) the objectification of her naked 
female body.  
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This is because her connection to and continuity with the space around her ‘institutes 
the link between a here and a yonder, a now and a future which the remainder of the 
instants will merely develop’ (Merleau-Ponty 1989: 140). When enhanced by the close-
ups of her body as she runs towards the camera, and the “ordinariness” of her 
movement, which cuts across time, space, and cultures, it represents a transcendental 
lived (female) bodily experience that has the power to then link to the outlying space 
and time of the audience, eliciting a self-reflexive consciousness of the viewers’ own 
bodies through kinetic familiarity and proximity. This is subversive because as Young 
so brilliantly articulates, this space of “yonder” has not traditionally been corporeally 
available to women:  
In feminine existence … the projection of an enclosed space severs the 
continuity between a “here” and a “yonder”…. [T]here is a double spatiality, 
as the space of “here” is distinct from the space of the “yonder.” … Thus the 
space of the “yonder” exists for feminine existence, but only as that which 
she is looking into, rather than moving in.                                             (40-41)                                                                  
 
Therefore, through combining with space and time to step into this space of “yonder”, 
Greenfield opposes the cultural determinants that fix women as objects. And through my 
own embodied connection with the film, I become part of this expanse, experiencing a 
wonderful feeling of freedom and exhilaration. In this way, she teaches her audience 
transcendence through the body, which, in a world where women and girls are still 
constantly reminded that they don’t belong to themselves, endows viewers with the 
power to already know that their body, spirit, and mind are their domain, that women 
have the right to own ourselves, and should not be slaves to others (or our own) deepest 
insecurities, hopes and desires. This is perhaps where the ritual association of entering 
water comes into its own, since the film’s “healing powers” can potentially help nurture 
a strong, positive, and healthy relationship to one’s body image. Furthermore, this 
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challenges the (patriarchal and Platonic) view that transcendence can only be achieved 
through “rising above” the body, as if our sensual materiality is merely an impediment 
to our souls/intellects attaining clarity and “truth.”  
 
Inviting self-reflexivity/objectification? 
Through the combination of her naked body in (joyful) motion, along with the 
cinematic devices that work to draw us into as well as expand the action and spatiality 
of her/my body, Tides bridges the gap between film and viewer, presenting us with a 
freedom of expression that is neither narcissistic nor sexually exploitative. Just as 
Greenfield’s nakedness ‘directs attention to no single part of the body, leading the 
viewer to see the dynamics of the whole organism’ (Haller 2007: 155), so too does the 
continual motion of her body/camera/editing work to overcome the fragmentation of 
her body – presenting us instead with a transcendent sense of a “whole” person. 
Furthermore, the illusions created by editing and a physically active camera do not jar 
with the film’s rhythm but enhance it, so that although I may “know” certain 
movements are purely cinematic and not actually possible, I neither question nor 
disbelieve in them.92 In this way, Greenfield’s play with form heightens the 
transcendent quality of her film.  
 
However, as Murray Smith writes, ‘spectators evaluate characters [and films] on the 
basis of the values they embody, and henceforth form more-or-less sympathetic or 
more-or-less antipathetic allegiances with them’ (1995: 75, original emphasis). 
Therefore, I must acknowledge that whilst the invitation via the camera to look at her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 An example being an underwater shot in which the camera is upside down when shooting, but then the 
image is inverted so that the shot is the right side up, but backwards. 
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body is certainly empathetic for me, it may also be predatory, reflecting the complexity 
of social/cultural relationships with the female body. As Iris Marion Young writes, 
‘[t]o open her body in free, active, open extension and bold outward-directedness is for 
a woman to invite objectification’ (45). Indeed, the 2012 YouTube censorship of both 
Element and Tides attests to this way of looking.93 Perhaps, then, this film, like the 
ocean itself, has the power to “draw” us in but is not without its inherent dangers – 
corresponding to the sort of powerful/powerless dynamic that a woman experiences 
when in her body.  
 
Confounding seduction and catharsis  
Whilst sharing an (non-elitist) aesthetic with Greenfield in her privileging of 
“everyday,” pedestrian movements and gestures over virtuosity, Rainer actively resists 
transcendence through movement in her first independent feature film, Lives. Instead of 
drawing the viewer into the film’s depths, concerned with showing how emotion 
“moves” the body and how, in turn, that body/body of the film “moves” the viewer in a 
direct experience of film, Rainer uses movement and stasis to stress the concepts, or the 
central questions that drive her desire/need to make work. This largely keeps the viewer 
at a critical distance, “looking on” from the outside where they can become a producer 
(rather than an embodied part) of meaning. In depersonalising her actors/dancers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
93 However, this censorship has since been lifted, with Greenfield credited for ‘breaking new ground for 
freedom of speech on the Internet. In 2010, the National Coalition Against Censorship and Electronic 
Frontier Foundation protested the censoring of her films Element and Tides on YouTube. The 
international stature of her work enabled them to bring attention to and change YouTube’s guidelines on 
nudity and art. Now, many filmmakers and performance artists have put their work on YouTube for the 
first time’. 
Found: http://www.amygreenfieldfilms.com/biography/ 
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through a range of distancing devices that totally oppose, and thereby deconstruct the 
classical Hollywood model of melodrama and the generic nature of the film’s clichéd 
love triangle, Rainer invites the intellectual and self-reflexive engagement of the viewer. 
This is unquestionably more “difficult” and demanding than the “altering” effects of 
kinetic rhythm, force, and highs, but certainly not without its own pleasures and 
rewards. 
 
Therefore, it would seem to follow that if Greenfield’s lack of interest in intellectual 
engagement goes towards explaining the dearth of scholarly discourse surrounding her 
work, then Rainer’s formally complex and intellectually demanding film work that is 
not afraid to be didactic, can help explain the abundance surrounding hers. Unlike 
Greenfield (but similar to Deren and Potter), Rainer has also spoken and written 
extensively on her own work, with numerous published interviews, essays, scripts, and 
books that delineate her progression from dance to film, as well as question the/and link 
it to film theory – particularly feminist film theory. Indeed, her films are mainly 
analysed from within a feminist or avant-garde framework, with a particular flurry of 
writing between the mid-1970s to the late 1980s that includes contributions from 
celebrated feminist and avant-garde theorists such as Laura Mulvey, the Camera 
Obscura Collective, Teresa de Lauretis, Kaja Silverman, Annette Michelson, Annette 
Kuhn, and Jonas Mekas. It was Rainer’s long-time concern with narrative and the 
narcissistic/voyeuristic spectacle of the live dancing body that led to her complete 
transition from dance to film in 1972, and Peggy Phelan acknowledges the ways in 
which this earlier choreography, as well as Rainer’s 1965 “No Manifesto” both predates 
and ‘anticipates feminist film theory’s attention to the structure of the gaze in terms that 
are resonant with Laura Mulvey’s celebrated 1975 essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
	   158	  
Cinema”’ (1999: 8, my emphasis). E. Ann Kaplan further substantiates this, arguing that 
Lives ‘preceded any coherent feminist film commentary in New York and any assertion 
of their voices by the female artists working in the male-dominated avant-gardes. At 
this time, artists’ anti-Establishment politics centred around Vietnam rather than around 
feminism’ (1983: 113). 
 
Characterised by the same concerns as her dance work, Lives explores the 
representation of women’s bodies with hostility towards voyeurism, an aversion to 
artificiality and the manipulation of an audience, a critique of disciplinary conventions, 
an interrogation of the role of performance, and an attraction to human relationships and 
emotions. Therefore, it is really no surprise that her films have received so much 
feminist scholarly attention, or that she herself is hailed as an uncompromising feminist 
avant-garde filmmaker, since she anticipated a number of theoretical interventions that 
revitalised the relationship between theory and practice as an act of feminist politics.94 
As a result of her diverse interests and influences that span disciplinary borders, such as 
postmodern dance, avant-garde film, visual arts, psychology, feminist film theory, and 
(Cagean) music, her innovative practice both “describes” and challenges the socio-
political-historical (and specifically academic feminist) contexts from which it sprung. 
Therefore it is, in many respects, a “perfect fit” for avant-garde feminist (dance) film 
analysis, despite (or because of) the fact that her work did not “fit perfectly” into any 
contemporaneous disciplinary trend.95  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Furthermore, Rainer’s later films would develop alongside and in direct relationship with feminist and 
psychoanalytic theory, exploring increasingly explicit (and political) feminist themes such as the 
menopause, breast cancer, lesbianism, white (female) privilege, and political violence against women.  
 
95 Although I stress here the connection between her work and feminist film theory, as Peggy Phelan 
asserts, ‘Post-structuralist, feminist, Marxist, and now also queer theory illuminate the intellectual and 
psychic terrain traversed by Rainer’s films’ (1999: 15).  
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Essayistic filmmaking 
In shifting her attention from the object, or what the viewer sees, to the subject, or what 
the viewer reads, Rainer espouses an essayistic mode of filmmaking. Always littered 
with intertexts that display her debt to other authors and thus point to the film’s status as 
a collaborative process, her work can be read as the application of her ideas/theories to 
her practice. Once again this contrasts with Greenfield’s materializing type of 
pedagogy, where theorising comes after/out of practice. Thinking, writing and reading 
her films are Rainer’s/the viewer’s creative practice, and it is no coincidence that her 
most famous piece of choreography, Trio A (first performed in 1966), was initially part 
of a larger work entitled The Mind is a Muscle. Whilst the mind is housed within the 
body, and thus they are one in the same thing, Rainer undoubtedly exercises and 
privileges this particular muscle of the body in both her choreography and filmmaking. 
This is because for her, it leads to a kind of disciplined liberation that the (female) body 
in motion (as the main element of the work) cannot achieve, since it will always be 
“weighed down,” restricted, and defined by its cultural and social inscription – or in 
other words, how it is read and the ideological repercussions of this for the audience. 
For Greenfield and to a lesser extent, Deren, it would seem that the exact opposite is 
true: it is the physical body beyond thought that leads and grounds their filmmaking and 
understanding of the world, creating a “freer” space of feminist creative imagination, in 
which women can change and define exactly how they are read.  
 
I am thus interested in exploring how Lives uses the medium of film to both challenge 
and develop ideas about dance and film, about the gaze and the representation of 
women, but also how these ideas can “reach out” to the viewer, moving their 
intellectual corporeality and thereby inspiring self-reflection and reflexivity – which are 
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the seeds of change and growth. I am also particularly interested in a dance scene where 
Rainer reinstates existential expression, offering viewers a moment of empathetic 
emotional identification through a sequence of movements that are beautifully executed, 
staged and shot. In marked contrast to the majority of the performers’ affectless 
choreographies throughout the film, this sequence activates (my) emotions rather than 
scrutinizes them, reflecting the complexity of Rainer’s film, as well as (my) relation to 
it. The bodily expression of emotion, then, is not (entirely) forgotten, but due to a 
certain (Rainerian) combination of cinematic devices, is also never (entirely) 
overwhelming. 
 
A ‘Progress towards conscious experience’96 
Lives begins with an intertitle quoting Leo Bersani, an American literary theorist, 
declaring that ‘Cliché is, in a sense, the purest art of intelligibility; it tempts us with the 
possibility of enclosing life within beautifully inalterable formulas, of obscuring the 
arbitrary nature of imagination with an appearance of necessity.’ This ultimately sets up 
the “meaning” of the film for its audience, as well as hinting at Rainer’s playful 
humour, since there will not be any seduction or confinement within the conventions or 
“meanings” of this arbitrary melodrama – only in the (literal) box that is the central prop 
in the film, and which appears in the opening shot. Throughout the film characters will 
move in and out of it, but the spectre of this box remains, representing the deeply 
entrenched limiting beliefs, ideologies, and behaviours, that can restrict people from 
thinking more expansively about life and film. Daring to challenge and change these 
attitudes, as Rainer is doing, can therefore be a liberating experience, because when you 
limit your thinking, you limit your life. So the image of this box represents the ever-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Quote by Bertolt Brecht, from (1978) Brecht on Theatre, London: Eyre Metheun, trans. J. Willet, 
p.276. 
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present choice of entrapment, of retreating back to the safety and confines of the 
familiar, the clichéd, the unquestioned, and thus, in a sense, the “easier” place to be – 
thereby symbolizing everything that the film is not. Through its reworking of narrative, 
cinematic genre, techniques, and images, Lives reveals that “inalterable formulas” are 
not inalterable at all. 
 
The first three minutes of this black and white film are silent footage of dancers’ 
perfunctory warm-up exercises and rehearsal in a bare room, which immediately 
contrasts with Babette Mangolte’s rhythmic and self-conscious camerawork that 
gracefully moves all around the space of the room and the dancers within it. 
Cinematography is thus more “dancerly” than the bodies it films, revealing itself to be 
an independent unit/body in relation to their movement, and thereby drawing attention 
away from it in order to highlight the process of filmmaking. Straight away, then, 
viewers are made aware that they are watching a film, and that the ‘real star of the show 
[is] cinema as personified by the play of pure cinematic devices’ (Carroll 2007: 90). The 
audience is further distanced from the dancers’ material presence through the camera’s 
fragmentation of their (decorporealized) bodies: alternately showing medium shots, low 
angled shots of legs, feet, and “decapitated” bodies. The dispassionate nature of this 
dissection works to resist ‘the implicit spectacularization of the dancing body’ (Albright 
1997: 19), just as the pared down, task-like choreography resists the 
narcissistic/voyeuristic duality of performer and audience. This is because without any 
choreographic emphasis, highs, lows, or dynamic rhythm, male and female bodies are 
more likely seen as simple “things”, generic (and not erotic) objects that move. This is 
enhanced by the uniformity of the performers’ “everyday” outfits, namely trousers/jeans 
and tops, as well as the moments in which they move together in time and in-synch. 
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Therefore, in its departure from classical virtuosic dance, the choreography works to 
broaden ideas about what dance is – just as the departure from continuity editing 
broadens ideas about what film is.  
 
Disjuncture: an act of becoming 
As the disembodied instructions of Rainer interrupt the silence, we get the first example 
of a non-synch voice-over, and of the disjuncture between the words heard and the 
images seen that will feature throughout the vast majority of the film. (This theme of 
disjuncture is also reflected in the film’s use of intertitles, as well as in the play between 
narrative and “real” life.) Another glimpse into Rainer’s sense of humour is also 
evident, as she tells the dancers that their “gaze is to the audience” in the same instant 
that the camera pans down to their lower bodies and feet. This short-circuits the 
exchange of gazes that her words set up, thereby displacing voyeurism by ironically 
reinforcing the point that emotional identification is certainly not the focus of this 
narrative, and that words are not always to be trusted. This lack of synchronization also 
breaks another rule of dominant narrative cinema, allowing female characters to both 
inhabit and speak from a space outside the diegesis. As Kaja Silverman so eloquently 
articulates, this is dangerously challenging to androcentricity because it ‘put[s] her 
beyond the control of the male gaze, and release[s] her voice from the signifying 
obligations which that gaze sustains’ (1984: 135). When no longer entrapped within the 
alignment of form and voice, within the ‘beautifully inalterable formulas’ of 
phallocentrism, the spatiality and motility of the female body is infinitely expanded, and 
the contradictory, multiple, and fluid nature of female identity is revealed. Thus, the 
ontology of woman is shown (or rather heard) to be one of becoming, not of being. It is 
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clear, then, that despite their differing methods, both Greenfield and Rainer are using 
the medium of film to step into a space of (feminist) ‘yonder’ (Young 2005: 40). 
 
An intellectual corporeality 
In marked contrast to the first scene of the film, a fixed and dispassionate camera shows 
a series of still photographs from one of Rainer’s earlier dance pieces, as well as 
scrapbooks of past performances. The voice-over narration by various members of the 
cast thus provides the only “movement” in this section, yet it is far from moving, despite 
relating the details and complexities of the love triangle between Valda, Shirley, and 
Fernando. This is because they improvise and read these narratives out in flat, 
monotone, and emotionless voices, denying any affect that the words may have by 
reminding the viewer that every aspect of this film is a performance. Because they don’t 
“own” the emotions of which they speak, there is a sense that they could be anybody’s, 
and in this way deeply personal narratives are depersonalized. The deliberate mixing-up 
of characters names so that viewers cannot follow the plot or get emotionally involved 
reinforces this, particularly when Valda and Shirely are called “number one” and 
“number two.” Different actors playing the same character further emphasise this theme 
of interchangeability, as well as scenes that are rehearsed and played in different ways. 
Through all of this, then, the generic, archetypal nature of emotions and narratives is 
revealed, as well as a sense of the multiplicity of alternative choices that exist within 
any narrative structure – revealing just how alterable a formula it actually is.  
It is in this juxtaposition of the stillness of the frame and the movement of the words 
that a space and time of unlearning is created, allowing the viewer to “slow down” in 
order to notice more. Stillness is thus a resource for discovery, and its reach of 
intentionality moves out to “touch” my (intellectual) corporeality, encouraging and 
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challenging me to find my own meanings in these distanced and fragmented narratives. 
Through the insights garnered from my experience of the film, I “turn” self-reflexively 
to my own attachments to archetypal narratives of emotion, which, through this process 
alone, releases me somewhat from their grip. I am, therefore, in complete agreement 
with Peggy Phelan’s (1999: 16) astute observations about Rainer’s work, when she 
writes that: 
In 1965, Rainer yelled “no to moving or being moved” but the rest of her 
effort has been geared toward finding the generative intelligence produced 
by, and necessary for, kinaesthetic, political, and psychic empathy. A well-
toned empathy increases our capacity to respond to the compelling 
possibilities of moving and being moved and remains our best hope for 
remaking ourselves and our worlds. 
 
However, Rainer has been criticized and dismissed ‘on grounds of intellectualism, 
opacity, and, probably, elitism’ (Rich 1998: 126). So this sequence (and indeed, the 
entire film) can also be read as incongruous, banal, and downright boring. As if in 
humorous acknowledgement of this, the sequence ends with a voice-over saying “lets 
go on, I’m tired of all this.” Once again, then, Rainer’s self-reflexive humour reminds 
viewers that whilst Lives is undoubtedly a serious investigation into the politics of 
narrative construction, it is never meant to be taken too seriously!  
 
Reinstatement of existential expression 
Apart from this ever-present humour, Lives reveals itself to be neither entirely detached, 
didactic, nor existentially expressionless in what is, for me, its most poignant scene: 
Valda’s solo. Through a six-minute, highly expressive silent sequence that is shot in one 
uninterrupted long take, the force of affect through a sensuous bodily performance of 
choreography is reinstated. Both the silence and initial stillness of the camera act as a 
counterpoint to the intense voice-overs/kinetic camera movement of other sections of 
	   165	  
the film, creating an immersive time and space that accentuates her movement. 
Cinematography thus establishes intimacy, despite there being no close-ups to draw the 
viewer towards her. Instead, the film’s body is made palpable through its concentrated 
look, taking the time and space to stay and move with Valda (as well as the spotlight 
that frames her), and this focussed “concentration” is infectious.  
 
At times her movements are graceful, fluid, balanced, and extended; and at others, 
frozen, falling, awkward, and hunched, conveying a sense of her beauty, strength, and 
pride, as well as her vulnerability and limitations. She also repeatedly picks up, holds 
onto, and lets go again of a ball, which visually articulates her ability (as well as her 
choice) to both hold onto the “ball and chain” of archetypal emotions that have 
entrapped her within a confining (and unhappy) narrative, as well as let it/them go. 
Therefore, Valda is not one thing and cannot be contained in nor defined solely by her 
words or by her body, because her body is neither fixed nor final, but multiple, fluid, 
and always in a state of “becoming.” This is literally highlighted by the hand-held 
spotlight that casts her silhouette on the wall behind, as choreography and lighting 
combine to express her character’s complexity/multiplicity. However, it also 
acknowledges her position as spectacle, since Fernando is both watching and 
evaluating, and despite the affective sensuality of her performance, is not moved. He 
has “seen it a hundred times,” and despite her claim that she “does it differently now, 
that she understands it better,” “it looks the same to him.” Perhaps this is a pun on the 
fact that it is another of Rainer’s recycled choreographies, but his insensitivity and 
inability to really “see” Valda’s multiple subjectivity also reflects the fact that whilst 
embodied subjects act, they are also always acted upon; and that bodies are lived as 
well as thoroughly written. But as Valda turns away from Fernando and looks directly 
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into the camera, a medium close-up of her sly, irritated expression suggests that he 
doesn’t convince her anymore. Deviating from the majority of the film’s expressionless 
close-ups, this aside imbues hope that she will escape her confinement from within the 
clichéd love triangle: that she isn’t merely an object filmed to seduce but a subject who 
speaks, questions, and moves beyond that which attempts to fix her. However, whilst 
Rainer allows for this empathetic connection between film, character, and viewer, there 
is no danger of being sucked in too deeply, because reflexivity is ever-present and 
cathartic resolutions are of course denied.  
 
What is complex about my relation to this scene is that whilst the film is undeniably 
conceptual, and I can “measure” its meaning(s) through symbolic thought and analysis, 
it also works to disarm me of my (intellectual) defences, encouraging more of an 
intuitive, direct experience. (All the more poignant in a film that privileges symbolic 
thought over immediate experience.) It is my feeling for “Valda” through her 
movement, unconnected to what narrative information has come before or what is to 
follow, that moves my understanding not just from the “outside”, but also into a 
relationship of feeling/coinciding with her/the film. Therefore, I am brought into a 
present experience, and for the first (and only time) I am “in” the film rather than 
looking on from outside.  
 
Like every other “episode” of the film, this scene is a unit that is part of an un-unified 
whole, in that each episode could be abstracted from the film and still hold as much 
“meaning” as it does within it, despite the narrative thread. This is because Rainer does 
not get caught up in (the time and space) of conventional narrative, which traditionally 
segments time into a beginning, middle, and a transcendent/catastrophic ending. 
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Instead, each dissociative unit has no time and space, and it is this lack of unity that 
encourages an intuitive sense of duration – or of ‘the heterogeneity which is the very 
ground of our experience’ (Bergson 1910: 97). As Rainer states herself in the now 
famous 1976 Camera Obscura interview, ‘I want everything I make to reflect my whole 
life…[to] have no time or space…[to be] pure events or states that the audience can 
hang on themselves very immediately, if they choose’ (1976: 96). So just as there is 
succession between these episodes, but not distinctions, there are multiplicities of 
choice within any narrative structure, despite the fact it implies a framework of 
homogeneity. In the same way that narrative and film are shown not to be (only) 
homogenous, neither is reality.  
What we must say is that we have to do with two different kinds of reality, 
the one heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities, the other homogeneous, 
namely space. This latter, clearly conceived by the human intellect, enables 
us to use clean-cut distinctions, to count, to abstract, and perhaps also to 
speak.                                                                                (Bergson 1910: 97) 
 
A shift towards embodied pleasure 
If Rainer anticipated feminist film theory, then Sally Potter (fifteen years her junior) has 
been directly influenced by many of the same critical, scholarly, and artistic discourses, 
just at a different stage of their development. Drawing upon the avant-garde, 
independent, feminist, and experimental cinemas, Potter was making highly theoretical 
and pedagogical films during the late 1970s and early 1980s when this kind of 
filmmaking was at the height of intellectual fashion. With her (1979) film Thriller 
widely considered to be a classic of feminist independent cinema, she was (and 
continues to be) widely celebrated as a feminist auteur. The attachment of this label has 
therefore led to her films being read and written about as “doing” feminist theory, and 
like Rainer, there is an extensive feminist academic bibliography surrounding her work. 
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Potter has also published her own writings on her films, as well as touring extensively 
with them whilst offering Q&As and masterclasses along the way. As (vocally 
expressive) feature filmmakers, then, Rainer and Potter have much in common in that 
their intellectual quest is part of their films’ aesthetic pleasure – arguably the reason 
why their films have polarised audiences. Furthermore, Potter has also used similar 
distanciation devices to Rainer: asking questions rather than giving answers, dividing 
the film into parts, inter-titles, a lack of closure, and voice-over, in order to disrupt and 
deny any sense of illusionism.  
 
However, although by no means a “popular” film, The Tango Lesson (TTL) marks a 
definite shift in her work (a shift that began with her (1992) film, Orlando): 
undoubtedly offering its viewers a more conventional form of visual pleasure, in what 
is, in many respects, a more “conventional” dance film (at least compared to the rest of 
the films examined here.) It therefore marks the beginning of Potter’s attempt at 
bridging the gap between independent/experimental/conceptual cinema and popular 
film, which by its very nature has to be somewhat less confounding.97 Despite this 
relaxed and arguably more measured approach to filmic style, Potter neither wholly 
departs from, nor completely undermines, the progressive political convictions and 
thematic/formal preoccupations that infuse her earlier, more confrontational work. As 
such, her visual language, in part, remains markedly different from classical cinema, 
with its interrogation of a gender system that both defines and limits experience, its 
exploration of female subjectivity, corporeality, and desire; its self-reflexive play 
between reality and fiction, the personal and the professional, looking and being looked 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 For whatever reasons, this is a compromise that Rainer has never made. However, Rainer’s last feature 
film, Murder and Murder, was made in 1996, whereas Potter is continuing to make films, with her most 
recent being Ginger & Rosa (2012). Considering austerity and funding cuts, and the fact that it is 
becoming increasingly more difficult for filmmakers to make independent work, Potter’s British yet 
international independent filmmaking success, within an industry still dominated by men, is notable. 
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at. As well as the more “popular,” highly accomplished and kinetically exhilarating 
dance scenes. Therefore, TTL is neither a purely conceptual, nor a Hollywood-style 
dance film, but an amalgamation of both. As I shall explore in the following chapter, the 
ideological elements in the Hollywood dance film, Black Swan, are so intensely 
contradictory (due to the pressure of appealing to as broad an audience as possible), it is 
impossible to yield to its more progressive potential. In its attempt to bridge the gap 
between different forms of cinema, TTL also makes a compromise that results in an 
ideological contradiction, and is thus not exempt from critique. This is because, as 
explored below, its inclusion of a “popular” romantic storyline and a desiring female 
gaze treads a fine and contradictory line between feminist empowerment and cinematic 
stereotyping. 
 
The film begins with a high-angled shot looking down on Sally (the character played by 
Potter) in a bare room, seated at a white table in front of a blank page, all suggestive of 
what we will later learn is her imprisonment within the barren void of writers block. A 
cut to a close-up of her pencil writing “Rage” is intercut with scenes of her ideas for this 
film within the film, striking in their Technicolor contrast to the black and white 
photography of TTL. As a gunshot is fired and a woman falls, a cut back to Sally shows 
her scrunching up the page and throwing it onto the floor. This immediately signals not 
the death of, but certainly the temporary abandonment of these more cerebral ideas 
driven by her “rage” (with the fashion industry’s reduction of women to mere objects), 
for a more personal, embodied exploration of the sensuality of dance and the politics of 
partnership that will bring intellect and senses together.98 Lucy Fischer puts it 
succinctly when she writes that whilst Rage (the film within the film) ‘might have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Potter would later turn this exploration of the fashion industry’s reduction of women to mere objects 
into the film Rage (2009), which would be very different to this version within TTL. 
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novel in the late seventies…by now the idea seems clichéd and hackneyed – which is 
precisely the point. On some level, Potter has not only abandoned the screenplay for 
Rage but the very emotion it signifies. Thus, in trekking around the world in pursuit of 
the tango, she chooses pleasure over pain’ (2004: 44). Therefore, just as Thriller (and 
any text) was a product of its specific socio-political-historical context, so too is TTL. 
And in terms of reflecting the changes within feminism and within the individual living 
through them, we now see a high-achieving, articulate, and empowered woman play 
with incorporating her “own” identity into her work, thereby complicating and defining 
feminism for herself.   
 
Ethical vision? 
If Potter has abandoned a now ‘clichéd and hackneyed’ critique of female 
objectification, then it may seem contradictory that the next scene has a close-up of 
Sally gazing desirously at Pablo Veron (and his partner) performing a tango in Paris. 
However, because she is also interested in his subjectivity, this gaze is not a simple act 
of reversed objectification, but it is nonetheless problematic. This is because, as 
Emanuela Guano so convincingly argues, despite revealing the particularities of her 
female desire and thereby reclaiming women’s visual power, it ‘ends up reproducing yet 
another exploitative visual structure: that of the desiring, and controlling, imperial gaze 
firmly cast on its Latin American object as a fetishistic image that, under its 
spectacularity, conceals the politics of its making’ (2004: 461). Regardless of Potter’s 
authorial intentions, then, this gaze/the film’s body reproduces the power relations and 
colonizing aesthetics that have been traditionally associated with dominant cinema, and 
the enduring exoticization of its ‘sensual Latin American Other’ (ibid: 472). Indeed, to 
begin with and before Sally has “taught” him how to be seen and how to behave, Pablo 
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embodies all of the tropes associated with ‘slick Latin lovers’ (Berg 2004: 159): he is a 
dancer, connected to his body (as opposed to Sally’s more intellectual identity as a 
writer/director), he is also ‘dashing and magnetic,’ macho, narcissistic, immature, and 
self-absorbed (ibid: 76). Therefore, I have to agree with Guano that Sally/Potter’s 
unreflexive reproduction of these Latinist tropes negates the feminist empowerment of 
her desiring female gaze.99 This is because “real” empowerment should never be at the 
expense (knowingly or not) of somebody else’s disempowerment.  
 
This contradiction in TTL is particularly salient because it relates back to the tension 
within Bodas de sangre and Carmen, explored in the first chapter. Despite being 
Spanish-made films that both attempt to disentangle Spanish stereotypes and archetypes 
from exoticized representations and projections, they do so by (reflexively) repeating 
these very same stereotypes. There is the danger, then, that in embodying a colonial 
gaze in order to deconstruct it, they encourage a colonial gaze. In the same way, by 
reflexively repeating the desiring gaze of a traditionally phallic camera in order to 
deconstruct woman as object, rather than bearer of the look, these looking relations 
undoubtedly objectify somebody else, ‘distanc[ing them] from the Anglo majority’ 
(ibid: 166). Therefore, these power relations are deeply embedded within the medium 
and history of film itself, and so any compromise concerning the use of more “popular” 
forms of filmmaking will always jeopardise the film’s progressive politics. 
 
However, this film is not merely one-dimensional, and in asking Pablo if he teaches, 
and more significantly, learning how to follow his lead, Sally/Potter relinquishes some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Although the fact that Sally is past the age where women in film are usually allowed to desire, let alone 
be desired back, unpunished, by a younger, attractive man, is a double transgression certainly not lost on 
its audience.  
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of her (filmmaker’s) control and power of vision in the twelve lessons that structure this 
narrative film. Similarly, Pablo will later learn to be led by Sally the director. Thus this 
film attempts to shows how (ethical) vision is not merely a tool of domination, but can 
create a respectful and open space in which subject/object, object/subject can negotiate 
between power and vulnerability, just as Sally and Pablo negotiate language in order to 
communicate. In this way, the risk of vulnerability is (once again) shown to be a 
connective rather than a disabling force, breaking down dualistic thought by revealing 
the fluidity of gender.  
 
Freedom through the body 
It is, however, not just (visual) ideas and words that challenge and transcend cultural 
and social inscription, since the dancing body itself works to bridge the gaps between 
men and women, language and cultures. In “giving herself completely up” to the tango, 
Sally is guided (both by Pablo and her own sense of touch and intuition) towards a more 
embodied sense of freedom, which Potter’s sensuous, kinetic camerawork makes 
infectious. Towards the end of the film an exhilarating pas de quatre between Sally, 
Pablo, Gustavo, and Fabian, expresses this sense of personal enlargement through 
somatic interconnectedness. 
 
After Sally directs Pablo to set up a tap routine for Gustavo and Fabian to follow, Pablo 
communicates the improvised choreography through, and Gustavo and Fabian listen 
with their whole bodies. In this way, listening and responding are shown to be the same 
thing. This synchronized movement, along with the sound of rhythmic tapping, 
immediately affects a sense of their intersubjectivity and togetherness. The pace of the 
editing between shots increases with the pace and intensity of the choreography, and the 
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insertion of extra diegetic music works to accentuate the build up to, as well as the 
ending of, Pablo’s climatic solo, as he leaps explosively through closed doors and into a 
beautiful old loft room/dance studio, with white light streaming in through the windows. 
His repeated pirouetting into this vast expanse evokes a journey towards openness, 
reflecting the journey that Sally herself has embarked upon since the opening shot. 
(Although her journey has been facilitated by her privileged position of power). No 
longer entrapped by her ideas (or lack of them), she now expresses them through her 
body as she also enters the room dancing with Gustavo. Sweeping, gliding camerawork 
then follows the dancers as they soar along the length of the room, responding to and 
reflecting the fluidity and mobility of their bodies as if a fifth partner in the dance. Sally 
is handed between and dances with each of the men; she is encircled by all three; they 
move together as a unit whilst performing intricate kicks and flicks between each others 
legs; and the sequence ends with the camera panning in to a dizzying close-up of her 
being lifted onto Pablo’s shoulders as he repeatedly spins around and around. The 
kinetic effect of this combined movement transmits a sense of what their dancing might 
feel like, and as my alignment with the camera works to submerge my body into the 
dance as well, I begin to ‘feel the movement as well as see the moved’ (Sobchack 1992: 
10).  
 
Challenging the stereotype that tango is predicated solely upon strictly defined gender 
roles, Sally’s interaction with her partners is not kinetically containing, despite being 
“shared around.” Instead, through alternating medium shots of upper bodies and 
(smiling) faces, long shots of whole bodies, and low-angled medium shots of legs and 
feet, the delicate and respectful communication between their bodies is made visible. 
Neither party seems to be completely in control nor completely submissive, and in 
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listening and responding to each other’s bodies in this way, it is as if they expand into 
and inhabit the space beyond their skin, filling the room and dancing as one. Through 
this sense of integration and transcendence through movement, gendered boundaries are 
critiqued and dissolved, and the female dancing body is suffused with an equal 
subjectivity. In this way, the film expresses a sense of freedom from the (gendered 
inscription of the) body through the body, constructing Sally/Potter as empowered in 
front of as well as behind the camera. It does not seem a coincidence, then, that the 
soundtrack to this sequence is Astor Piazzolla’s Libertango, Spanish for liberty tango. 
 
Conclusion 
However, TTL is careful to acknowledge that Sally’s embodied freedom only comes 
through the discipline and hard work that she applies to her dance lessons, just as 
Potter’s (thoughtful) return to her lived body is also the result of hard work: the work of 
(1970s/80s) filmmakers and feminist film theorists (as discussed above), including 
Potter and Rainer, who have deconstructed the fetishized body of patriarchal cinema in 
order to restore a sense of female subjectivity. Only after this revalorization has Potter 
deemed it “safe” to return to the sensual and bodily aspects of female subjectivity, and 
to the idea of transcendence through the body. And this has been reflected in the 
resulting shift towards more sensuous modes of film scholarship, as spearheaded by 
Vivian Sobchack and Laura Marks. 
 
This all helps explain why Deren (until the more recent scholarly explosion of interest 
in her work), and particularly Greenfield’s sensuous form of screendance has been 
‘regarded with some suspicion for that pleasure’ (Haller 2012: 32). Although similar to 
both Rainer and Potter in that these films were made prior to and contemporaneous with 
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(so-called) “second-wave feminism” and the related development of feminist film 
theory, their specific privileging of introspection and embodied experience did not 
appear to make any significant contribution to the conceptual frameworks that were 
dominant at the time. However, what I hope to have revealed through a more “holistic” 
approach are the feminist sensibilities and aesthetics that infuse all of these films, 
despite the discourses surrounding them, the contradictions within them, or whether the 
filmmakers identify/identified themselves as feminist artists or not. Greenfield, Rainer, 
and Potter are undoubtedly indebted to Deren, as well as to each other, since there are 
precious few artist/filmmakers who have dared to form their own visions based on their 
own experience of being a woman. So despite coming to film from different angles and 
using/encouraging the use of different “muscles” when reading/watching/feeling their 
films, they all share a similar “goal” – connecting out to the audience in order to 
think/feel film as a liberatory practice. 
 
This reflects the fact that “feminism” has never been a unified, monolithic ideology or 
dogma, but a field of inquiry that is made up of a pluralism of feminist epistemologies, 
methods, and aesthetics, despite the (superficial) hegemony of certain trends at certain 
points in time.  Furthermore, the balance that comes from considering a cinema of the 
body alongside a cinema of ideas, affirms how ‘[p]erception is, as it were, mid-way 
between mind and body and requires the functioning of both’ (Grosz 1994: 94). 
Screendance analysis cannot be anti-ocular, just as it cannot be anti-sensuous – it has to 
be both. So whether it is through the body/the body of the film, or through words and 
visual ideas, or the combination of the two, Deren, Greenfield, Rainer, and Potter have 
all imagined and visualized their own ways of moving beyond boundaries in order to 
extend and expand the language, spatiality, and motility of the female body. Therefore, 
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through showing that neither image nor narrative can ever convey or contain the 
complexity and multiplicity of female identity, and in providing the space for viewers to 
find their own meanings, they collectively and creatively imagine different ways of 
moving beyond the same boundaries. This provides, to quote bell hooks, ‘education as 
the practice of freedom’ (1994: 207).  
 
However, keeping a check on any sense of over-idealisation, none of these films have or 
likely will be seen by a wide audience. Indeed, as Rainer acknowledges herself, and I 
would argue that the same is true for all four filmmakers, ‘my thinking and making 
process will always result in a product that appeals to a very select audience, an 
audience already disposed to share my point of view and appreciate the manner in 
which it is conveyed’ (1976: 76). Therefore, their power of subversion and “liberation” 
is undeniably reduced, yet by no means does this imply that their work is without 
political value. Even if they only affect, influence, and inspire a small number of 
people, this is valuable in and of itself. And furthermore, whether audiences see their 
films directly or not, the indirect influence of their work on others will always be 
evident. 
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Chapter Four 
Hollywood Cinematic Excess: Black Swan’s Direct and Contradictory Address to 
the Body/Mind 
 
Introduction  
In this final chapter I aim to bring together a discussion of all of the key themes and 
issues examined in previous chapters, namely the representation of disability, feminism, 
and national identity, through analysis of a contemporary and globally popular (albeit 
independent) Hollywood film, Black Swan (2010).100 Sensitive to the often-
contradictory politics of representation, and how cultural texts are open to multiple 
interpretations, I shall use a multi-disciplinary approach in order to explore the nuances 
of this multi generic, hybrid film. This will include a phenomenological exploration and 
analysis of how cinematography and sound combine to literally “touch” the viewer with 
the central character’s psychosis. As the film attempts to break down the mirror-
boundary between viewer and screen, as Nina (Natalie Portman) smashes the mirror and 
stabs herself with a shard of it, I will also consider the ethical implications of this 
embodied assault/experience. I will then utilise feminist psychoanalytic tools of analysis 
in order to explore the film’s construction of femininity, and its complex negotiation 
between misogyny and feminism. Finally, I will explore how the unstable ontological 
level of Nina’s world can be seen to relate to and be placed within a wider socio-
cultural context of American national identity. Whilst none of these approaches or 
insights can offer any “truths” or definitive meanings, they do work together in 
productively investigating the complexities of representation and (embodied) 
identification within a popular independent Hollywood dance film.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 This chapter explores, as does Black Swan, a psychiatric rather than a physical disability. 
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Black Swan tells the transformational story of a disturbed young dancer’s journey in 
becoming the Swan Queen in a new production of Swan Lake, as artistic breakthrough 
merges with psychotic breakdown. Perfect as she is for the innocence and graceful 
fragility of the White Swan, she lacks the sensuality and darkness necessary for the 
Black Swan, recognising these qualities in her own “dark double”/understudy, Lily 
(Mila Kunis). Therefore, under increasing pressure to find and release these qualities 
within herself, and combined with the conflicted relationships she has with her mother, 
fellow dancers, understudy, and artistic director, Nina’s paranoid delusions and 
hallucinations intensify, building to the film’s horror climax and her hallucinatory 
transformation. 
 
A phenomenological cinematic psychosis 
Nina’s frightening and climactic descent into a psychosis of paranoia is first implied in 
the film’s use of mirrors and phantasmal doubles, and then in the escalating violence of 
her hallucinations which include bleeding wounds, sexual encounters, “demonic” 
portraits that come to life, horrific deformities/metamorphosis, and murder/suicide. 
With the highly kinetic (and almost exclusively) hand held camerawork that fluidly 
moves with Nina as she dances and traverses her everyday life – sometimes following 
behind her, sometimes in front; sometimes catching up with, encircling, and swirling all 
about her, and occasionally embodying her point-of-view – the viewer is encouraged to 
feel more connected to her world as they are touched, increasingly uncomfortably, by 
the disorienting and claustrophobic experience of her unstable and paranoid 
subjectivity. In variation from “objective” formal norms, then, Nina’s subjectivity is 
thus expressed even when she is seen in the frame (and not just in point-of-view shots) 
because the film itself mirrors and brings close Nina’s physical, emotional, and 
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psychological experience/crisis. Stylistic decisions are thereby based on the immersion 
in her increasingly disturbed mind, decisions which, whilst undoubtedly playing with 
traditional identification, serve to draw the viewer in as they are implicated in the 
subjective “feel” of the shots and the psychosis of the film itself. Nina’s audition for the 
role of Black Swan near the beginning of the film is an exemplary illustration of this, 
and although only forty-three seconds long, is a crucial sequence for the way it both 
introduces and prefigures the action of the film.  
 
Having auditioned the White Swan to perfection, Nina is directed by Thomas (Vincent 
Cassel) to dance Odile’s (the Black Swan’s) coda. As she turns and walks towards her 
starting position, the camera also turns and follows her from behind, capturing a close-
up of the back of her head, hair pulled back into a perfect ballet bun. As it catches up 
with her, revealing a close-up of her side profile, she “senses” that she is being watched, 
looks out from the corner of her eye, takes an audibly sharp intake of breath and turns 
her head. Just at this moment the film cuts to a close-up of Veronica (Ksenia Solo), her 
fellow dancer and rival for the part, who inclines her head slightly to one side as she 
glares back at the camera/Nina with a cold, malicious, and defiantly superior expression 
in her unblinking eyes. The camera then cuts back to a close-up of Nina looking back, 
then turning away and casting her eyes down to the ground in side profile, anxiously 
taking another sharp intake of breath as she clenches her jaw. The sound of her 
footsteps and anxious breathing amplify the sense of her “aloneness” in this harsh and 
hostile environment. Neither fellow dancers nor director are rooting for her, doubting 
that she can and hoping that she won’t embody the sensuality and freedom of the Black 
Swan.  
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As she gets to her position and turns toward the maestro, another close-up of the back of 
her head bowed towards the floor reinforces her anxiety and isolation, as well as 
heightening the (perhaps paranoid) sense that she is always being watched and spoken 
about from behind her back and by those who are close to her. Indeed, there are 
numerous shots like this throughout the film that follow her in close-up and from behind 
as she walks through forbidding hallways, corridors, and subways. Therefore, in what is 
an interesting duality of expression, camerawork is able to both objectify Nina as it 
breathes down her neck, and simultaneously express the feeling of her paranoid 
subjectivity.101 This is because whilst the camera is always close to and motivated by 
her movements, it is neither (strictly) subjective, nor exactly objective, but somewhere 
between these. And because of this, it can potentially both draw the viewer in and 
distance them from Nina’s experience, making her a subject/object. This 
cinematographic split not only reflects the film’s theme of doubling, but also highlights 
what Ann Cooper Albright refers to as the ‘fascinating double moment’ in the 
performance of dance, ‘in which performing bodies are both objects of the 
representation and subjects of their own experience. […] [And] [t]he ambiguity of this 
situation creates the possibility of an interesting slippage of viewing priorities’ (1997: 
13). Moreover, it visualises the way in which Nina’s interiority threatens to separate her 
self from the exterior world, just as a severe mental illness might.  
 
As Steven Shaviro hints in his blog on Black Swan, this expressive ambiguity offers a 
version of cinematic free indirect discourse.102 Adapted from the literary term by Pier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 The sound is also crucial in establishing this sense of Nina’s subjective experience, and is explored in 
depth below.  
 
102 Steven Shaviro’s weblog is called ‘The Pinocchio Theory’, and his review of Black Swan can be 
found at: 
http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=975 
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Pasolini in his essay on ‘The “Cinema of Poetry,”’ this device identifies a style of 
cinematography that ‘is, simply, the immersion of the filmmaker in the mind of the 
character and then the adoption on the part of the filmmaker not only of the psychology 
of his character but also of his language’ (2005: 175).103 In the case of cinema, this is 
the language of images. Although the sequences that follow Nina from behind are not 
strictly point-of-view shots, they do, as I have argued above, express a subjective sense 
of her separation and paranoia, whilst simultaneously forcing an awareness of the 
formal qualities of the film itself. As Pasolini argues, then, this poetic device ‘has the 
common characteristic of producing films with a double nature,’ which in turn creates 
an irresolvable ambiguity that can be divisive (ibid: 182, my emphasis). For example, 
Katherine Fusco argues that Black Swan’s cinematography ‘emphasises the voyeuristic 
act of looking at Nina … encourag[ing] examination, not empathy’ (2013: 21), whereas 
Mark Fisher believes that ‘[m]uch of the film’s power derives from its lack of proper 
perspective: we are always inside Nina’s paranoid schizophrenia, just as we are inside 
the madness of Carole (Catherine Deneuve) in Polanski’s Repulsion’ (2011: 58). 
However, what is infinitely more interesting than either perspective being “right” or 
“wrong” is the unnerving effect of this cinematographic “queerness.” Whether 
objectifying Nina or expressing her psychology, or both, the unrelenting intensity of the 
camerawork builds up a tone of unease and anxiety which can, in turn, push the viewer 
into feeling consistently “on the edge” throughout their filmic experience, just as Nina 
is in the diegesis of the film. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
103 Free indirect discourse/speech is a literary device favoured by modernist writers such as James Joyce 
and Virginia Woolf, in which a third-person narration contains the essence of first-person direct speech. 
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Overwhelming proximity 
With the back of her head in close-up as she faces the maestro, Nina clears her throat 
and the film cuts to a medium-long-shot of the studio: placing her in the right-hand 
corner of the frame stretching her feet whilst fellow ballet dancers/auditionees are 
seated against a vertical, mirrored wall behind her – except for Veronica who is 
standing, and is, significantly, dressed all in black. Not only does this contrast with the 
soft pink, grey, and white shades of Nina’s attire, but along with her attitude, also 
further enhances the sense that Veronica is more suited to the role of the Black Swan. 
Thomas is also standing in front of the horizontal mirrored wall in front of Nina, and 
due to his mirror reflections both behind and to the (screen) left of him, he is tripled in 
this shot, accentuating Nina’s object-ness as she is literally surrounded by his critical 
panoptic gaze. 
 
Nina nods at the maestro, the music begins, and the film cuts to a close-up of her 
(visibly sweaty) side profile anxiously looking in the direction that she will move into. 
The camera then travels with her in medium close-up as she pirouettes in a diagonal 
phrase across the studio, cutting to a close-up of her foot rising onto pointe – the 
amplified sound of which expresses the tremendous (and painful) effort it takes to 
appear weightless. A cut to a medium-close-up of Thomas shows him watching, 
negatively shaking his head from side to side with his finger on his lip. Reflected in the 
mirror behind him is a double mirror image of Veronica “standing” out, once again 
hinting at her suitability for the role as Thomas expresses his dissatisfaction with Nina’s 
Black Swan. As he shouts out “not so controlled, seduce us” there is a cut to a medium 
shot of Nina pirouetting past him, and for a split second the doubled mirror reflections 
of Thomas, Veronica, and a seated woman are visible. Not only does this reflect the 
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film’s theme of doubling, of exploring (multi faceted) identity and of not knowing who 
you are, but it also suggests that Nina, at this point, is not in touch with her dark 
side/double, because her reflection is not visible as she dances past the mirror – as 
indeed it should be and as it was when auditioning Odette, the White Swan. This could 
perhaps be attributed to an oversight in post-production, where the digital removal of 
the camera operator’s reflection has also caused the erasure of Nina’s, since they were 
moving in synch, at pace, and in such close proximity. However, due to the film’s 
attention to detail as well as its play with doubling throughout, it seems more likely to 
be a deliberate device used to highlight Nina’s inadequacy at this split second in the 
film.  
 
The constant motion of the dynamic camera cuts back to Thomas shouting “Not just the 
Prince, but the court,” then back to a medium-close-up of Nina repeatedly pirouetting as 
Thomas can be heard shouting “The audience, the entire world, come on.” At this point 
there is a momentary reprieve as the camera cuts to a static long shot of the studio as 
Nina presents her fouettés en tournant, with Thomas shouting, “Your fouettées are like 
a spider spinning a web.”104 Then the last few moments of this already intense sequence 
intensify, as images blur in and out and frenetic editing cuts between close-ups of 
Nina’s anxious, wide-eyed expression as she spins, dizzying 360-degree camera 
rotations that are a whirl of exposed brick wall and harsh light, and medium close-ups 
of Thomas shouting, before blurring out again and into the same whirl of wall and light, 
and then cutting back to close-ups of Nina spinning. Throughout, Thomas is shouting, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
104 The fouettés en tournant is a movement in classical ballet where the dancer is momentarily on flat foot 
with the supporting knee bent, with the whipping motion of the other “working” leg enabling her to spin 
around. This working leg pulls back in to touch the supporting knee as she rises up onto pointe on the 
supporting foot. Being able to consecutively perform thirty-two of these is considered a bravura step by 
the ballerina. 
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“Attack it. Attack it. Come on,” as well as visually expressing his displeasure and 
audibly sighing in disappointment. This dizzying and pressured sequence is repeated 
until the sound of the door being opened distracts Nina, and in one of the whirling 
rotations the camera briefly focuses in on a figure at the door, which, only when viewed 
in slow-motion is clearly Natalie Portman playing the “dark double” of herself/Nina, 
with her hair loose and dressed all in black. Indeed, the film delights in playing with 
these uncanny tricks of the eye, and this face-changing motif, along with the 
doppelganger and the split personality motifs, run throughout the film. This all works to 
play (visual) mind games with the viewer, so that when combined with the delirious 
effect of the dancing camera, we, like Nina, become increasingly confused as to what in 
the images we have seen is “real” and what isn’t, or whether we even saw it at all.105 
We can thus potentially begin to feel as confused and (emotionally) unstable as she 
does. 
 
The camera then proceeds to blur out again, continuing to rotate until cutting back to a 
shaky handheld close up of Nina as she stumbles out of the frame, gasping. We then cut 
to a close-up of her legs and hands as she struggles to regain control, cut back to her 
face turning to look and then to a short blurry whip around to a medium long shot that 
reveals that it is in fact Lily who has entered the studio, late. Although also dressed all 
in black with a black bag, her hair is in a bun, differentiating her from the “dark” figure 
that momentarily flashed onto the screen. Therefore, through the subjectivity of the 
camerawork, it is clear that Nina sees in and projects onto Lily a version/the opposite of 
herself that she wishes she could be, but hasn’t allowed herself to be, yet. The arrival of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
105 The film also plays aural tricks on the viewer. For example, an eerie, mocking reverb/dissonance helps 
the viewer to adopt Nina’s fear and paranoia, and is particularly associated with Lily. However, there are 
moments that imply Lily is in fact perfectly nice and innocent in her dealings with Nina, and that her 
coveting the role of the Swan Queen is all in Nina’s mind. 
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Lily has, then, literally “opened the door” to Nina’s repressed Black Swan, and this 
doubling further mirrors the rivalry between Odette and Odile: the Black and White 
Swan of the ballet.  
 
The relentless “closeness” of the camera to Nina in this sequence is a technique that is 
used throughout the film, effecting a claustrophobic and oppressive quality due to the 
sense of there being no separate, outside world, but only the world as it exists in 
connection to her, in her mind. And the small, insular, and tightly framed space of the 
ballet studio, just like the apartment she shares with her Mother, her bedroom within it, 
Beth/Nina’s dressing room, Thomas’s office, and the numerous bathrooms she locks 
herself into, all work to exacerbate this sense of her confinement. Nina is the ballerina 
in the music box by her bed, trapped within the restrictive space of her arrested 
development and her obsessive-compulsive drive for perfection.106 In order to become 
the Black Swan she has to break out of this imprisoning desire to please others (her 
mother, Thomas, her audience), because only then will she find her own pleasure and 
release. However, the abundance of mirrors in all of these spaces implies that there is no 
way out, that she is trapped in and surrounded by her own (narcissistic) reflections and 
doubles, by her desire to be other, and by the constant surveillance from all angles. So 
just as Nina cannot escape the intensity of her own internal (as well as physical) 
struggle, neither can the viewer, since the repeated close-ups put her emotions and 
presence, as well as the pressure of Veronica’s competitiveness and Thomas’s 
displeasure, literally “in our face.” Through denying its viewers any comforting 
objective distance in this way, the spatial relationship established between film and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 This makes the close-up of this broken figure, torso-less and missing a leg but still turning to the 
twinkling of the Swan Theme, all the more disturbing, since it comes directly after Nina’s violent 
hallucination/transformation and collapse the night before her opening performance. Despite Nina’s 
psychological and emotional fragmentation, the show must go on. 
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viewer is one of stifling proximity. Not only does this viscerally express the “closing 
in” of Nina’s world/psychosis, but it also effectively mirrors the relationship that she 
has with her mother – with its absence of appropriate individual, emotional, and 
physical boundaries. And since, as Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘[d]istance is what 
distinguishes [a] loose and approximate grip from the complete grip which is proximity’ 
(1989: 261, my emphasis), Black Swan has the ability (and is clearly attempting) to 
completely overwhelm the viewer. This is because cinematography, sound, mise-en-
scène, and performance all work together to elicit in the viewer the same kinds of 
feelings Nina experiences as her psychosis begins to take hold, potentially deepening 
their bodily and emotional connection to, and empathy with, her experience. Through 
this sensorial assault, it is as if the viewer is being constructed as Nina’s (extradiegetic) 
double. And not unlike psychosis and ballet, there is nothing subtle or comfortable 
about this incredibly over-the-top and melodramatic visual language that pummels its 
unreal realism into the audience.107 
 
Vertiginous intertextuality and the prefiguration of doom 
The whirling camera rotations that express Nina’s dizzying perspective as she spins 
draw the viewer into the sensation of the movement by inducing a similarly vertiginous 
experience; and the blurring in and out of Thomas shouting renders palpable the 
pressure she is under. This affective camerawork is directly taken from a sequence in 
Powell and Pressburger’s ballet film, The Red Shoes (1948), highlighting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Further contributing to this fevered pitch of the film’s visual language is the dark, moody lighting and 
imagery that underscore Nina’s inner psychological disintegration. The muted, monotone palette of 
blacks, whites, pinks, and greens, and the overt symbolism of these colours are demonstrated in the 
gradual darkening of her ballet clothes from the whites and pinks of her innocence, to shades of grey, and 
finally to the black that personifies the release of her dark side/swan. The extreme pinkness of her 
bedroom filled with pink teddies and childish trinkets represents her arrested development, and the green 
walls of the apartment’s narrow hallway underscore the competitive, envious, and claustrophobic nature 
of the relationship between mother and daughter, also reflected in her relationship with other dancers.  
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intertextuality between the films and thus allowing Aronofsky and Matthew Libatique 
(the director of photography) to pay homage to this classic of British cinema and of 
dance film. The subjective whirls in The Red Shoes do not occur in the famous fifteen-
minute ballet sequence of the film’s name, but in an earlier matinee performance of 
none other than Lac des Cygnes, or Swan Lake, just as this sequence from Black Swan 
occurs at the beginning of the film and not in Nina’s opening night performance. Both 
are composed of a multiplicity of shots and are exceptionally short, with The Red Shoes 
sequence lasting only twenty-eight seconds. However, as is also the case for Nina’s 
audition, this sequence is crucial for the way it both introduces and prefigures the action 
of the film.  
 
As a medium close-up moving shot of Vicky Page (Moira Shearer) pirouetting cuts to 
her perspective, the theatre turns round in a blur through a series of whip pans over the 
audience that alternate with shots of her ecstatic face. That is until a subjective whirl 
flashes past the impresario of the Ballet Company in the audience, Lermontov (Anton 
Walbrook), cutting to a long shot of Vicky holding her pose in order to cut back to a 
medium close-up of him watching. Like Thomas, he observes “his” dancer critically: 
with one eyebrow raised, a cold expression in his eyes, and his hands clenched and 
touching/covering part of his closed mouth as everybody else in the audience applauds. 
The camera then cuts back to an extreme close-up of Vicky, and there is something 
about her heavily made-up face and wide-eyed, wild expression that offers a frightening 
glimpse of madness/horror – a generic element that Aronofsky will push to an extreme 
in Black Swan. The whiteness of her powdered face connotes (and foreshadows her) 
death, whilst the scarlet red around her painted eyes and lips prefigure her starring role 
in The Red Shoes as well as accentuating the passion/madness of her desire to dance as 
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well as please Lermontov on the one hand, and Julian (her husband) on the other. The 
ecstasy conveyed on her face whilst dancing thus contrasts with the fear and panic of 
being (emotionally) divided, and it is this conflict that will ultimately lead to her 
suicide. The ecstatic sensation of and obsessive compulsion to dance and to attain 
perfection is therefore shown to be deadly.  
 
Consequently, Black Swan’s reference to this film thirteen minutes in is foreboding. 
And whilst Nina bears a close resemblance to Vicky in that they share a compulsive 
desire to attain perfection in their dancing, are dominated by a manipulative director, 
and are both, albeit in different ways, split in two, Vicky at least expresses her rapturous 
joy when dancing. In contrast, Nina’s inner anguish is permanently etched onto her face 
(until her transformation at the end). This detail accentuates the already overwhelming 
sense of anxiety created through cinematography and sound, and Black Swan is 
undeniably a much “darker” film, as reflected in the monochrome palette compared to 
the glorious Technicolor of The Red Shoes. In terms of prefiguring the action and 
thereby acting as a (phenomenologically felt) microcosm of the whole film, this 
audition sequence shows that Nina is already under intense (psychological) pressure 
even before she is given the role(s). The shaky handheld camera that captures her 
stumbling out of the frame as she is distracted by the entrance of Lily/her dark side, 
elicits in the viewer her growing sense of instability and nervousness, just as the grainy 
texture of the film stock reflects her ever-diminishing grip on reality. The feverish pace 
of the editing combined with the speed of filming and intricate detail of the sequence 
enacts a compulsive drive that doesn’t allow the viewer to catch their breath, almost as 
if they have just performed the audition themselves. More importantly, this drive 
mirrors the film’s/Nina’s unrelenting acceleration into full-blown horror/psychosis, as 
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she begins to hallucinate, “becomes” her dark double, and then ultimately stumbles out 
of the frame/the ballet/ her life/her mind as her compulsion to attain perfection destroys 
her. It is, then, as Maya Deren argues, the emotional integrity of the body of the film 
that ‘recreate[s] through filmic means – editing rhythms, camera attitudes and 
movements etc. – the sense and spirit of,’ in this case, Nina’s physical as well as 
emotional/psychological experience, thereby prefiguring the action of the film (2005: 
230).  
 
Sonic tactility and the “touch” of madness 
As I have hinted above, the disconcerting nature of all of this visual complexity is 
mirrored in the macabre multi-layered texture of the horror-film sound design, as well 
as Clint Mansell’s menacing adaptation of the original Swan Lake. Making liberal use 
of Tchaikovsky’s most memorable leitmotif of all, the Swan Theme sounds throughout: 
in Nina’s rehearsals, her final performance, the tinkling of her ballerina musical 
jewellery box, her mobile ring tone, and even mixed in with the Chemical Brother’s 
track featured in the visually and aurally complex club/drug scene. Beginning with 
subtle adaptations, its “beauty” and “purity” is gradually and radically distorted by 
darkly processed sounds to a point almost beyond recognition, acoustically reflecting 
(as well as absorbing the viewer into) the horror of Nina’s own 
transformation/psychosis. At times, the harshness of these sounds taps into instinctive 
fears, just like the classic screeching violins of Psycho (1960) or the crashing chords of 
Jaws (1975), and the abrupt shifts up and down in pitch work to enhance its emotional 
impact. And as this theme builds to its explosive ending, neither Nina nor the viewer 
can escape the increasing intensity of her suffocating obsession. For, just like her, we 
hear Swan Lake everywhere. In this way, the score reinforces the sense that what we 
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experience on screen represents Nina’s inner psychological condition, rather than some 
independent reality.108 Furthermore, when I first saw Black Swan on its release, the 
sound in the cinema was so loud that it was, at times, quite literally painful. Indeed, I 
was not the only one who thought so, since Peter Bradshaw’s review for The Guardian 
states that, ‘Motörhead could not have played the Swan Lake theme any louder than 
this. I left the cinema with blood trickling from my ears.’109 This embodied experience 
of being “hurt” by the film heightened my sense of sensory involvement, further 
coercing me into the space of Nina’s subjectivity, since she is herself continuously and 
progressively in pain (both physical and psychological) throughout.  
 
Bubbling over this loud score are the amplified (and intimate) sounds of Nina’s 
agitated, raspy breathing, cracking bones, scratching, retching and vomiting, as well as 
sinister gasping and laughter, barely audible whispering, approaching footsteps, and 
fluttering wings etc. All of this creates a foreboding paranoia and sense of what is to 
come, never releasing the listener/viewer from its grip and viscerally demonstrating the 
physical power of sound and our susceptibility to it. (Indeed, even the texture of Nina’s 
childlike voice puts me on edge!) It is this highly subjective as well as acousmatic 
(Chion: 1994) sound that fleshes out the already disturbing cinematography, elevating 
its representation of bodily abuse, paranoia, and uncanny hallucinations by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 A further point of interest concerning the score is that it does what Nina is attempting to do throughout 
the film. Instead of obsessing over getting a highly revered ballet “right”, Mansell “lets go”, expands and 
distorts it, surprises the audience and thereby transcends the original (I do not mean in terms of musical 
quality, just in terms of its difference). In the same way, Nina is pursuing “perfection” distinct from 
technical accuracy, which requires her to “let go” of her overwhelming need for control and to discover 
who she is. This does indeed lead to her transcendence, but at a cost – her complete detachment from 
reality. Therefore, in a sense, the brilliance of the score is that Nina’s ultimate madness in the pursuit of 
artistic perfection is hermetically sealed by it, since the transformative process ultimately destroys/distorts 
them both beyond recognition. 
  
109 Peter Bradshaw, ‘Black Swan – Review’, in The Guardian, Thursday 20 January 2011. Available: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2011/jan/20/black-swan-review 
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‘connect[ing] us in a way that vision does not‘ (Bull & Back 2003: 6).110 This is 
because sound is quite literally physical: objects (including the vocal chords) have to be 
touched in order to make a sound, which then travels in waves and tactile vibrations that 
sonically touch and affect the entire body of the viewer, thereby ‘reintroducing an acute 
feeling of the materiality of things and beings’ (Chion 1994: 155). This tactile and 
experiential aspect of listening can therefore incorporate the viewer/listener into the 
absolute horror of Nina’s interiority. Or rather, it is the jarring, unnerving, and 
penetrative shock of the sound effects that prod and probe at us, “touching” our inner 
self with her psychosis. As Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener write: 
When a film performance is no longer limited to the screen alone, by 
virtue of the spatial extension brought about by the envelope of sound, 
omnipresent in the room, then it becomes indeed difficult to decide 
whether the cinematic experience takes place “inside” or “outside” the 
body.                                                                                           (2010: 140) 
 
This brings to mind Wayne Koestenbaum’s eloquent account of his own embodied 
experience of listening to, or being entered by opera: ‘The singer, through osmosis, 
passes through the self’s porous membrane, and discredits the fiction that bodies are 
separate, boundaried packages. The singer destroys the division between her body and 
our own, for her sound enters our system’ (1993: 43). However, since touch is both 
physical and social/cultural/political, due to the fact that our experience of 
touch/touching is dependent upon our corporeality and everything that constitutes it, I 
shall explore my own experience of touch in Black Swan’s deployment of sound in 
order to avoid universalising what are specific, located, and locatable experiences. This 
is because whilst I am (voluntarily) engaged with this film, both physically and 
corporeally, its tactility can also be denied for a multiplicity of reasons – every bit as 
valid as my own engagement. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Michel Chion (1994) defines acousmatic sound as that which one hears without seeing its source. 
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An intense auditory/bodily experience 
The first indication that this ballet film has a “dark side” occurs right at the beginning in 
the title sequence. After twenty seconds of the opening of Tchaikovsky’s Swan Theme, 
a reversed whoosh of wind/breath comes in. This fades into a sinister, distorted laughter 
which then dissipates into a low-end throbbing sound before returning to the score. All 
of this coincides with the appearance of the title, Black Swan, and comes just before the 
film opens onto Nina’s dream of dancing the White Swan. With both the reverse reverb 
and sinister laughter signalling an eerie sense of demonic/otherworldly possession, a 
daunting and unsettling undertone to her dream/the film is established before it even 
begins, with the low-end throbbing adding a sense of unnerving anxiety. Variations of 
this darkly dissonant insertion will be repeated and adapted throughout in order to 
indicate Nina’s paranoid hallucinations, as well as marking the moments in which we 
catch a glimpse of her inner black swan. This provides a POV audio that supports the 
subjective feel of the cinematography and thereby allows me to enter Nina’s unstable 
headspace acoustically. However, despite the unsettling effect of these kinds of acoustic 
conventions of horror, it is the gruesome sounds of her bodily injuries (or her slow and 
terrifying metamorphosis) that for me provide the real “horror”. This is because whether 
diegetically “real” or imagined, these visceral sounds/images directly address my body, 
inviting me to experience the same sensations through their textural qualities. And 
because of this visceral immediacy and direct address, Black Swan perfectly fits within 
the categories of what Linda Williams calls “body genres”, since ‘the success of these 
genres is often measured by the degree to which the audience sensation mimics what is 
seen on the screen’ (1991: 4). 
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Straight after the opening dream sequence, a visual and auditory close-up of Nina’s 
neck and feet cracking is nauseatingly intense. Like the dissonant insertion in the title 
sequence, this immediately establishes the “politics” of the film, which is less 
concerned with the ethereal, dream-like, and distanced portrayal of ballet dancing, and 
more interested in overpowering the viewer with the affective intensity of its underlying 
brutality. Like Nina, I do not feel in control of the images I see/hear but am rather 
subjected to them, and this physical/emotional vulnerability counters any (illusory) 
sense of power and mastery over the image that classical film spectatorship might 
provide.  
 
Having returned home from her disastrous audition, Nina begins to obsess over her 
pirouettes by practicing in front of a mirror, and as the camera cuts to a close-up of her 
foot rising onto pointe, the film briefly slows down in order to exaggerate the disturbing 
crunching sounds as she spins and grinds into the floorboards. The force and tension of 
what sounds like wood being twisted to the point of snapping is actually painful to 
hear/see, because it effects a sense of the agony of this unnatural load-bearing, as well 
as sounding as a metaphor for Nina herself, who also begins to crack and give way 
under the pressure. This is, however, nothing compared to the even more exaggerated 
and squirm inducing sound of her toenail splitting, which is more gruesome than the 
actual image itself. Similarly, whilst being debuted as the new Swan Queen at a black 
tie fundraiser for the ballet company, Nina fixates on a tear in her cuticle and, after a cut 
to the toilet, tears away a long strip of skin from her finger. It is not only the texture but 
also the length of this fleshy ripping sound that makes it particularly horrific in its 
attack, and despite it being signalled as one of Nina’s hallucinations, is rooted in a kind 
of everyday pain that many of us have actually experienced, thus evoking body 
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memories that contribute to an overwhelming feeling of physical revulsion and pain. 
Furthermore, Nina’s pulling at this wound reflects the incessant pressure that she is 
under as the pain of her psychiatric instability gradually becomes uncontainable, 
threatening to sabotage the image of “exquisite” perfection that Thomas demands she 
project. 
 
However, the most disgusting/captivating sound/image for me comes towards the end of 
the film during Nina’s horrific transformation/hallucination, as bristles violently tear 
through the bubbling skin of her animated rash. As she pulls out what proves to be a 
black feather from her back, the drawn out squelching sound/image is so affecting I feel 
as if I am pulling it from my own body, perfectly illustrating how the texture of a film’s 
sound design can communicate “feeling” through its close association with the sense of 
touch. And whilst the touch of this sequence is quite literally repulsive, her viscerally 
marked and suffering body certainly captures my attention, thereby destabilising the 
pain/pleasure dichotomy. Moreover, because the “realistic” texture of these sounds 
endows them with a greater sense of metamorphosis than do the images alone, it also 
breaks down ontological distinctions between human and animal. This perhaps helps to 
explain why I find this scene so disgusting, since the morph, as Vivian Sobchack writes, 
taps into ‘specifically historical – concretions of contemporary confusions, fears, and 
desires’ (2000: xiii), particularly concerning notions of self-identity and contagion. And 
when considering how hair, in particular, is so overdetermined with (gendered) 
meanings and associations, and how our dominant Western culture has become 
‘especially obsessive about denying the hairiness of women, who remove it from legs, 
upper lip, chest, and armpits, and … from the pubic region also’ (Miller 1997: 57), it is 
no surprise that despite my proud feminism and rejection of these constructed, 
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ideological norms, I have nonetheless learnt and internalised this specifically gendered 
“horror.”  
 
Therefore, this sound/image also collapses other boundaries founded on gender and 
disfigurement/beauty, which reflect the kind of bodily transformations many women go 
through every month, when hormones connected to the menstrual cycle can produce 
extra/excessive hair growth. Despite being a common occurrence, the undeniable 
cultural taboo and disgust with hairy women can deeply affect a woman’s self-
confidence, and in extreme cases, her mental health. This, then, brings the horror as well 
as the fascination and freedom that Nina’s final metamorphosis provides even closer, 
because it is only during this final process that we see her “let go” of her need for 
control, of concealing and plucking, in order to embrace and enjoy the sensuality and 
“freedom” of her (hairy) embodiment. To quote Sobchack again, Nina’s uncanny 
morphing thus ‘generates our physical and cultural “double” – some radically other 
“familiar” whose visible image […] not only “reflects” us but also “renders” and 
“clarifies” us’ (Op cit. 2000: xii).  
 
Although not directly connected to her body, the final examples of visual and auditory 
close-ups that I want to consider are of Nina breaking in a new pair of pointe shoes 
towards the beginning of the film. This is because the amplified and ritualistic sounds of 
taking them out of the plastic, pulling and thwacking them apart, sewing on the ribbon, 
plastering up sore and swollen feet, and scoring the soles with scissors, all presage the 
mutilation and fragmentation of Nina’s body/mind. Just as the shoes are smashed and 
flattened in order to conform to the shape of her feet, Nina is similarly “broken” in order 
to fit the role of the Black Swan. In contrast to this auditory violence is the sensuous 
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sound/image of putting on the shoes and tying the satin ribbon around the fine and 
delicate material of her tights. Indeed, the texture of this sound gives me a feel of the 
fabric as if against my own skin, offering a momentary and luxurious flash of pleasure. 
However, because this is followed by the squirm inducing twisting/manipulating sound 
of her feet rising onto pointe, as well as the fact that I have just seen the battered and 
deformed reality of what is hidden beneath, I am not seduced by its elegance. Rather, I 
am again reminded of the central metaphor of the film: that however enticing and 
“beautiful” ballet/Nina appears to be on the outside; beneath this veneer is a great deal 
of (physical, emotional, and psychological) pain and horror. In this way, sound unveils 
the problems inherent within “ideal” images, and the extent to which they can be 
destructive to a woman’s body/mind, working to subvert the image of the female ballet 
dancer as an ideal of embodied femininity. 
 
Contradictory ethical implications 
This contradiction between outside appearance and hidden, inner agony also says 
something about the embodiment and lived experience of people disabled by severe 
mental illness, because whilst it is not always “visible” on the outside in the same way 
that a physical disability is, it is nonetheless a material as well as a mental experience. 
Like the exposed grey brick walls in the ballet studio, this film is stripping down and 
laying bare an unstable woman’s experience of the harsh world of professional ballet. 
However, this reading is undoubtedly complicated due to the “unstable woman” being 
such a familiar trope in cinema, historically representing woman in general rather than 
disability. Indeed, the most significant development in the treatment of women in film 
during the 1980s, was, as Molly Haskell asserts, ‘the crazy women … an endlessly 
expanding category of neurotics, murderers, femmes fatales, vamps, punks, misfits, and 
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free-floating loonies whose very existence was an affront, not only to the old, sexist 
definitions of pliant women (or even categorizable psychotics), but also to the upbeat 
rhetoric of the women’s movement’ (1987: 373). With this in mind, it is difficult to see 
Nina as representing mental disability in any serious way – particularly when most of 
the female characters in the film (except for Lily, who might not be “real”), are also 
mentally unstable. In the next section I shall explore this complex and contradictory 
swing between misogyny and feminist potential in greater depth.  
 
Yet despite this complication/contradiction, during the actual experience of viewing, the 
visible, audible, and kinetic aspects of Nina’s emotional and physical breakdown are so 
close that I momentarily give up my ‘own sense of separateness from the image’ (Marks 
2002: 13), and my body responds to the pain of what I perceive to be Nina’s psychosis. 
It is only after the immediacy of this filmic experience, when there is more distance 
between my body and the body of the film that I begin to conceptualise and critique it. 
This undoubtedly arouses a different response in me and therefore garners different 
meanings. I would argue, then, that the affective elements of the film are compromised 
by the ideological elements, which are themselves contradictory. This is effective in a 
way, because I remain, like Nina, confused as to exactly what I think or feel, and the 
complexity of this makes it more interesting to me.  
 
But focusing for now on my phenomenological viewing experience/reading, Black 
Swan’s increasingly uncomfortable and “ugly” sounds/images invite me to feel/think 
about Nina’s (painful) psychosis, as well as paying due attention to the social causes 
and construction of her “madness”.111 Therefore, because Western culture places 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 These social causes include the highly stressful and competitive environment of a professional ballet 
company, and all the psychosocial stresses that are specific to this profession. Ravaldi et al’s research into 
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“madness” “outside” and regards it as “other”, this film allows us the opportunity of 
(temporarily) taking up this different position and of making, as Sara Ahmed writes of 
orientalism, ‘”the strange” familiar, or the “distant” proximate’ (2006: 126). In this way 
film “works” on us, as it ‘displaces our world, and shows us another world’ (Frampton 
2006: 202). And in the best-case scenario, this projects the possibility of transcending 
more traditional and established ways of thinking, expanding our conceptions by 
eliciting sympathy (rather than fear) for the experience of people who live with a mental 
illness. 
 
Furthermore, it does this without romanticising Nina’s psychiatric disability, a 
dangerous celebratory trope often used in popular Hollywood cinema. For example, 
although the recent Oscar winning film, Silver Linings Playbook (2012) does portray its 
central characters with bipolar disorder and depression as people rather than simply 
psychological conditions (since people have a disease, they are not the disease), it also 
arguably sanitises and trivialises mental illness through the narrative trope of 
redemption.112 Part romantic comedy, part serious drama, and part dance film, its 
undeniably feel good, slightly glamorous, happy ever after ending can contribute as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Gender role, eating disorder symptoms, and body image concern in ballet dancers’, comes to the 
conclusion that the ‘cultural pressure towards an ideal of leanness, which gives a dancer an eternally 
adolescent and prepubertal appearance, could interfere with the complex process of gender identity 
acquisition’ (2006: 534). It also encourages a higher risk for eating disordered behaviour, body 
dysmorphia, and perfectionism due to a constant feeling of not being good enough. Although we can’t 
wholly rely on Nina’s narration, there is evidence to suggest that her mother, Erica, is overbearing and 
controlling, simultaneously wanting her daughter to succeed and resenting it at the same time. Indeed, the 
evidence would suggest that Erica struggles with her own mental health issues, indicating a possible 
genetic vulnerability/propensity for learnt behaviour/depression/psychosis. Certainly overly protective of 
her “sweet girl”, Nina is torn between the comfort and familiarity of her naïve and sheltered upbringing, 
and the desire/pressure to “grow up” and embody the impulsive and sexually confident Black Swan. On 
top of this, she is further pressured through the sexual advances/harassment of her patriarchal ballet 
director, and takes Ecstasy or MDMA (a powerful hallucinogen that can trigger a psychotic event if 
predisposed), when she is at her most vulnerable.  
 
112 This type of “politically correct” romantic discourse can also be seen in Hollywood films such as 
Benny and Joon (1993), As Good as it Gets (1997), and A Beautiful Mind (2001). 
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much to the stigma attached to mental illness as its automatic association with 
pathological violence. This is because not everybody with a mental illness is able to 
function well in society, has a family that supports them, or is able to fall in love. 
Therefore, heroising and celebrating (what may be) a disabling illness as a lovable 
quirk, is not as politically correct as it perhaps aspires to be. And if, as Stephen Harper’s 
book on madness and the power of the media attests, ‘people are likely to form their 
understanding of mental distress through its cinematic figurations’ (2009: 59), then they 
will come to expect sufferers/survivors bad times to be neither too severe nor long-
lasting.  
 
Clearly, then, Black Swan does not fit into this romanticised category, and despite 
Nina’s murderous hallucination, neither does it perpetuate the stigmatising association 
between mental illness and aggressive violence. Whilst Nina may well embody the 
stereotype of the alienated psychotic, she does not actually harm Lily, she only hurts 
herself. Therefore, although the visual spectacle of her “madness” oversimplifies and 
exaggerates her symptoms for horror effect, it does not descend into the horror genre’s 
longstanding and enduring dehumanisation of “the mentally ill” as people who are 
deranged, psychopathic killers.113 There is, then, something potentially transgressive 
about a popular Hollywood film that foregrounds the “horror” of her painful psychosis, 
without actually turning her into a crazed “monster” or a loveable outsider.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 There are numerous examples of this Hollywood/generic treatment of people with a mental health 
condition, including one of the most iconic homicidal killers, Norman Bates, in Psycho, and Mike Meyers 
in Halloween (1978). In the late 1980s/early 1990s, Hollywood enacted a backlash against feminism with 
a spate of female psychopath films, including Fatal Attraction (1987), Misery (1990), The Hand that 
Rocks the Cradle (1992), and Basic Instinct (1992). More recently in The Dark Knight (2008), the 
terrifying yet charming Joker attempts to commit mass murder for no other reason than his psychopathic 
lunacy. And a mother with bipolar disorder murders her own children only to be murdered by her 
husband, who also goes “mad’, in Shutter Island (2010).  
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Whilst Nina has a shy and sweet side, she is also deeply and narcissistically self-
absorbed, alienated, pained, humourless, and withholding. It isn’t altogether easy to 
“like” her, and it certainly isn’t much fun being so “up close” to her. Yet the film still 
encourages my embodied interaction through its affective (visual and aural) intensity, 
connecting me to her experience and thus promoting compassion rather than 
objectification, because my relationship to her is not merely specular. Having myself 
grown up around family members diagnosed with severe and chronic mental illness, I 
understand this complex duality of not much liking what the worst of the illness can do 
to the person, and to those close to them, but still never losing sight of the fact that it is 
an illness deserving of support, understanding, and compassion. I therefore 
acknowledge that my sympathy for Nina/the film is in part dependent upon my own 
context, and my own rallying against the systematic stigmatisation of madness in our 
Western culture. 
 
Although they focus solely on Black Swan’s illustration of obsessive-compulsive 
spectrum disorder, where as I see it as a descent into paranoid psychosis, psychologists 
Danielle Vanier and H. Russell Searight support this reading of the film. They argue 
that despite it being far from “accurate,” its exaggerated and visceral representation of 
Nina’s mental distress can ‘make learning about these conditions both enjoyable as well 
as memorable’ (2012: 7).114 And due to the power and reach of Hollywood cinema, 
including its highly successful “independent” films like Black Swan that do record 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
114 Although it is not my intention to judge the “accuracy” of Black Swan’s representation of mental 
illness, my own experience of observing psychosis suggests that people usually have auditory, rather than 
visual hallucinations. However, as I have established, this film is not interested in a straightforward 
portrayal of “reality”, and the visual manifestation of her hallucinations makes it a more dramatic and 
frightening filmic experience. Also excessive are the whole host of anxiety disorders that Nina 
experiences, which are, in reality, highly unlikely to all appear together in one person and at the same 
time. In addition to her psychosis, Nina appears to be both anorexic and bulimic. The scratching and 
ripping of her skin implies that she self-harms, and her meticulous perfectionism certainly suggests 
obsessive-compulsive disorder.  
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significant box-office business, and are circulated in global popular culture, it can help 
ensure that a debate will at least occur amongst a much broader audience, and thus the 
profile of psychosis (and all psychiatric disabilities) might be raised. In contrast, the 
films that I consider in my chapter on dance and disability will never reach beyond 
niche audiences, despite (or rather, because of) their social engagement and aesthetic 
experimentation that privileges “art”, difference, resistance, and opposition over 
commerce. Constructed as the perpetual other to Hollywood, their power of subversion 
will unfortunately always be reduced.  
 
However, Black Swan is made primarily to entertain, not to teach. Although I do not 
have the space here to explore in any depth the contested category (and plurality) of 
independent cinema (versus the Hollywood studio system), Black Swan arguably fits 
within Michael Z. Newman’s definition of an ‘indie blockbuster,’ in that it ‘aims to 
bargain away some outsider credibility in exchange for commercial reward … nudging 
… toward the mainstream to occupy negotiated terrain, part outside and part inside’ 
(2011: 5).115 Horror devices are therefore used (or exploited) in order to maximise 
emotional impact, because emotionally engaged audiences equate to box-office success. 
Moreover, whilst its treatment of “madness” is not overtly stigmatising in the ways that 
I have listed above, it still focuses only on the spectacular horror of Nina’s experience, 
thereby supporting dominant (and debasing) perspectives about people with disabilities, 
which can lead to opposition to and fear of their freedom. In contradistinction, in the 
film The Cost of Living, (analysed in my chapter on dance and disability) viewers get to 
know the character/actor Dave through a series of everyday experiences that reveal his 
strength and ability to cope, his sense of humour, as well as the occasions in which he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
115 However, despite this compromise ‘it is often possible to retain the credibility and integrity associated 
with independence while also appealing to a wider audience’ (Newman 2011: 5). 
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needs help and is discriminated against. In many ways, then, he is represented as a 
recognisably “ordinary” person who happens to be an extraordinary dancer, which 
makes his physical disability both imaginable and palatable. This can, in turn, 
encourage viewers not familiar with disability politics, to make the leap of identifying 
with a character who is neither “conventionally beautiful” or “able-bodied.” So 
although dealing with different forms of disability, and although Black Swan does 
encourage empathetic identification with Nina, it clearly goes for the more conventional 
generic association between disability, vulnerability, and horror, which is more likely to 
elicit sympathy and/or fear than respect and intervention.  
 
Furthermore, Black Swan is undoubtedly influenced by stereotypes of gender and 
lesbianism. With its constant references to mirrors and reflections, female archetypes, 
individuation, and transfiguration, it has an undeniably heavy allegorical hand, and 
indeed, Amber Jacobs goes so far as to argue that it is anti-feminist, ‘proceed[ing] as if 
feminist film theory never happened’ (Fischer & Jacobs 2011: 60). Therefore, it is 
impossible not to look at this film through a feminist lens, since the body is not simply 
an issue in phenomenology and epistemology, but also a theoretical location for debates 
about power and ideology. In the next section I will explore its aestheticisation of 
female madness, and the fetishisation of melodramatic, hysterical, and tragic femininity 
through the trope of the ballet dancer. It is, unfortunately, still too often the case that 
‘[w]hile the mad men of contemporary cinema are often represented as active heroes 
struggling against psychiatric adversity, mad women are more typically represented as 
the passive victims of their disordered psyches’ (Harper 2009: 77). 
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An ‘infernal vision of patriarchy’: gratifying (or subverting) the male gaze?116 
Mirrors and reflecting surfaces are omnipresent throughout the film, reflecting back at 
Nina the desired yet repressed adult/dancer she wishes she could be, and is pressured 
into as well as held back from being. Many of her hallucinations occur when she is 
locked in a bathroom looking into a mirror, since it is one of the rare places in which 
Nina escapes the gaze of others, and thus offers her a private space in which her internal 
battles may be fought with her “darkly” seductive, dangerous, and even vicious self. 
This recurring and ‘worn-out visual cliché’ (Fischer & Jacobs op. cit.: 60) thereby 
highlights her increasingly fractured state of mind, her unstable and split subjectivity, 
and the centrality of the gaze. This is not only in terms of Nina’s ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ 
(Mulvey 1975: 63, original emphasis), but also in her own construction and projection 
of a specific image, an illusory ideal that marks the internalisation of her ‘panoptical 
male connoisseur’ (Bartky 1988: 72). Unlike the female dancer, Viv, in The Cost of 
Living, who does not look at her mirror image in the space of the ballet studio and 
thereby symbolically rejects the patriarchal Imaginary and its dichotomous construction 
of femininity, Nina reproduces the terms and pleasures of this male fantasy. This is 
because her obsession with the disjuncture between her “one true original” (White 
Swan) “self”, and the aesthetic ideal of dark perfection to which she aspires, perpetually 
alienates her from her own subjective and material experience. Therefore, instead of 
showing identity as something that we do rather than something that we are, there is an 
overwhelming sense that she has to choose either/or, black or white, virgin or whore 
identity, as reflected in the film’s black and white chiaroscuro. Like the camera that 
often follows her closely from behind, Nina is thus always on the “outside”, obsessively 
scrutinising herself and thereby fuelling her own psychosis. For this reason, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Taken from Fischer, Mark (and Amber Jacobs), 2011: 59. 
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and although the causes of mental illness are complex and varying, it may be easy for 
some viewers to blame her for her own narcissistic self-absorption rather than 
acknowledge the overarching social and cultural factors that undoubtedly play a part. 
This highlights how the definition, judgement, and punishment of “madness” can be 
seen as powerful tools that help maintain patriarchal (and heterosexual) hegemony. 
 
In this way, mirrors/the film can be seen as instruments of control, because in fighting 
and literally shattering her own multi-faceted image in order to become the Black Swan, 
Nina/the film can be seen to undermine the (queer) understanding and celebration of 
identity as multiple, flexible, dynamic, and volatile in favour of a discourse of 
normalised dichotomous identities. The film can thus be read as the story of her 
sacrifice to the age-old archetype of the duplicated woman, to the patriarchal definitions 
of female “beauty” and “perfection,” how underneath this painted perfection is the 
horror of monstrous femininity, and to the enduring idea that women do not really exist 
at all, only for the sake of others.117 Indeed, Nina’s guilt inducing and self-sacrificial 
mother, Erica, embodies yet another female archetype: the monstrously terrifying (and 
terrified) despotic mother, who only “lives” vicariously through her daughter.118 Having 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 The trope of the duplicated woman is largely a male fantasy that has inspired too many cinematic 
doubles to mention. 
 
118 Through wielding her power over her daughter by picking on her Achilles heel: her rash/skin, as well 
as dressing/undressing, manicuring, constantly calling, feeding her cake from her fingers, and even 
watching her sleep, the relationship between Erica and Nina is shown to be disturbingly intimate, 
suffocating, and strained. This then implies that Nina’s trauma has been born and created from her 
mother’s own mental instability, from which she needs to be “rescued” by the invariably absent father 
figure/phallic director. As Barbara Creed explores in her (1986) essay on ‘Horror and the Monstrous-
Feminine: An Imaginary Abjection’, this pathological construction of the monstrous mother ‘reveals a 
great deal about male desires and fears but tells us nothing about feminine desire in relation to the 
horrific’ (265). Erica thus contributes to the horror of the film precisely because she is a typical Freudian 
nightmare, threatening to devour her daughter with her needs as well as mould her into a version of 
herself. Whilst there may well be ballet/stage mothers like her, this cinematic trope reveals the enduring 
ways in which mothers continue to be categorised, idealised, and demonised, and how this individualising 
of her “monstrosity” works to absolve both the audience and society of any responsibility. This is because 
it fails to set her actions within a larger cultural and social framework, which might, for example, 
consider how abandoning her attachment to her daughter is made more difficult by patriarchy’s placing of 
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been ousted from her role as the company’s prima ballerina and replaced by a much 
younger Nina, a suicidal Beth (Winona Ryder) speaks volumes about interchangeable 
female identity and aging when she (sarcastically) advises Nina to “enjoy the moment,” 
and then later repeats the words “I am nothing.” In a ballet world full of interchangeable 
doppelgangers all competing for Thomas’s attention and approval, as well as for the 
same principal parts, it is undoubtedly a struggle to define who you are when you are 
merely one of many performing moves that are by and for somebody else. And 
Thomas’s advice before her opening night performance is for Nina to “lose” herself. 
Therefore, Amber Jacobs’ exasperated dismissal of the film’s ‘fixed take on femininity’ 
is certainly understandable, since ‘[t]he mirrors crudely hammer this point home; the 
infinite image of the reflected, homogeneous bodies and faces of the ballerinas 
represents a construction of femininity that has no life outside the terms of the 
mirror/gaze of the male symbolic’ (Fischer & Jacobs op. cit.: 60).  
 
Indeed, the idea that women are irrational, abject commodities who are quite literally 
“nothing” until they are selected/objectified by the dominant and controlling gaze of the 
male ‘bearer of the look’ (Mulvey op. cit.: 61), is perfectly expressed early on. Coming 
just after a scene set in the dressing room, in which myriad mirror reflections highlight 
the striking similarities between the female dancers as some of them gossip unkindly 
and competitively about Beth’s age, the film cuts to the daily company ballet barre 
class. Moving in amongst the closely situated dancers, the camera establishes an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the responsibility for child-rearing on the mother. Neither does it offer an explanation for her controlling 
behaviour. Indeed, one only need think of the sheer number of cinematic monstrous mothers, as compared 
to their counterparts, demonic fathers, in order to understand how this cinematic trope works to ‘shore up 
the symbolic order by constructing the feminine as an imaginary ‘other’ which must be repressed and 
controlled in order to secure and protect the social order’ (ibid). To cite just a few examples of these 
cinematic monstrosities: there is the classic dead mum in Psycho, the religiously-fanatical and abusive 
mum in Carrie (1976), the vain and self-absorbed (biographical) mum in Mommy Dearest (1981), the 
frighteningly abusive mum in Precious (2009), and the terrifying matriarch of a crime family in Animal 
Kingdom (2010). 
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intimate sense of people hard at work as it moves between close-ups of legs and feet, as 
well as panning up dancers’ bodies to medium close-ups of their faces and arms. This is 
heightened by the warmth and encouragement of the ballet mistress who also walks 
amongst the dancers, smiling and counting them in, saying “good,” telling Nina that she 
is “beautiful as always,” and directing her to “relax.” Therefore, when the film cuts to a 
high-angled long shot looking down onto the studio, and the back of Thomas’s head 
comes into view, a very different spatial relationship purposefully establishes his 
dominance before we even know who he is. With a cut to a low angled shot looking up 
at him as he crosses his arms, observes, objectifies, and judges, there is no mistaking his 
authority, which is compounded by the ballet mistress as she acknowledges his 
presence, claps her hands, and directs the pianist to stop. There is then a decided shift in 
tone as dancers anxiously remove layers of clothing in order to improve the display of 
their ‘to-be-looked-at-ness.’ It is only Lily, the new addition to the company, who finds 
this behaviour strange, as expressed by her puzzled, critical expression and her failure to 
remove any clothes. Thomas then makes a motion with his hand, the lesson resumes, 
and he walks down in amongst the dancers, recounting the tragic story of Swan Lake as 
he scrutinises the female dancers at close range whilst tapping many of them on the 
shoulder. As if playing ruthless mind games with his “subordinates,” he finishes his 
monologue by advising “all the soloists I tapped, go to your scheduled rehearsals this 
afternoon, and for the girls I didn’t tap, meet me in the principal studio at 5:00pm.” A 
series of cuts between the latter reveal their pleasure, and in the case of Veronica, her 
sense of triumph in being selected to audition for the Swan Queen by this “brilliant” 
man.  
 
 
	   207	  
A complex negotiation between misogyny and feminism 
In so many respects, then, this scene is a textbook demonstration of the male gaze, as 
women who appear to lack a core identity are infantilised and dismembered under a 
misogynistic lens – and what is worse, are grateful for it! Importantly, however, this is 
complicated both by Lily’s reaction to Thomas, and the way in which he is introduced 
as repellently egotistical and cruel. At the exact moment he explains how the Swan 
Queen desires her freedom, “but only true love can break the spell,” he brazenly gazes 
into the mirror at his own reflection, strokes his hair, and thus identifies himself with 
the role of heroic “rescuer.” This doubling serves to reveal how he uses his position as 
artistic director to live out his own exploitative, male fantasies, and a cut to Lily rolling 
her eyes reflects back a resistant viewers’ sense of disapproval and exasperation with 
his dominating and manipulative will to power and mastery. It is moments like these 
that insert a subtle form of feminist politics into a film intended for mainstream 
exhibition, and I therefore have to also agree with Mark Fischer when he writes that 
Thomas is ‘an almost parodically phallic artistic director’ (Fischer & Jacobs op. cit.: 
59), who selects Nina because she is so obviously vulnerable and in need of “liberating” 
(from the confinement of her arrested development). However, whilst she is 
undoubtedly in need of psychological help, it is certainly not the kind of sexual 
harassment and humiliation that Thomas has to offer under the guise/excuse of tutelage, 
which only adds to her stress by exacerbating her anxiety.119 In one scene, disappointed 
and frustrated with Nina’s rehearsal, he even asks David/The Prince (Benjamin 
Millepied) in front of her, “Honestly, would you fuck that girl?”, thus reflecting back 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 In an chapter on ‘Women’s Mental Health Research’, Gayle Y. Iwamasa and Audrey K. Bangi write 
that: ‘Although some may not feel that sexual harassment is at the same level as domestic violence or 
rape, it still has profound psychological effects on its victims. Certainly, domestic violence and rape are 
severe physical assaults on women, and may even cause death. However, sexual harassment may lead 
women to feel trapped and psychologically immobile’ (2003: 279). Therefore, Thomas’ fantasy of 
liberating Nina may only serve to further her imprisonment.  
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the kind of scopophilic pleasure and power that viewers may get from watching and 
judging the sexual worth of a female object based on the way that she moves. He then 
answers his own question with, “No, no one would”, before going on to kindly 
demonstrate the necessary passion and sensuality he is looking for by forcing her to kiss 
him and groping her body in her most intimate places. As if humiliating an obviously 
vulnerable person’s inexperience was not enough, what is particularly sadistic about this 
scene is that at the moment Nina appears to respond and actually enjoy this sexual 
contact, he walks away, asserting that it was him seducing her and that it needs to be the 
other way around.  
 
Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that he is encouraging her to access her darker 
impulses and push herself to her limits not for altruistic reasons, but for his own selfish 
ends and with no regard for the devastating consequences that will entail. Thus, he does 
not see Nina as a real person, twisting her to fit his own image and loving only the 
reflection of himself that he sees in her. Nina is merely a commodity, groomed to 
replace the “worn out” Beth and continue to sell his ballet company until she, too, wears 
out and/or is used up.120 Business is business. This is shown in his acknowledgement to 
Nina that Beth’s accident was an attempted suicide, driven by the “dark impulse” that 
made “her so thrilling to watch, so dangerous, even perfect at times,” knowing full well 
how Nina obsesses over perfection, and thus encouraging her to sacrifice herself to the 
medium and satisfy his impossible demands no matter what the cost. Having discovered 
that Lily has been made her alternate later on in the film, Nina tearfully approaches 
Thomas for reassurance but he only exacerbates her insecurity and paranoia by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
120 A telling exchange between Nina and a male admirer (in the club scene) reveals the extent to which 
she has learnt and internalised this self-negation, as she answers the question of who she is with “I’m a 
dancer”, rather than giving her name.  
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confirming that “there is always an alternate” and that “everyone in the world wants 
your place.” And finally, the theme of substituting one woman for another is cemented 
right at the end of the film when he calls Nina “my little princess” – exactly the same 
name that he used to call Beth and will no doubt call the next in a long line of “sweet 
girls.” 
 
In Lily’s succinct words, then, Thomas is a “prick.” So if cinema is a mirror, then as 
well as reflecting and gratifying the male gaze, Black Swan can also be seen as ‘a black 
mirror held up to patriarchy’ (Fischer & Jacobs op. cit.: 59). Despite its ‘boy-friendly 
thriller structure’ (Mullen 2011: 49), it is a female-centric film with four major female 
roles, confronting many of the significant issues facing young girls and women in a way 
that few mainstream films dare. It touches upon the impossible nature of (arrogantly 
egotistical) male expectation; the ways in which (patriarchal/ballet) culture is 
constitutive in numerous ways of girls’ and women’s pathologised bodies, 
subjectivities, experiences, and practices; society’s disdain for and unfair treatment of 
aging women; the damage that the internalisation of patriarchy has done to female 
friendship and competition; the mother/daughter relationship; sexual harassment in the 
workplace; and the pursuit of “perfection.” In exploring the complex and contradictory 
mix of Nina’s repression, desire, guilt, and achievement, Black Swan also addresses the 
ways in which women have been taught to fear our own power and abilities, believing 
that if we fully exercise both we risk destroying ourselves, and those close to us. It 
raises the question of whether we can maintain our integrity and be successful, or do we 
have to morph into something that is demonised and desired (by patriarchy) in order to 
fiercely go after what it is that we want? Alternatively, can we reconcile these 
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contradictions by transcending this enduringly and deeply entrenched archetypal 
good/bad girl tug of war?  
 
Indeed, although it is, as Sight & Sound critic Lisa Mullen puts it, ‘a difficult, conflicted 
film which denies its audience any simple payoff’ (ibid), its play between delusion and 
reality does leave the ending ambiguous enough for it to simultaneously acknowledge 
the cinematic tradition of punishing transgressive women, and leave it open to 
interpretation/rewriting. Nina (symbolically) kills her dark double by smashing the 
dressing-room mirror and stabbing Lily/herself with a shard of it, and her White Swan-
self “dies” on stage along with the character of Odette, so perhaps, and as Virginia 
Woolf advises (in her essay, ‘Professions for Women’), Nina acts out the (metaphorical) 
killing of both her own self-sacrificial ‘Angel in the House’ as well as her archetypal 
opposite, because it is only through killing these aesthetic ideals that Nina can ‘rid 
herself of falsehood’ and be free to put the fragments back together, aware that they will 
never form a “whole” but will instead always be a multifaceted fiction. (Woolf 2008: 
142). Sure enough, having realised that she has stabbed herself rather than Lily, we see 
close-ups of Nina’s pain, the familiar terror, her emotional exhaustion, and then, in a 
brief moment as she wipes away her tears and dabs her face with white powder, a sense 
of peace and even the hint of a smile. This therefore marks the first and only time we 
see both the timid White Swan and confident Black Swan in the same expression. 
 
Therefore, Black Swan’s politics are not as black and white as its symbolic use of 
colour, or as divisive as the feminist/anti-feminist debate between Fischer and Jacobs in 
their joint article on the film. Instead, it is a complex negotiation between these 
extremes that both reinvigorates and subverts clichés, just as it is a hybrid genre that 
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straddles the traditions of dance film, psychological thriller, horror, and melodrama in 
order that it be as easily consumed and as broadly appreciated as possible. For this 
reason, whilst Amber Jacobs’ well-argued and articulate feminist critique of the film as 
a lewd male fantasy is absolutely fair, I also find myself somewhat troubled by it, 
because showing the sexism and misogyny that is so prevalent in the ballet world (as 
well as in the film industry), is not the same as being sexist and misogynistic. 
Furthermore, what is interesting about Black Swan’s problematic blend of what appear 
to be mutually exclusive ideas and suggestions, is that it reflects the way in which Nina 
is caught between repression and liberation, passivity and aggression, naiveté and 
knowledge, girlhood and womanhood. And whilst doubling and mirrors are 
undoubtedly a cliché, not only of the ballet world, but also of the dance film and horror 
genre, their multiple levels of symbolism do reveal the absolute horror of Nina’s 
psychological experience due to the patriarchal conditioning within which she is 
trapped.121 So rather than being regressive, these familiar tropes and archetypes can still, 
as Laura Mulvey wrote in 1975, ‘get[] us nearer to the roots of our oppression’ (op. cit.: 
59), because despite the very clear evidence of progressive social change since then, 
there remains a decidedly anti-feminist backlash (even twenty years after the 
publication of Susan Faludi’s seminal book, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against 
Women). Largely driven by capitalist consumer industries that profit from our 
insecurity, this backlash has undoubtedly been deeply internalised. So if Nina perfectly 
embodies the desired and conventional aesthetic of our dominant culture: skinny, white, 
young, middle-class, “beautiful,” and a talented dancer, then in deconstructing this 
superficial cultural ideal of “perfection” by showing the physical, emotional, and 
psychological cost at which it is obtained and lived, the ideal itself is shown to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 These themes and motifs may well have been chosen in order to draw attention to their arcane quality, 
as a political comment/acknowledgement that equality between the sexes has not been achieved, and thus 
to reinvigorate a feminist debate. 
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disabling. Whilst this is not meant to imply that all ballet dancers will existentially and 
psychologically self-destruct, it does work to challenge the narcissism that is sold to 
young girls/women through our mediatized consumer culture, with its relentless 
bombardment of (largely unobtainable) images of models, Hollywood stars, and 
“beautiful” ballerinas.  
 
Reinvigorating and exploiting lesbian clichés? 
As with so many popular narrative films, it is impossible not to return to the fact that 
Black Swan is simultaneously interesting and found wanting in quite complex ways, and 
this continuous oscillation between potential progressiveness and regressive 
presentation is mirrored in the emotional tonality and rhythm of the sound design. 
Sometimes really quiet and at other times so loud it hurts, these abrupt shifts in pitch go 
to extremes then pull you back, which perfectly reflects the (patriarchal/feminist) 
dynamics of the film. Therefore, I cannot write about the contradictions within the text 
that offer up these feminist spaces of politics and desire, without considering the 
arguably cynical and gratuitous inclusion of the two-minute soft-core lesbian sex scene. 
Indeed, in an interview in the American magazine, Entertainment Weekly, Natalie 
Portman says: ‘Everyone was so worried about who was going to want to see this 
movie…I remember them being like, “How do you get guys to a ballet movie? How do 
you get girls to a thriller?” And the answer is a lesbian scene… Everyone wants to see 
that’.122 
 
Of most interest is the point at which a close-up of Nina’s open-mouthed expression of 
pleasure cuts to a close up from her perspective, as she looks down at Lily’s head 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Entertainment Weekly’s feature cover story, ‘Natalie’s Dark Victory’, Dec 31st 2010,  p.32. 
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between her legs. As “Lily” looks back up at her, her face morphs into Nina’s, and an 
abrupt burst of kinetic syncopation expresses Nina’s panic as she springs up in horror. 
As the camera cuts back to a close-up of Lily, now with her rightful face, the music 
changes to soft, romantic strings as she comforts Nina and eases her back down. Then 
both the music and Nina build to their climax, as Lily continues to perform oral sex on 
her. Throughout this scene, there is a conspicuous (and unpleasantly disturbing) juicy, 
slushing sound of fluid, layered with an uncanny twisting, manipulating sound as Lily’s 
tattooed wings move about her shoulder blades. There is also an insect-like sound that 
merges with wings flapping as parts of Nina’s skin become animated and goose-fleshed, 
and all of this is interspersed with Nina’s gasps and moans of pleasure, until it goes 
quiet for a few seconds of peace after her orgasm. Then the sound of mournful strings 
come back in as a medium close-up of Lily, with a mirror directly behind her in the 
background, shows her sit up, wipe her mouth and say “sweet girl,” the exact words that 
Nina’s mother uses to refer to her daughter. A cut looking down onto Nina’s panic 
coincides with the crashing chords that then build to the second (horror) climax of the 
scene, as Lily once again turns into Nina, grabs the pillow and smothers Nina as the 
screen goes black and the soundtrack goes silent. 
 
Combining the body genres of pornography and horror with the viscerally disturbing 
sound effects and emotionally impactful music, this scene undoubtedly aims to incite a 
physical response in the viewer. And with its acceptably feminine, conventionally 
attractive Hollywood stars and standard lesbian porn clichés, it is no doubt particularly 
titillating for the kind of heterosexual male gaze that fantasises about (a stereotypical 
kind of) lesbian sex. Therefore, as Portman indicates above, lesbianism offers the 
“spice” that will transform the film into a more sellable commodity, and both reveals 
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and represses/exploits lesbian desire and representation at the same time. The switching 
of Lily’s face to Nina’s can be seen to support Freud’s contention that lesbians are 
‘plainly seeking themselves as a love object’ (quoted in Hart 1994: 18). Which is further 
corroborated through the suggestion that this entire scene is hallucinogenic and 
masturbatory. Therefore, in accordance with Lacan’s (1981) reformulation of Freud’s 
work in Feminine Sexuality, Nina’s sexual attraction to Lily is grounded in her desire to 
be her, connoting a narcissistic and pre-Oedipal desire that relegates lesbianism to 
immaturity. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence in the text to support this theory of her 
arrested development, as she constantly projects a sexualised image of herself onto 
other women, has an overbearing and protective mother, and has thus failed to 
successfully complete her psychosexual development by fully transferring her 
desire/identification from the mother/self to the (absent) ‘Other’ father/man. 
Furthermore, her mother/lover/self/other literally smothers her in this scene, in front of 
a mirror. This psychoanalytic theory of lesbian psychosis thereby promotes the 
patriarchal, heterosexist, and homophobic assumption that lesbianism is a “phase” that 
should be outgrown, and a desire based only on gender dysfunction rather than 
autonomous desire. Therefore, because the sex scene is represented as a natural 
consequence of Nina’s neurosis/psychosis, and no “real” lesbians are involved, any 
subversion that it may have posed to hetero-patriarchy is dissolved, and what is left is a 
“safe” male fantasy.  
 
It is, then, clearly understandable why this scene has evoked mistrust and cynicism, 
since it is, as ever, a patriarchal institution (Hollywood) that benefits from 
institutionalised lesbian verisimilitudes. However, what is once again interesting is the 
contradictory way in which it is designed to both repel and gratify, as highlighted by the 
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David Cronenberg-esque body-horror sound effects, as well as Nina’s own horrified and 
appalled reaction to her own apparent narcissism. Moreover, as much as the 
indeterminacy of their encounter being “real” or not may well strengthen male fantasy, it 
can also be seen ‘as a knowing joke on the desires of the [heterosexual] male audience, 
giving them what they want but at the same time making it disturbing, uncanny and only 
an embarrassing wet dream!’ (Christiansen 2011: 311). Indeed, although in no way do I 
believe him to be representative of all heterosexual male viewers, Mark Fischer argues 
that: ‘A heterosexual male viewer coming to Black Swan looking for titillation would 
surely be deeply disappointed. The film shows a female body too destabilised by anxiety 
and delirium to be the object of a masturbatory male gaze’ (Fischer & Jacobs op. cit.: 
61).   
 
Yet apart from these considerations of the male gaze, and regardless of whether it is yet 
another case of assimilationist visibility (at the expense of a marginalised invisibility), 
this scene does represent a woman’s fantasy about another woman – who happens to be 
flattered by the idea if not the reality. A mainstream indie-Hollywood film undoubtedly 
increases the visibility of and discussion about queer/lesbian desire in a space in which 
lesbianism still remains relatively invisible, propagating a more fluid conception of 
human sexuality. It will therefore have resonance in different ways for different 
audiences, and as my previous MA (audience) research into lesbian viewing 
(dis)pleasure in (un)friendly popular cinema suggests, lesbians are not a homogeneous 
mass who respond to the politics of representation in the same way, so no doubt there 
will be some who will derive just as much visual pleasure from this scene as the next 
“guy.” And these will not necessarily be just lesbian/bi/queer-identified women either, 
as highlighted by Portman’s comment above. For this reason, Amber Jacobs’ assertion 
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that ‘[i]t functions entirely for the pleasure of the heterosexual male spectator [and] 
absolutely precludes any other kind of desire’ (Fischer & Jacobs op. cit.: 60), seems 
somewhat reactionary in its dismissal of the contradictions within the text that reflect the 
same contradictions within the dominant ideologies of the day. However, to further the 
sense of contradiction, as a lesbian/queer/feminist viewer myself, I tend to agree with 
her whilst simultaneously acknowledging the fact that “our” response cannot speak for 
all women.  
 
A feminist phenomenological assault  
Whilst Black Swan’s cinematic excess can thus be potentially “maddening,” it can also 
be completely and viscerally overwhelming, and it is this way-over-the-top, hysterical, 
conflicted, and intense tone that differentiates the politics of this popular dance film 
from the kind of films I consider in my chapter on avant-garde feminist screendance. 
For example, whilst Tides and Meshes of the Afternoon also privilege embodied 
experience, immersion, and connection, they do so by giving viewers the time and space 
in which to enter into their “depths,” creatively imagining alternatives to patriarchal 
thinking and reality (despite being considerably shorter films). This is achieved through 
their use of rhythm, time (particularly slow motion), space, and repetition, which 
drastically contrasts to the violent immediacy of Black Swan’s exploration of the power 
structures that have given rise to Nina’s psychosis, without necessarily confirming 
them. This perhaps addresses the wider context of our cultural fascination with and 
Hollywood’s need to sell experiences of immediacy, in order to compete with an 
increasingly digital media landscape which aims to provide unmediated visual and aural 
experiences. However, this is not meant as a value judgement because they are different 
forms of filmmaking, and the avant-garde has always worked against the predominant 
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cultural forms of its day. Instead, the point of this comparison is to show how this 
independent Hollywood film is undoubtedly a hybrid form that incorporates and 
assimilates different filmmaking practices, whilst retaining its allegiance to 
representational practices.  
 
As briefly mentioned above, independent cinema is a slippery category, and whilst it 
can be seen to embody cultural critique and be ‘a viable system that parallels that of 
Hollywood … [it has also] in some cases been incorporated by it’ (Newman 2011: 2). 
This is because even within the independent sector there is a spectrum of 
“independence,” with what Sherry B. Ortner refers to as ‘a more Hollywood-y end of 
the spectrum and a more radically avant-garde and experimental end’ (2012: 2). 
Therefore, whilst more avant-garde techniques and aesthetics are used in Black Swan, 
they are used differently because the purpose of popular ‘Hollywood-y end’ film is 
different from its non-commercial counterparts. Where as the avant-garde is primarily 
concerned with conveying messages and critiquing the mainstream, Black Swan 
predominantly uses its more experimental techniques for stylistic purposes and dramatic 
effect, in order to support the “product’s” entertainment value.123 However, what I hope 
to have revealed is that whilst this inevitably leads to a more conservative text because 
it is trying to please a much broader audience, which explains its oscillation between 
progressive/regressive presentations, it does not preclude feminist politics. Indeed, this 
“hybrid” text can be read as explicitly political and critical, literally moving viewers 
and encouraging a deeper psychosocial understanding of the role of representational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Although this is not meant to imply that mainstream, big-budget Hollywood studios never produce 
challenging and progressively politically films, but just to acknowledge that these kinds of films will 
always be in the minority within the context of Hollywood’s output. Conversely, independent films are 
largely made up of these kinds of complex and challenging films. 
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forms in producing and challenging marginality. However, it can also be consumed 
simply (and “safely”) as a narrative spectacle.  
 
This breakdown of boundaries between the traditional worlds of avant-garde, 
independent, and popular Hollywood filmmaking is not new. Indeed, there is a 
substantial body of independent/mainstream work ‘that began roughly in the mid-1980s 
and thrived through the 1990s and into the mid-2000s’ that actively questions and 
disregards some of the conventions of traditional Hollywood film production (ibid: 
1).124 However, despite some anomalies, what is strikingly apparent is its predominant 
association with a certain kind of cultish male-orientated cinema, celebrating the work 
of filmmakers such as Quentin Tarrantino, Michael Mann, David Fincher, and Darren 
Aronofsky.125 What is clear, then, is that even in the supposed progressive space of 
independent/Hollywood cinema it is the boy-wonder myth that prevails, whilst ‘the girl-
wonder myth doesn’t exist…you just end up in the girl ghetto’ (Lane 2005: 199). 
Therefore, despite there being evidence of a productive interaction between feminism 
and the more mainstream end of independent cinema, it is largely on male terms, 
pointing ‘strongly to the cultural gender biases that govern independent filmmaking’ 
(ibid: 204). In contrast, the avant-garde has been more able to subvert the usual male 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
124 Many independent film companies and studio divisions closed down by the end of the 2000s, as a 
result of the global economic recession. However, as Ortner argues, ‘[d]espite being hit hard by the Great 
Recession since about 2007, and despite widespread (but questionable) pronouncement that independent 
film has collectively sold out to Hollywood, the movement still retains a good deal of artistic and political 
independence and force’ (2012: 2). 
 
125 However, as Michele Schreiber argues in her essay on women directors in contemporary independent 
cinema, the space ‘between Hollywood homogeny and ‘unpopular’ experimental filmmaking has become 
increasingly populated with women directors […whose] innovative contribution is regularly overlooked 
in scholarship on independent cinema’ (2013: 6-7). Whilst being something to celebrate and write about, 
these films do tend to be more on the experimental, and thus the less viewed and accessible, side of the 
spectrum of independent filmmaking. Therefore, I would argue that despite the success of filmmakers 
such as Lisa Cholodenko, Rebecca Miller, Nicole Holofcener, Mary Harron, Kelly Reichardt etc., there 
remains an undeniable gender imbalance when it comes to the more commercially successful independent 
filmmakers, and the kinds of films that garner large audiences. 
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gaze of commercial films and allow for an uncompromising feminist perspective, 
because it has always been more open to nonpatriarchal, resistant women filmmakers 
making films about women’s stories. This is largely due, no doubt, to its own marginal 
status. 
 
Black Swan and the crisis of American national identity 
Considering the long film studies tradition of reading horror and science fiction genres 
as expressive of fears of national identity, I want to briefly explore the way in which 
Black Swan’s anxiety around Nina’s fractured identity, and the unstable ontological 
level of her world, can be seen to relate to and be placed within the context of a wider 
socio-cultural crisis of American national identity, an already complex and contested 
concept. As Annette Kuhn writes in her edited collection, Alien Zone, ‘the overt 
contents of science fiction films are reflections of social trends and attitudes of the time, 
mirroring the preoccupations of the historical moment in which the films were made. … 
[As well as] voic[ing] cultural repressions in ‘unconscious’ textual processes, which … 
require interpretation in order to reveal the meanings hidden in them’ (1990: 10, 
original emphasis). Nina tries to access (as well as deny) her multiplicity, but she is also 
afraid of it as it surfaces repeatedly and insistently, providing moments of horror as 
multiple mirror reflections fail to coincide with the reality of her movements. For 
example, as she is standing still in front of a mirror whilst being measured for her Swan 
Queen costume, the first in a long line of doubled mirror reflections scratches the rash 
on her shoulder and turns to look directly at Nina, and later as she is practising alone in 
the studio the night before her opening performance, with her back facing the mirror, 
her “dark doubled” reflection turns around and confronts her just before the lights go 
down. Not only highlighting her own psychic instability, these moments of horror can 
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be seen to reflect a nation’s fear of its own fragmented and increasingly multifaceted 
identity. 
 
In his book, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, Samuel P 
Huntington explores how in the years preceding September 11 2001, American 
‘national identity seemed at times to have faded from sight. Globalisation, 
multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, immigration, subnationalism, and anti-nationalism 
had battered American consciousness’ (2005: 4). During the ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s, 
the “grand narratives” of old (as laid out in the American Creed and the Declaration of 
Independence) were challenged and abandoned (by some) as unduly privileged, and a 
celebratory notion of intersectionality, multiplicity, and flexibility had gradually 
replaced the idea of a patriarchal, racist, and hegemonic identity. Since the discrepancy 
between these lofty ideals and the reality as experienced by certain groups, particularly 
African-Americans, could no longer be ignored, increasing insistence was placed on the 
differences of race, gender, class, ethnicity, and sexual preference. However, 
‘September 11 drastically reduced the salience of these other identities and sent Old 
Glory back to the top of the national flag pole’ (ibid: 8). This is because when under 
attack, a vulnerable people are more likely to come together and identify more clearly 
with their national identity, history, values, and pride, putting aside their differences in 
order to construct themselves against, in this case, their “dangerous Muslim/terrorist 
Other.” After all, the September 11 attackers were indiscriminate in their killing, paying 
no mind to America’s internal diversity.  
 
For a time in post-September 11 America, then, the revival of patriotism and 
Islamophobia was unprecedented (Huntington: 2005). Similarly, governments across 
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Europe (including our own here in Britain) had the incentive they needed to attack years 
of hard work by declaring the death of multiculturalism and the crackdown on (illegal) 
immigration, by playing on fears that it fosters extremist ideology and terrorism. The 
legacy of this has been an increased desire to fix national identities across the globe, 
with ‘commercial, governmental and cultural forces actively work[ing] against multiple 
and performative experiences and practices of identity’ (Van Zoonen 2013: 46).  
 
Therefore, the ‘unconscious’ of Black Swan can be read as a warning of the “horrors” 
that await when we move away from the hegemony of a single, ”safe” (national) 
identity (Kuhn: 1990). Like America, Nina is experiencing a crisis of identity and is 
therefore vulnerable, particularly to the perceived threat of Lily, the new dancer from 
another company – code for immigrant ‘Other’ – who threatens her position as prima 
ballerina/sense of national identity. Because Nina’s unstable identity requires 
differentiation, she immediately compares herself with (the exoticised) Lily, which then 
leads to both evaluation and competition. As Huntington writes, a nation sources its 
sense of identity through, ‘[c]ompetition [that then] leads to antagonism and the 
broadening of what may have started as the perception of narrow differences into more 
intense and fundamental ones. Stereotypes are created, the opponent is demonized, the 
other is transmogrified into the enemy’ (26). Nina’s constant paranoia about her “dark 
Other” trying to usurp her place and position can thus be read as a metaphor for 
America’s fear of its own internal threat of immigration. As Fraga and Segura assert, 
American national identity ‘is threatened by growth among native-born and immigrant 
populations of Latin American origin, particularly – but not exclusively – Mexicans’ 
(2006: 279). And if the threat of immigration is dealt with by assimilation, then Lily has 
shown that she is not prepared to adapt herself to her new surroundings, by criticising 
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Thomas and refusing to display herself like the other dancers. Therefore, the “unity” of 
the company is threatened, just as America’s linguistic and cultural unity is being 
questioned as it ‘prepares for a future where Caucasians are a far smaller proportion of 
the national population than may ever have been the case in our history’ (ibid). 
 
Black Swan’s pervasive sense of paranoia, fear, and doom thereby reflects back the kind 
of socio-cultural anxieties that have risen to the forefront since the start (in 2008) of our 
global economic decline and recession. With increasing financial insecurity, 
unemployment, and pervasive cuts to social services and health care, not to mention the 
War on Terror (2001-present) and the related threat of terrorism, the on-going conflict 
in the Middle East, and the number of devastating natural disasters that have occurred 
around the world since 2000, including Hurricane Katrina that hit America in 2005, it is 
not difficult to imagine the enormously negative impact this current “age of anxiety” 
can have on peoples’ mental health, as well as fostering racist and xenophobic attitudes 
toward immigrants. The unfriendly and isolating competitiveness of this dance troupe, 
and Nina’s paranoia and fear concerning interlopers and usurpation, can thus be seen in 
some way to stand in for America. Unlike the affective choreography of Carlos Saura’s 
post-Franco Bodas de sangre (Blood Wedding), and Carmen126 that opens out to 
cultural, national, and gendered multiplicity after a long period of “closed” dictatorship, 
Black Swan’s stealthily close tracking shots rather evoke a sense of (cultural) unease 
and suffocating anxiety. This highlights how film, as well as theory and the meanings 
ascribed to identity categories, do not exist in a vacuum, but always relate to wider 
political and economic contexts. However, because these contexts are always complex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 As explored in my chapter ‘Interrogating National, Cultural, and Gendered Identity through Flamenco 
Dance and Film’. 
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and contradictory, as well as constantly in the throes of change, “meaning” is never 
fixed or stable.   
 
Indeed, since Black Swan is set an inescapable world of mirrors in which there is no 
way of telling the “real” from the reflections, a more progressive 
“meaning”/interpretation would highlight how this reflects the fact that America is a 
nation of immigrants. Any fantasy of “wholeness” will thereby always be illusory, since 
national (as well as individual) identity is overwhelmingly constructed, and, like the 
film itself, both insistent and unfathomable. Indeed, it is never clear that Lily poses any 
actual threat outside of Nina’s paranoid delusions, so rather than the threat of 
Lily/immigration, we could read Nina’s/America’s own paranoia and fear of/desire for 
diversity and multiplicity as the cause of her/its own destruction. If she just embraced 
Lily’s difference as part of who she is, there would have been no battle. Therefore, to 
return to Vivian Sobchack’s work, as well as to the film’s contradictory politics, it is no 
surprise that Nina morphs into a swan in the grand finale, since:  
Morphing’s dramatic emphasis on process thus foregrounds not only 
metaphysical but also political contradictions. That is, it threatens to 
dissolve dominant fixations of “American” identity whilst also appealing 
to their very mythos and grounding in the American ideal of social 
mobility and the “be all that you can be” mutability of the “self-made-
man.”                                                                                             (2000: xi) 
 
Conclusion 
As explored previously, the abrupt and violent shifts in the politics of this popular 
independent Hollywood dance film mirror and reflect the same shifts in its sound and 
rhythm, and when combined with the incredible sense of proximity due to its (almost 
exclusive) use of handheld close-up shots, as well as Natalie Portman’s emotionally 
wrought and Oscar-winning performance, it makes for an intensely contradictory and 
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exhausting audio-visual experience. As the dancing camera lurches, leaps, and 
pirouettes, with accompanying shock cuts, zap hallucinations, off-kilter framing, and 
moody chiaroscuro, it feels as if I am being tossed around the stage and “shaken up” 
along with Nina, and that we are connected through our surrender to the violence of this 
dark, tough, and nerve-wracking experience. Therefore, despite the low cultural worth 
often ascribed to dance film and melodrama, body genres that have long been dismissed 
and trivialized for being too corny and “obvious,” Black Swan’s lack of subtlety is the 
point. And this overload does not equate to a lack of effect, however open it is to 
contradictory and multiple interpretations.  
 
I would therefore liken the experience of this film to a frenzied phenomenological 
attack, employing conventions of horror, melodrama, and pornography in order to grab 
hold of the viewer’s body, whilst also effectively blending independent and 
European/experimental-influenced styles of filmmaking with the Hollywood studio 
style, in order to also engage the mind. This is seen in the film’s violation of the 
classical realist paradigm through reflexive, dancing camerawork, a stylised reality, the 
use of computer graphics, and an “irrational” narrative that frustrates viewers’ desire to 
draw coherent interpretations, along with “big” Hollywood moments such as the ballet 
scenes and “spectacular” images of horrific transformation. However, unlike the 
popular utopianism found in its more mainstream Hollywood dance film counterparts, 
there is no conventional “feel good” happy ending, and despite Nina’s eventual success 
in the role of/transformation into the Swan Queen, it is certainly no ‘fantasy of 
achievement’ (McRobbie 1997: 230) due to the terrible cost at which this fantasy is 
achieved. Further perpetuating the film’s theme of doubling, then, even the form 
straddles two modes of filmmaking, as it attempts to effect in the viewer a full-bodied 
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experience of cinema, simultaneously drawing us into and divorcing us from the 
diegesis.  
 
Because of this multi-generic and multi modal form of filmmaking, it has made sense to 
use different critical frameworks in order to explore the contradictory dynamics of a 
film that may not make me feel “good,” but certainly invites me to both feel and think. 
This makes for yet another interesting contradiction, since it deals with fragmentation 
holistically. This is why I have sectioned out a phenomenological analysis of the 
representation of disability, from a more “traditional” feminist psychoanalytic approach 
to identity and representation, as well as a consideration of how Black Swan can be seen 
as a response to and a reflection of particular socio-political and historical anxieties. 
The film is neither merely affective, nor merely ideological, but an ambiguous blend of 
both with conflicting ideologies that do not allow for a passive model of film 
spectatorship. Yet, at the same time, with its horrific images of metamorphosis and the 
use of some of the oldest horror gags in cinema (such as the mirror shock cut) to 
entertain and appease, it can be superficially enjoyed for its spectacle. Perhaps, then, the 
film itself is like Nina: a mess of technical perfection that lacks a core identity due to its 
desire to please.  
 
This points to an important distinction between this popular indie-Hollywood film and 
most of the other filmmaking practices I consider throughout the chapters of this thesis. 
Whilst in many respects it faces the crisis (of psychiatric disability, feminism, and 
national identity), it never fully engages with the alternative filmmaking practices it 
uses in order to create any alternatives to the trauma of what it represents. Although far 
less contradictory and problematic in its representation of feminist politics, this is also 
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the case with Saura’s Carmen, in that it uses filmic form only to demystify, rather than 
reinvent, the language and subjectivity of archetypal woman. So whilst Black Swan may 
work to elicit a powerful sensory involvement that can connect the viewer to an 
embodied experience of psychosis, highlight the damage that patriarchy has done to 
women, and work through pertinent socio-cultural historical anxieties, we are left with 
an overwhelming sense of powerlessness, just as Nina is left “bleeding” and accepting 
of her fate in the final shot. Therefore, despite it being a film about transformation, there 
is no sense of this (horrific) world becoming-otherwise. Whilst one could argue that this 
reflects back a realistically harsh, cynical, and unpalatable truth about life in 
contemporary society, it is difficult not to think that in some respects, commerce has 
been privileged over a more radical cultural critique and potential – especially when 
considering Natalie Portman’s comments concerning the anxiety around projected 
audiences for this film. Therefore, because the contradictions are so deeply embedded 
within Black Swan, it is impossible to fully yield to the progressive potential that can be 
read into it. 
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Conclusion 
Existing approaches to screendance tend to argue for the specificity of dancefilm, and 
whilst the somatic response of viewers has been addressed, it has been more in terms of 
its historical context as a tool for discussing dancefilm, and less about in-depth 
embodied and/or ideological analyses of selected films. What I have tried to do in this 
thesis is to approach screendance more holistically and from a specifically film studies 
perspective, striking a balance between phenomenological lived-body experience and 
critical distance/discussion that aims to demonstrate how textuality and embodiment do 
not have to oppose each other. I have thus incorporated sensuous and deep textural 
analysis of my chosen films, with theoretical text-based and socio-political historical 
contextual analyses. Investigating what meanings come from the affective elements of 
the film and the ideological elements, and whether they work together in order to 
heighten the impact of screendance, or whether one is compromised by the other. I have 
thus been most interested in the movement and potential for mimesis between the film 
and viewers’ body, and whether it can constitute an ethical experience, encouraging 
progressive and self-reflexive political and ideological engagement. 
 
Through paying attention to the immediacy of my own lived body experience of 
screendance, I have connected to an experience, and thus to an understanding of what it 
means to be an embodied part of a (marginalised Spanish) collective, enjoying a 
corporeal and political sense of togetherness and strength as we move in-synch and 
against historical, phallocentric, and orientalist norms that attempt to fix “us.” A haptic 
reciprocity between my body and the bodies of disabled dancers/film has connected me 
to a somatic understanding of their movement, and to what it means to be excluded as 
well as connected on the grounds of one’s embodiment. Immersed in the mutuality of 
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this relationship, I have seen/felt disability as an experience, as a lived thing and not a 
stereotype or a clinical diagnosis. In moving with the rhythmic current, dance, structure, 
sound, pace and force of avant-garde feminist films, I have moved beyond imposed 
boundaries as “we” extend and expand the language, spatiality, and motility of the 
female body. And finally, a popular Hollywood dance film has waged a powerful multi-
sensory attack on my body, incorporating me into a horrific yet sympathetic (if 
ideologically contradictory) experience of psychosis. Therefore, the corporeal ties 
between dance, film and audience constitute, for me, a sensuous and ethical experience 
that is far more effective than austere didacticism, because, as Merleau-Ponty writes, 
‘there is no thought which embraces all our thought’ (1962: xiv). As these films “touch” 
and become a part of me, I am brought closer to the ‘Other’/film through empathetic 
embrace and surrender. And as Jennifer Barker writes on this experience:  
The empathy between the film’s and viewer’s bodies goes so deeply 
that we can feel the film’s body, live vicariously through it, and 
experience its movements to such an extent that we ourselves 
become momentarily as graceful or powerful as the film’s body, and 
we leave the theatre feeling invigorated or exhausted, though we 
ourselves have hardly moved a muscle.                   (Barker 2009: 83) 
 
This material foundation of my knowledge of the ‘Other’/film (and of myself) gives, as 
Vivian Sobchack argues, ‘ethical gravity to semiotic and textual production and 
circulation, serving and far too often suffering as their very ground’ (Sobchack 2004: 
187). This is because during the process of empathic immersion and surrender I call into 
question my received notions of things, learning how to understand as opposed to how I 
have been taught I must understand. Surrender is, then, in no way passive, but an 
intuitive state in which established somatic, affective, and cognitive boundaries are 
made permeable. Films that are able to induce this surrender in me are of particular 
interest, because although I never give up my sense of identity in the process of 
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viewing, I am sensuously reminded of just how flexible that identity is. This is why, to 
refer back to Stanley Cavell’s words quoted in the introduction, certain films have 
always taken on such ‘unspeakable importance for me,’ because in relaxing self-
boundaries and self-representations, I not only learn about the world and others, but also 
about myself and the possibilities of who I want to be (1979: 154). Just as each of the 
films I consider involve narratives (whether explicit or not) of surrender, control and 
agency, screendance is a medium through which the viewer can embody these same 
ways of being through mimesis.  
 
Through the films capacity to “manipulate” me materially and politically, and through 
my own embodied/political receptivity, I am thus “produced” by the ‘powerful 
mirroring effect’ of this particular body genre (Gaines 1999: 90). And not only does this 
lead to a self-reflexive, political and ideological engagement with minority/marginalised 
groups and cultures who are given the space in which to ‘“image back,” but it can also 
offer viewers a temporary taste of what it feels like to be a part of something, to be 
connected in an intersubjective relationship. This points to the potential of screendance 
to help galvanise viewing communities, just as we recently witnessed the kinaesthetic 
power of televised sport/movement to shift perceptions about disability during the 2012 
Paralympic Games. So whilst acknowledging that empathy will always be contextual 
and dynamic, and that one’s experience of empathy will not necessarily lead to any kind 
of action, this does support the political implications of a sensuous approach to 
spectatorship. As Jane Gaines writes on political mimesis, such an approach: 
[A]llows us to deal with the wish that images could change the world, 
that bodies on the screen could have their concrete connection with 
bodies in social space, whether these screen bodies are seen as 
performing the ideal or enacting the taboo. Finally, the notion of the 
world and the wide screen as having a “sympathetic” relationship, the 
one with the other, takes us out of the realm of any mechanical, 
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behavioural connection and into the realm of unpredictability, opening up 
the possibility of miraculous transformation.                              (1999: 94) 
 
Having thus explored the immediacy of my own lived body experience of and 
interaction with screendance, and its importance as a political tool in the chapters of this 
thesis, I have come to a better understanding of why I have been drawn to existential 
phenomenology as a method. This sense of surrender has a close connection with what 
Merleau-Ponty refers to as ‘phenomenological reduction’ (1962: xiv). Rejecting 
Husserl’s original transcendental and idealist interpretation, Merleau-Ponty posits that at 
the heart of our intentionality, or our bodily grip and “direction toward” the 
world/things, is the epoché, a methodological principle that brackets our judgements 
concerning the world (of which we can often be unaware) so that we can experience, in 
his own words, the ‘’wonder’ in the face of the world’, which then allows us ‘to respond 
to their call’ (ibid: xiii, 139). On this he writes that: 
[I]n order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, we must break 
with our familiar acceptance of it and, also, from the fact that from this 
break we can learn nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world. 
The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the 
impossibility of a complete reduction. … The philosopher … is a 
perpetual beginner, which means that he takes for granted nothing that 
men, learned or otherwise, believe they know. … Far from being, as has 
been thought, a procedure of idealistic philosophy, phenomenological 
reduction belongs to existential philosophy.                                      (xiv)                                                                
 
In this way, existential phenomenology neither accepts nor rejects but brackets what we 
“know” in order to experience, in this case, film, in the here and now, as it immediately 
appears and “feels” to us. This “surrender” thereby moves away from typification to a 
more complex and richer kind of (contextualised) understanding, creating a space in 
which we can look at the plurality of the world/people/things, as well as from the 
‘Other’s’ point of view. This then relates to our epistemological interest in the world, 
and the moral, political, and aesthetic implications and meanings of this embodied 
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response, which can, in turn, lead to some kind of action and/or change/transformation. 
This potential for corporeal reflexivity thus confirms that the body is never merely 
passive, but has generative potential. Therefore, despite my anxieties concerning the 
interdisciplinarity of my thesis, of circling around the exterior of well-established modes 
of philosophical thought in which I am not grounded, and of philosophy’s reported bias 
towards men, I have found that a phenomenological approach to film shares a feminist 
‘scepticism of all universalising claims,’ and thereby helps to do justice to the 
complexities of the holistic viewing experience (Stanley & Wise 1990: 27). 
 
I have found that for the most part, the meanings that have come from my embodied 
experience have confirmed what I perceive to be the ideological project of the films, 
stressing the importance and effectiveness of, as Vivian Sobchack calls it, ‘the sensual 
thickness of lived experience’ of film (2004: 187). That is except for a contradictory 
gaze in Sally Potter’s The Tango Lesson, which sensually embodies a desiring female 
(and feminist) look, but ultimately reproduces another exploitative structure by 
exoticising its ‘Latin Lover’ object, thereby negating its political and sensual power of 
subversion. And throughout the Hollywood film Black Swan, the affective elements are 
compromised by the ideological elements, which are themselves contradictory. 
Therefore, despite my bodily yielding to its sympathetic and multisensory experience of 
psychosis, its potential to increase embodied and ethical understanding of mental illness 
is undermined by a long (cinematic) history in which female madness has become 
paradigmatic of Woman, and has been both aestheticized and fetishized. At the same 
time, however, the embodied meanings that I take from it resist this ideological 
framework, as my body reads against the grain of my intellect and the film is both a 
progressive and regressive (ethical and political) experience and representation. 
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The relationship between film’s and viewer’s bodies can thus be one of inspiration, 
imitation, and resistance, and the way that our body reads the film’s body is dependent 
upon its specific gestures (which can be “unconscious” or ambiguous as well as 
intended), and the response that these gestures provoke, which are themselves 
dependent upon their context and the viewer’s personal history and identity. Therefore, 
the extent to which our embodied experience of film plays into, confirms, or resists the 
ideological project of the film is complex and multi-layered, and as Jennifer Barker 
asserts, it is only ‘[w]hen viewers and films share certain attitudes, tasks, or situations, 
they will move in similar ways’ (2009: 85). Since one can only “surrender” when there 
is a two-way relationship of trust, it would be interesting for future research to open out 
to ‘Other’ audiences in order to explore how an embodied response intersects with race, 
class, gender and sexual orientation, potentially deepening an understanding of the 
relationship between affective and ideological elements. An audience study could 
provide access to the nuanced (but not unproblematic) insights that can arise from the 
dialogue between different approaches to film. And whilst no single approach can ever 
offer any “truths” of meaning, interpretation, or embodiment, because audiences are not 
a homogenous mass and meaning, interpretation and embodiment will always be 
situated, multiple and shifting, it would be both an interesting and useful tool in further 
exploring the depth of embodied participation and response to screendance, its relation 
to ideology, and its potential to elicit a transformational experience both internally and 
in relation to our perceptions of the world. 
 
To conclude, whilst I agree with Siegfried Kracauer that film engages the viewer 
‘physiologically before he is in a position to respond intellectually,’ eliciting ‘a 
“resonance effect” provoking in the spectator such kinaesthetic responses as muscular 
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reflexes, motor impulses, or the like,’ I could never focus solely upon the meanings that 
are generated through the body (1997: 158). This is because the body is not simply an 
issue in phenomenology and epistemology, but also a theoretical location for debates 
about power and ideology. And as much as I trust in my intuitive bodily response, 
holistic and ethical meaning has to involve stepping outside of this experience in order 
to look at it from different perspectives that you don’t or can’t embody. This is why I 
keep in play “suspicious” readings of screendance as ideology, and have an abiding 
interest and respect for traditions in film studies that have, for the past forty years, 
emphasised the importance of narrative and image as bearers of meaning. A balance 
between different approaches thus produces a more balanced approach to film and to 
“knowing.” 
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